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My dissertation explores the theoretical value of political participation. I argue 
that some acts of political participation, such as abortion escorting, constitute 
“political action” as Hannah Arendt used the term. These acts do not fall under the 
umbrella of either civil society or activism. As such, a more nuanced account of 
political participation is need. This account must include participatory, deliberative, 
and republican ideals, and it must take political action more seriously than the 
predominant procedural, communicative, or economic visions of liberalism currently 
do. Here, abortion escorts exemplify the type of political participation that Hannah 
Arendt argued was missing at Little Rock Central High School during the period of 
integration. Arendt called for citizen escorts during integration, and abortion escorting 
provides a positive example of this behavior today.  
Arendt confessed she was moved to write her essay only from a photograph 
that she saw, and she was criticized for her lack of fieldwork. However, I went into 
  
the field to observe abortion escorting. Moreover, while Arendt’s factual statements 
about integration and American racial politics have been somewhat discredited, I 
argue there are still important theoretical insights in her essay—and in Arendt’s 
theoretical work more broadly—that need resuscitating even if her empirical account 
is troubled at times.  
As such, I use abortion escorts as an example—a means of rescuing Arendt’s 
theory of political action and integrating it into a contemporary body of American 
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You’ve been good to me 
Yes I’ve come to believe 
You’re where I want to be 
You may not be what everybody needs 
But Tennessee 
You’re good enough for me 
 
I can see 
Stars shining in your night 
Your daytime sings 
Like Cash and Patsy Cline 
They may not be what everybody needs 
But they touched my soul 
And that’s good enough for me 
 
You may not be what I will always need 
But I call you home… 
If I can call you home… 
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able to support his dissertation experience as he has mine, though I would highly 
doubt this is possible.  
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on cold mornings when it was too cold, sometimes even despite the warm coffee. I 
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That’s the reason I studied escorts and not protestors. The reason that I study Hannah 
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feeling is wonder. Like Hannah Arendt, I am fascinated, not simply by the intellectual 
challenge of trying to understand politics, but by the wonder of politics. I relate to 
Arendt’s sense of wonder, especially as demonstrated in the wonderful biography of 
Arendt by Elisabeth Young-Bruehl. I consult this book frequently to remind myself 
that a crazy approach to politics can be accepted and celebrated. If this dissertation is 
at times difficult to read or follow, I beg your pardon. I wished to do more than 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
John Dewey wrote that “[t]he idea of democracy is a wider, fuller idea than 
can be exemplified in the state even at its best. To be realized it must affect all modes 
of human association, the family, the school, industry, religion.”1 I submit adding 
“the sidewalks in front of abortion clinics”” to Dewey’s list. A compelling example of 
democratic politics unfolds every Saturday morning outside of abortion clinics. On 
these sidewalks, abortion escorts volunteer to accompany strangers safely into 
abortion clinics while protesters pressure the entrants to turn around. Over cups of 
coffee in the winter and cold drinks in the summer, escorts and protestors engage in a 
contestation that exemplifies the “full idea” of democratic politics that theorists like 
Dewey describe. Abortion escorting embodies the competitive side of democratic 
politics—it is a valuable case study helping us to understand the competitive political 
struggle inherent with living in a plural, political society.  
The abortion-escorting case study exemplifies a particular type of political 
action. Hannah Arendt defines it this way: “To act, in its most general sense, means to 
take an initiative, to begin, to set something in motion.”2 Arendt writes further that, 
“[i]n acting and speaking, men show who they are, reveal actively their unique 
personal identities and thus make their appearance in the human world.”3 Arendt’s 
definition of acting has to take place in the public, because, as Arendt explains, “It 
assures the moral actor that his passing existence and fleeting greatness will never 
                                                
1 John Dewey, The Public & Its Problems (Athens, OH: Ohio University Press, 1954), 144. 
2 Hannah Arendt, The Human Condition (Chicago: University of Chicago, 1998), 177. 




lack the reality that comes from being seen, being heard, and generally appearing 
before an audience of fellow men.”4 Arendt’s understanding of action provides a way 
to understand why people act regarding the public for the public’s sake. Moreover, 
her definition explains why people fight bitterly over abortion in the first place— 
their concerns are related to questions of identity and existence, as well as with the 
moral status of fetuses.5  
Political thinkers articulate varying accounts of political participation, but 
few, if any, have given as comprehensive an account of how political participation 
exists in the public sphere as Hannah Arendt. However, taking Arendt’s ideas of 
participation or the public seriously involves critiquing much of contemporary liberal 
political theory. The democratic theorist engaging in this critique must realize that he 
is not merely criticizing a body of political theory that has been intelligently 
developed and fiercely defended, but one that has also been used as a point of 
reference for explaining other political behaviors. The liberal tradition as it has 
evolved has not only served as a common public philosophy, but, as such, has served 
as the background set of assumptions under which a heavy volume of empirical 
political science research operates. However, contemporary liberal theory tends to 
describe behaviors, and nothing more than behaviors—an approach that is 
problematic because these scholars describe the political world as one without the 
possibility for action. Benjamin Barber derisively calls such liberal accounts, “politics 
                                                
4 Ibid., 198. 
5 See Kristin Luker, Abortion & the Politics of Motherhood, ed. Brian Barry and Samuel L. 
Popkin, California Series on Social Choice and Political Economy (Berkely: University of 
California, 1984), Faye D. Ginsburg, Contested Lives: The Abortion Debate in an American 




as zookeeping.”6  Hannah Arendt’s writings, however, demonstrate the importance of 
public political participation and, here, her ideas are underscored by empirical 
examples of political action like abortion escorting. In short, the “politics as 
zookeeping story” cannot provide an acceptable account of the political world that 
explains abortion escorting. Nor, can liberal theory explain why abortion escorting 
has the characteristics of action as defined by Arendt as, “not only ha[ving] the most 
intimate relationship to the public part of the world common to us all, but [as the] one 
activity which constitutes it.”7 In sum, contemporary political theory is missing some 
pieces in its conception of political practice and the abortion-escorting example 
supports and limits important theoretical and normative claims about civic 
engagement.  
The actions of the abortion escort privileges the liberal-revisionist arguments 
offered by the “republican revival” in contemporary American political theory.8  This 
                                                
6 Benjamin Barber, Strong Democracy (Berkeley: University of California, 1984), 3-25. 
7 Arendt, The Human Condition, 198. 
8 The term “republican revival” comes from S. D. Gerber, "The Republican Revival in 
American Constitutional Theory," Political Research Quarterly 47, no. 4 (1994).  Gerber 
coins the term in a review of the work of Cass Sunstein, Bruce Ackerman, and Frank 
Michelman. Sunstein later wrote a piece entitled, “Beyond the Republican Revival,” 
furthering the use of the term and the discussion in the literature on American Constitutional 
thought, Cass R. Sunstein, "Beyond the Republican Revival," The Yale Law Journal 97, no. 8 
(1988).  Aside from the discussion in the public law community, the “Republican Revival” 
encompasses writings of political theorists such as Hannah Arendt, Richard Dagger, Stephen 
Elkin, Iseult Honohan, Phillip Pettit, J. G. A. Pocock, Micahel Sandel and Quentin Skinner. 
See Hannah Arendt, On Revolution (London: Penguin, 1990), ———, Crises of the Republic 
(San Diego: Harcourt Brace, 1972), Stephen L Elkin, City and Regime in the American 
Republic (Chicago: University of Chicago, 1987), Stephen L. Elkin, Reconsructing the 
Commercial Republic: Constitutional Design after Madison (Chicago and London: 
University of Chicago Press, 2006), Iseult Honohan, Civic Republicanism, ed. Tim Crane and 
Jonathan Wolff, The Problems of Philosophy (Londen: Routledge, 2002), Phillip Pettit, 
Republicanism: A Theory of Freedom and Government (Clarendon, 1999), Philip Pettit, 
"Keeping Republican Freedom Simple: On a Difference with Quentin Skinner," Political 
Theory 30, no. 3 (2002), J. G. A. Pocock, The Machiavellian Moment: Florentine Political 




revival is growing; however, it has yet to develop a full account of its project of 
political imagination. The “republican revival” movement is scattered across 
disciplines and is oftentimes at cross-purposes. It has thus far reached few 
conclusions about its commitments to questions regarding deliberation, epistemology 
and privilege.9 It has had a difficult time piecing together its common cause with 
other liberal critiques, such as postmodernists like Michel Foucault or Chantal 
Mouffe and Ernest Laclau.10   The “republican revival” has unified around the idea 
that standard accounts of political theory disregard what people in this movement 
would call “the public.”  As Bonnie Honig writes, “When Arendt calls for the 
protection of political space, she does so largely out of the conviction that plurality 
and difference (and magnaminity toward them) are the first casualties of the 
displacement of politics and the closure of political space.”11 Studying abortion 
escorts lends credibility to Hannah Arendt’s concern for the relationship between 
action and public space because they show this concern to be both plausible and 
existent.    
 
   
                                                                                                                                      
Press, 1975), Quentin Skinner, Liberty before Liberalism (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1998), Michael Sandel, Democracy's Discontent: America in Search of a Public 
Philosophy (Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1996). 
9 For example, see the debate between Richard Dagger and Michael Sandel on how liberal 
republicanism should be and in what ways in Richard Dagger, "The Sandelian Republic and 
the Encumbered Self," The Review of Politics 61, no. 2 (1999), Michael J. Sandel, 
"Liberalism and Republicanism: Friends or Foes? A Reply to Richard Dagger," The Review 
of Politics 61, no. 2 (1999), Richard Dagger, "Rejoinder to Michael Sandel," The Review of 
Politics 61, no. 2 (1999). 
10 See Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison, trans. Alan Sheridan 
(New York: Vintage Books, 1995), Ernest Laclau and Chantal Mouffe, Hegemony and 
Socialist Strategy: Towards a Radical Democratic Politics (Verso, 2001), Chantal Mouffe, 
The Return of the Political (Verso, 2005). 
11 Bonnie Honig, Political Theory and the Displacement of Politics, ed. William Connolly, 





Civil Society and Activism  
 
Traditional accounts of civil society cannot account for the phenomenon of 
abortion escorting. Many contemporary civil society scholars have diverted their 
attention away from politics’ competitive side. As a result, issues of conflict, power, 
and autonomy—issues that belong in any discussion of political practice—end up 
neglected or ignored by these writers. These writers describe civic associations as 
organs, and so their research asks what the function of these “organs of democracy” 
are—as if “civic life” is to “politics” what the “small intestine” is to a “human being.” 
Nancy Rosenblum labels this view the “transmission belt” view of civil society. 
Those ascribing to the “transmission belt” theory understand civil association as a 
means to an end with positive spillover effects for participating individuals, the 
collective interest of the group, and the public as a whole. This model makes some 
intuitive sense, but Rosenblum argues that this account of civil society is incomplete, 
and more importantly, unproven. Rosenblum notes that these spillover effects from 
participation are presumed “[a]s if we can infer enduring traits from behavior from 
one sphere to another. As if we can infer enduring traits from behavior in a particular 
setting.”12  
Rosenblum’s discontent with the “transmission belt” view leads her, amongst 
others, to raise an important question: if the “transmission belt” view of civil society 
is incorrect, incomplete, or both, then what is the relationship between group 
                                                
12 Nancy Rosenblum, Membership and Morals (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University 




participation and political practice? The answers that Rosenblum and other 
democratic theorists offer are varied, and this piece does not purport to offer a 
detailed explanation of these theories at this time. Importantly however, if we choose 
to doubt the theories that understand civic associations as “organs” or as 
“transmission belts,” then we must view civil society as doing more than merely 
reinforcing values and maximizing public welfare.  
One such “transmission belt” theorist, Mark E. Warren, suggests that our 
understanding of associational life is derived from the answers to two questions: 
“what we should expect associations to do for democracies or why we should expect 
associations to carry out these democratic functions.”13 In these pages, however, I 
examine a specific type of participation, abortion escorting, that reveals the 
shortcomings of these two questions. Abortion escorting is a particular type of 
political volunteerism that is set apart from other types because of the democratic 
functions it facilitates, namely the warding off of mass social pressure and the 
creation of a space that protects law-abidingness and preserves what Arendt and 
Wolin will call proper political space. My interest in abortion escorting is as an 
example of a non-conventional form of political action, and I am not concernced with 
the practice of abortion or the moral debate surrounding the issue. , It is my hope that 
grounding Arendt’s theory of action in a real-life example will lend it more credibility 
and relevance.  
                                                






Just as civil society literature fails to account for behavior like abortion escorting, 
theoretical accounts of activism also fail to explain this type of volunteerism. Unlike 
civil society literature, which frequently runs into the “transmission belt” problem, 
activism literature poses a different problem. Activist scholars define activism as a 
commitment to an “epistemically immodest” position that one militates for and 
cannot be expected to accept reasonable defeat. Critics of activsim, like Robert 
Talisse, question whether organizational power, even in the form of activist 
movements ought to be tolerated if they are merely pushing for a Hobbesian truce 
between powers rather than an exchange of reason.14 The abortion escort, however, 
avoids Talisse’s criticism because the escort is not participating in an organizational 
power. The difference in organizational power between activist movements and 
individual abortion escorts is comparable to the difference between YMCA basketball 
and a neighborhood pick-up game. At its most disparate, the difference can be as 
wide as that between the National Basketball Association and the aforementioned 
neighborhood game.  In sum, because abortion escorts are not part of  larger activist 
movements and organizational powers, standard critiques of activism are inapplicable 
to the work of abortion escorts—abortion escorting does not fall within the standard 
definitions of activism.  
 Abortion escorting can be further distinguished from activism insofar as the 
former can be viewed as part of “the political” whereas the latter is mere “politics.”  
                                                




Sheldon Wolin defines this distinction between “politics” and “the political.”15 Wolin 
notes that “the political” involves the foundational values of any working political 
society whereas “politics” concerns the unceasing conflict over resources once those 
foundational rules for governance have been established.16 Activist movements fight 
over the politics of distribution and recognition. By contrast, abortion escorting 
belongs to “the political.” Abortion escorting helps prevent the intimidation of clinic 
entrants by protestors. Their ultimate goal is to allow nothing more than that those 
wishing to enter the clinic do so. Drawing on her arguments from “Reflections on 
Little Rock,” Hannah Arendt would likely argue that escorts are not engaged in the 
“politics of abortion” or “the politics of motherhood,” but are instead engaged in “the 
political” as they refuse to accept the rule by threat of the mob.17   
Move Over, Harold Lasswell 
Abortion escorting is not just another example of an amorphous “civic 
association” whose specific content is ignored for its perceived utility. Asking stock 
liberal questions such as “does this civic association promote values of toleration?” 
does not provide us with ample means of judging the activity or its value. Instead, the 
abortion escorting case hints that we might live in Dewey’s political world whereby 
“the public consists of all those who are affected by the indirect consequences of 
transactions to such an extent that it is deemed necessary to have those consequences 
                                                
15 Sheldon S. Wolin, "Fugitive Democracy," in Democracy and Difference, ed. Seyla 
Benhabib (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1996). 
16 Ibid, Sheldon Wolin, Politics and Vision, Expanded ed. (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 2004). 
17 See Hannah Arendt, The Human Condition, 1st Edition Paperback ed. (New York: 
Doubleday Anchor Books, 1958), ———, On Violence (San Diego: Harcourt Brace & 




systematically cared for.”18 Benjamin Barber describes this possibility in similar 
terms, as “a rag and bone shop of the practical and the concrete, the everyday and the 
ambiguous, the malleable and the evanescent.”19 In this world, the importance of 
making and following law is of utmost importance, not because the law and the state 
are somehow universally justifiable, but precisely because they are not so. We, as the 
public, are responsible for the constitution of our own society, and not merely players 
in the games of a politics. We care about more than Harold Lasswell’s famous 
definition of politics—“[w]ho gets what, when and how.”20 
Law is the tool by which we negotiate our interactions with each other—we 
agree to act in some cases, and refrain from acting in others. While no doubt those 
who volunteer to escort women into abortion clinics are motivated by their pro-choice 
beliefs,21 primarily their volunteerism upholds and fulfills the spirit of the law. 
Montesquieu noted that it is through this process that our laws are reinforced—
through state policy, culture, habit, environment, and memory22. Abortion escorts 
volunteer to facilitate nothing more than what our current law already permits—that 
anyone who wishes to go to an abortion clinic for consultation or to have a procedure 
performed is allowed to do so. It has become popular to call acts of this nature juris-
                                                
18 Dewey, The Public & Its Problems, 16. 
19 Barber, Strong Democracy, 130. 
20 Harold D. Lasswell, Politics: Who Gets What, When, How (P. Smith, 1950). 
21 The terms “pro-choice” and “pro-life” are labels that are common currency and are often 
used as self-descriptions, it is for these two reasons, and not due to some blissful ignorance of 
how loaded both terms are in their meaning, that I use them in my work. 
22 Montesquieu, The Spirit of the Laws, ed. Anne M. Cohler, Basia C. Miller, and Harold S. 
Stone, Cambridge Texts in the History of Political Thought (Cambridge: Cambridge 




generative,23 but this phrase undercuts the importance of such acts. Political action is 
not simply “law generating,” because “law generating” behavior creates not only law, 
but the laws and the manner in which they are created, obeyed, enforced, lived with, 
etc.  Abortion escorting goes beyond an act of law generation to something which ia 
embedded in a wider web of relationships that constitute world generation.24  
Abortion escorts engage in a quasi-confrontational volunteerism that, from time to 
time, involves incidental physical contact with strangers, and verbal abuse. Moreover, 
escorts are often unable to know if their contribution is making any instrumental 
difference. Both escorts and protestors spend long stretches of their “volunteering 
time” waiting around for something to happen. The idea that people would volunteer 
with various pro-choice causes may not raise any eyebrows, but to choose this 
particular means of participation deserves a serious look. Abortion escorts are not 
merely organs of the broader pro-choice movement. They are citizen-actors whose 
deeds literally shape the political space of their neighborhood sidewalks.   
Most escorts that I talked to are what Putnam would call “joiners.” These 
“joiners” volunteer for lots of different activities, but almost all of them told me that 
clinic escorting was the most satisfying type of volunteer work that they had 
encountered. In fact, many escorts told me that after participating in “clinic defense”25 
                                                
23 Seyla Benhabib, Another Cosmopolitanism, ed. Robert Post (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2006). 
24 Arendt writes, “Living beings, men and animals, are not just in the world, they are of the 
world, and this is precisely because they are subjects and objects—perceiving and being 
perceived—at the same time. Nothing is perhaps more surprising in this world of ours than 
the almost infinite diversity of its appearances, the sheer entertainment value of its views, 
sounds, and smells, something that is hardly ever mentioned by thinkers and philosophers.”  
See Hannah Arendt, "Thinking," in The Life of the Mind (San Diego: Harcourt, 1971), 20. 
25 “Clinic defense” is another term for escorting, since escorting may inadvertently conjure up 




for a sustained period, they became less active in other voluntary associations and 
more active in escorting. In my interviews and field research, escorts reported 
frequently that they derived more satisfaction from abortion escorting than they did 
from other political activist groups. Perhaps this preference can simply be attributed 
to selection bias, as it would make sense that people continue with activities that they 
find satisfying. Nevertheless, escorts describe their satisfaction with the activity in 
ways that reinforce the ideas of civic republicans and participatory democrats.  
A Field Test for a Republicanism with a Participatory Purpose 
In City and Regime, Stephen Elkin argues for a school of thought that believes 
(1) that the study of local politics should be normative, (2) that it should be normative 
not just in an evaluative sense but in a way that pointed to political practice, and (3) 
that this normative focus should chiefly concern the contribution that local political 
institutions could make to a desirable political way of life.26 
 
My work here provides an opportunity to “field test” Professor Elkin’s vision. 
Therefore, my data collection is focused—designed to test the sorts of accepted and 
contested explanations of political practice that I am interested in, and not to amass 
facts and let them “speak for themselves”. To quote Dewey once more, “If one wishes 
to realize the distance which may lie between ‘facts’ and the meaning of facts, let one 
go to the field of social discussion.”27 I take this to mean that empirical analysis is 
uninteresting on its face without the ability to contextualize data in a larger theoretical 
context. On one hand, the importance of context seems obvious, as we would never 
generate research interests if we did not generate theories that were interesting and 
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worthy of testing. On the other hand, context creates serious difficulty for political 
theory, as accounts of political life must draw from an enormously wide array of facts 
and theories that are situated amongst one another in a massively complex manner. 
The array of learning and knowledge that is relevant to political theory’s task is so 
broad, that it is no wonder that Aristotle named the science of politics the “master 
science.”  
There is so much information to incorporate into our broad understandings 
that contextualize political knowledge, that the relationship between fact and theory is 
always one of reflexive uneasiness and uncertainty. One way that political science has 
dealt with this challenge is a compartmentalization of “theorists” and “empiricists” 
that often cuts off avenues of productive conversation and abandons the reality that 
both sides need one another. No one is a “pure empiricist’ or a “pure theorist”, for 
there would be no interest in researching facts without a theoretical sense of why 
learning such a thing would be important in the first place, and there is political 
theory, no matter how “otherworldly” it may seem, that is entirely devoid of appeal to 
fact.  
To the extent then that we proceed with the understanding that theory and fact 
need one another, there are challenges to note before undertaking a project that 
attempts to bring the two together to illuminate the virtues and deficiencies of 
contemporary political theories. Perhaps Thomas Kuhn’s most important contribution 
to method is revealing that the process of integrating facts into a broad theoretical 
context is much more political than most scientists would be willing initially to 




that, “a new scientific truth does not triumph by convincing its opponents and making 
them see the light, but rather because its opponents eventually die and a new 
generation grow up that is familiar with it.”28 Dewey provides further insight by 
noting that some of the facts of the political world are generated by politics, as 
evidenced by when he writes that “[t]he more sincerely we appeal to facts, the greater 
is the importance of the distinction between facts which condition human activity and 
facts which are conditioned by human activity.”29  
Hannah Arendt believes political science commonly fails to distinguish 
between “causes and consequences.”  This tricky relationship, complicated by 
Dewey’s above-cited insight, stems from the fact that “[r]eason’s aversion to 
contingency is very strong”.30 For Arendt, the strong aversion to contingency will be 
a problem because contingency is the result of freedom and action, and thus to devise 
ways to limit contingency is to eliminate action. If a mode of thinking informs our 
action, it tends to over inflate the validity of our perception of the causes and 
consequences, “as in the case of the murderer who says that Mrs. Smith has died and 
then goes and kills her.”31  In this example the intermediary action does not justify the 
prediction, but the example shows the lengths to which people will go to make 
objective statements about the world appear as true.  
For my part, I am taking the observed consequences of a specific form of 
political participation, and I am attempting to evaluate the implications of these 
observed consequences for their usefulness in giving a valued normative account of 
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this particular instance of political practice. Specifically, I have conducted a series of 
interviews and field observations with an eye towards examining how political action 
confirms the practical value of thinking about the political life of citizens. Stephen 
Elkin explains that this political action is, “defined, in part, by the posing of public 
regarding questions to one another.”32 Here, I believe that Elkin’s definitional claim 
works in conjunction with Hannah Arendt’s definition of “freedom.” Arendt does not 
associate freedom as directly related to the faculty of willing, as contemporary liberal 
political theory does. Instead, she treats freedom as a condition—as the very 
possibility that people can act in the world and overcome “the chances that tomorrow 
will be like today [which] are always overwhelming.”33 This sort of understanding of 
political freedom also overlaps, as I will develop more in chapter five, with Phillip 
Pettit’s attempt to revive the non-domination principle of freedom, what he calls 
“freedom as antipower.” 
 The construction of freedom, action, and political life I develop need not be 
complete, for my arguments are not aimed towards creating a counter-ideology. I do 
not seek to overthrow the arguments of those who disagree, but note the possibility 
that the prevalent view on these matters oversimplifies the situation. Arendt’s 
definition of freedom and action is not meant as an overhaul of our semantic 
understandings of all key political terminology, but merely to suggest our 
contemporary conceptions of such things omit part of what such words used to mean 
in a way that described the world in a manner now largely forgotten, but still useful.  
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I explore whether Arendt’s vision of politics, carried on by contemporary theorists 
like Jeffrey Isaac, exists as an alternative merely in thought or in fact. No matter what 
one believes about abortion as a political issue, it should be quite apparent that the 
reason protestors assemble outside of abortion clinics is to coerce by voicing their 
disapproval to those entering the clinic. Some may argue that the protestors are 
raising public questions, and that may very well be so. But, it is the kinds of public 
questions abortion escorts are raising that distinguish them as a unique case of 
inquiry. Abortion escorts are, by nature of the content of their actions, facilitators of 
law abidingness. Mainstream thinkers focus on the “abortion debate” at the expense 
of examining the political action taking place outside the clinics. Inspired by Arendt’s 
theory of action, we can see acts outside of the clinic for what they are. To paraphrase 
Sherlock Holmes, we find it simply because we were looking for it.  
 In other words, abortion escorts are not defending “pro-choice values” as 
much as they are protecting one’s ability to conduct one’s own affairs as protected 
under the law. One escort put it to me this way: “Imagine if you were going to the 
dentist and there were people outside yelling at you as you were trying to go in, you 
wouldn’t allow that!” The escorts’ actions have nothing to do with the issue of 
abortion except abortion serves as the catalyst for the contentious situation. Likewise, 
if the situations were reversed, and the pro-life movement was organizing to protect 
law-abidingness, the study would be no less interesting.  
 I also wish to highlight that simply because I believe the kinds of public 
questions that the presence of abortion escorts raise are more interesting than those 




protestors. The history and mechanics of political protest and protest movements has 
been a long and carefully studied subject, and on this topic I have little new to offer. 
In chapter three, I will trace social activism scholarship’s understanding of its own 
meaning with an eye towards arguing that abortion escorts do not “fit the mold,” so to 
speak. I do not intend for my arguments about social activism’s shortcomings to 
imply that protests are unimportant, only limited. From time to time, the protestors 
may appear as “others” in the story since they oppose those who are the object of my 
study. This view is undertaken merely because I am interested in the political 
questions raised by the actions of abortion escorts and not the types of questions 
raised by the organizations formed by abortion protestors. Protestors have the legal 
right to assemble as they do, and I would not want my work to be misconstrued as 
saying that this is not the case, nor would I wish it were so. As a political theorist, I 
am simply interested in the organizations and activity of escorts and not that of the 
protestors.  
 Abortion is unavoidably an incendiary subject, and I have not intended to 
carry on an argument that weighs the relative ethical implications of legalized 
abortion. I recognize, however, that I am examining the political behavior of a group 
who happen to identify as pro-choice, and that this may give the appearance of 
ideological endorsement. I was surprised, perhaps naively, that the escorts I 
interviewed interpreted my study and interest in their work as an endorsement of their 
political views. All assumed that I was pro-choice. Many assumed that I was a 
member of the Democratic Party, and perhaps most shockingly, all of them seemed to 




 Rather than weigh in on a moral controversy, I am studying a group of people 
involved in a moral controversy. Significant moral controversies generate the spaces 
where political theorists expect participatory action to emerge. I went to the source of 
a moral controversy to see it in action. Further, I would simply draw attention to the 
various attempts of political theory to take the moral question of abortion head on. 
Those who have written on abortion often use it as a testing issue various political 
positions must resolve in order to maintain their credibility.  We see this in the legal 
theory of Lawrence Tribe and Ronald Dworkin,34 the disputes over liberalism and 
religious tolerance between Robert George and Stephen Macedo,35 the attempts at 
comprehensive political theory by John Rawls and Michael Sandel.36  Sandel believes 
he has an answer as to why even Rawls’ Political Liberalism cannot find a way to 
“bracket off” the disagreement when it comes to abortion. Sandel writes, “The moral 
price of political agreement is far higher if abortion is wrong than if it is permissible. 
How reasonable is it to bracket the moral and religious views depends partly on 
which of those views is more plausible.”37 Meanwhile, Bonnie Honig argues that the 
legacy of Roe v. Wade is a lesson in how the law is not enough to foreclose 
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contestation. Honig writes, “In the mistaken belief that the agon had been 
successfully shut down by law, pro-choice citizens ceded the agon to their opponents 
and found, years later, that the terms of the contest had shifted against them.”38  What 
Honig offers as a criticism to all of the commentators cited above, and many more 
who have written similar pieces, is to argue that they have all forgotten about the 
perpetual competition of politics. For Honig, “To affirm the perpetuity of contest is 
not to celebrate a world without points of stabilization; it is to affirm the reality of 
perpetual contest.”39  The relationship of perpetually competitive politics and the 
stability of norms, laws, and common obligations to one another is a theme important 
both to theorists like Hannah Arendt and Sheldon Wolin. Abortion politics, writ large, 
brings out this relationship in sharp relief. 
Politics of Virtue, Politics of Virtù 
Contemporary discussions in democratic theory, civil society literature, as well as 
moral and political philosophy teach us to understand human beings as they find 
themselves in their world. In a fundamental way, there always must be some degree 
of civil society, always some degree of politics, and some occasional space that opens 
up where people can act. As long as human beings live among one another, then what 
we might call the public, the social, and the private all necessarily components of our 
world.40   
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The inevitability of the “social” means that politics, society, and the self, 
while they are malleable, have elements to their character that are, if not fixed, are at 
least given. It also implies that how we change the settings of these three realms 
changes the world we find ourselves “at home” in the same way that building a 
skyscraper on an empty piece of land would do so. What makes the democratic “good 
society” actually good is that it provides the fullest ability to navigate the different 
characteristics of humanity as it finds itself in the world with as close to the 
appropriate amount of prudence and humility as fits human beings, not as they could 
potentially be, but fits them best as they necessarily must be. In particular, they must 
be largely autonomous and always pluralistic.  
Enter the contemporary debates between liberalism and its constructive critics. 
Theorists like Benjamin Barber, Bonnie Honig, Jeffrey Isaac, Hannah Arendt and 
Sheldon Wolin are but a few of the contemporary theorists that have pushed back 
against a worry regarding the perceived “totalizing” nature of mainstream political 
liberal ideology in a way that is attempting to save liberalism’s virtues from its own 
vices. The essence of this critique is that attempts to summarize all of the political 
world under the aegis of liberal political values sells short the autonomy of subjects 
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and the plurality of human life in ways that are detrimental, even though liberalism’s 
primary aim is to protect and nurture those same values.  
 Jeffrey Isaac and Benjamin Barber have both noticed that there is an apparent 
problem with contemporary liberalism’s ability to combat different elements of 
willful zealotry. Despite Francis Fukayama’s musing about the end of ideological 
alternatives to liberal democratic existence following liberalism’s apparent triumph 
over Marxism, Barber and Isaac point to numerous nationalist and religious political 
forces that seem to be gaining momentum rather than losing ground. Isaac writes,  
My prognosis for democracy is not heartening. I do not believe that we have entered 
a dawn of liberal democratic triumph or that antiliberal politics has been 
ideologically vanquished by liberalism, nor do I believe that there exist at present 
either the resources or the political will to strengthen or deepen liberal democratic 
forces or to master our difficulties in any more profound way.41 
 
Isaac’s Democracy in Dark Times raises the possibility that contingencies in political 
behavior in the world change on too small a level for liberal nation-states and their 
institutional arms to deal with many of the “political plagues” running loose in our 
current sate orders. One gets the feeling that Isaac sides with Camus’ character Tarrou 
in his belief that “[o]fficialdom can never cope with something really catastrophic. 
And the remedial measures they think up are hardly adequate for a common cold. If 
we let them carry on like this they’ll soon be dead, and so shall we.”42 In The Plague, 
Camus commonly cites the state of lacking the imagination and the ability to respond 
nimbly to the crisis in Oran. Lt. General Romeo Dallaire’s account of dealing with 
Western governments and the United Nations during the Rwandan genocide eerily 
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mirrors Camus’ fictional account of dealing with officialdom.43 The ideal of perfect 
administration seems quite distant in the context of such stories.     
 Benjamin Barber highlights an aspect of the problem noting that, “[a]lthough 
liberalism has benefited from democracy, it has rarely acknowledged the benefits and 
has generally treated democratic practices (if not also democratic ideas) as 
perilous.”44 Barber argues forcefully that the crises that most threaten the individual’s 
political liberty are “the consequence not of too much democracy and not enough 
liberalism but of too little democracy and too much liberalism.”45 The lesson to take 
from both Barber’s and Isaac’s criticisms is that democratic practice offers a far more 
adaptive and creative means to take on many of the world’s ever-complicated changes 
and challenges than do large legalistic institutional bodies.  
Isaac and Barber seem to agree that democratic practices in the current liberal 
democratic political world are, to use Barber’s term, too “thin”. Isaac talks about this 
in terms of liberalism’s inadvertent closing down of an individual’s ability to “neither 
rule nor be ruled.” He highlights this “thinness” when he discusses the central role 
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that isonomy plays in Arendt’s political theory.46 Thin liberalism unintentionally 
eliminates political space for people to live free isonomically, neither ruling over or 
being ruled, The possibility for appearing before one another as equals becomes less 
of an important quality in one’s daily life the more that the administrative state steps 
in to administer politics on one’s behalf.  
Barber expresses a similar criticism in more systematic terms when he lays 
out the differences between a conception of a “thin” and “strong” democracy. When 
the schema of democratic participation for the citizen is reduced to procedural 
institutional activities, such as voting, then there is an increased reliance on 
considering the citizen as merely a legal person.47 Barber gives the following example 
to illustrate the flattening of democratic political ideals,  
The very term constituent has been transmogrified from a noble word signifying 
constitutional author into a term for voter and thence into an almost derisive synonym 
for client—for the individual whom representatives must please and pacify in order 
to retain their offices. 
 
This patron-client relationship is an institutional relationship between officeholder 
and voter, and not one where “citizens relate to one another as beings equally 
possessed of needs, wants, and limits, who collectively decide on their common 
interest through free and open dialogue.”48     
Judith Shklar’s critique of “legalism” also notes that liberal political theory 
that prioritizes rule following and conceptions of justice. Skhlar notes that, “[a]ll 
politics must be assimilated into the paradigm of just action … for here it is not 
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logical deduction but pure chaos that reigns.”49 Rules are created with the intent that 
they are to be followed, and that in following them, they tend to create predictability 
and desirable ends. The spontaneity and “messiness” of everyday practical political 
engagement frequently leads to layers of complexity in both decision-making and 
outcomes that generally ruins any hope of understanding much of civil society by 
general rules. Shklar writes about the chaotic realm of politics and what legalism is 
doing to it, 
To subdue this irrational political world it becomes all the more necessary to insist on 
a policy of uncompromising rules and rule following. Either rules for their own 
protection must be magically lifted out of politics, or society itself must be made safe 
for justice by imposing a unity upon it, which will make possible a consistent policy 
of justice according to universally accepted rules. The first is the positivist program, 
the second that of natural law.50 
 
This conception of politics often runs into serious trouble in its ability to “recognize 
its real place in it—not above the political world.”51 Shklar’s concern is again echoed 
by Isaac when he writes that, “a good deal of political theory has thus retreated from 
the world of politics altogether.”52 
 Barber, Isaac, and Shklar share an understanding of politics that is not held 
together by some sort of “Newtonian Frame,”53 but that instead tries to understand the 
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messy exchanges of political practice and harness the energy of such practices. 
Machiavelli wrote in The Prince that as a rule, a wise prince always arms his subjects 
“for by arming them, these arms become your own.”54 In a similar vein, the tools of 
democratic power are best put in the hands of the people, as it is the best way to 
create loyal partisans for democracy. There is a growing sense in democratic theory 
that the more that centralization and bureaucracy govern the everyday lives of 
citizens, the less likely liberal democratic societies will be capable of fighting off 
great challenges because the citizenry will be largely inert political subjects.  
 Bonnie Honig distinguishes between this participatory brand of democratic 
politics from more systematic constructions by distinguishing between what she calls 
the politics of virtue as opposed to the politics of virtù. Honig calls the politics of 
virtue those positions that share the “assumption that success lies in the elimination 
from a regime of dissonance, resistance, conflict, or struggle.”55  Practically all 
formulations of civil society also share in the same assumptions. Even scholarship on 
activism, which might seem to e engaged in the type of perpetual politics that Honig 
is interested in, ends up ultimately as part of the “politics of virtue.” This is because 
activists and activism scholars are still committed to the idea that there task is “to 
resolve institutional questions, to get politics right, over, and done with, to free 
modern subjects and their sets of arrangements of political conflict and instability.”56 
 The politics of virtù, by contrast, believes “that every politics has its 
remainders, that resistances are engendered by every settlement, even by those that 
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are relatively enabling or empowering.”57 The politics of abortion, and the 
disagreement that leaves reasonable liberals at wit’s end, appears to be such a 
remainder of our systematic politics. Rather than forcing a settlement through law, 
which it has already been noted that Honig thinks is impossible, and rather than 
thinking the gathering of protestors and escorts is failure of politics, Honig’s 
compelling perspective is to suggest that we develop an understanding that this is a 
critical component of how politics gets done. 
Politics Without Resolution 
 Many scholars believe that the values of being active and willful defenders of 
democracy and liberalism are protected and exercised through citizen’s joining a 
variety of groups. The goods that flow from these associations range from an 
increased tolerance and respect for others to more tangible public goods like 
decreased crime rates. Accounts of civil society celebrate the lessons of community 
and diversity that can be learned and in turn proclaim that good civil associations help 
the state attain its goals. However, the picture of citizen participation is not entirely a 
cheery one. Civic engagement entails grappling with groups that are intolerant and 
hostile to others, liberal democracy, or both. Some civic groups are not very good at 
“bridging” across to others with points of view hostile towards their own. Is this 
necessarily a bad thing? Outside the abortion clinic, democratic partisans take to the 
streets on both sides. One side assembles to protest the law, the other side to help 
facilitate it. Boundaries of acceptable behavior are drawn and occasionally fudged, 
but at the end of the day contention and coexistence usually carry the day.  
                                                




The scene above can only be explained as an example of citizens realizing 
their democratic power “against the grain” of a continued deracination of liberal 
democratic politics. Crowds of protestors assembled to protest the IMF, the World 
Bank, or the invasion of Iraq by the United States and her allies are ineffectual in 
reaching those with the ability to actually make policy changes on such subjects. The 
continuation of these movements, in spite of their futility, suggests that these 
movements are engaged in a different kind of political project than abortion escorts. 
Mass protests seek to petition officialdom, claiming their citizen status as clients who 
are unhappy with their patrons. Instead, abortion escorts and protestors are acting out 
as citizens with a source of self-sovereignty and flexing real power to shape the 
dynamic of a political situation.  
Abortion escorts, volunteers whose organization consists of little more than an 
email list, participate to engage in action that is agonistic by its nature. The escorts’ 
political participation is necessarily confrontational in nature, and portrays a 
participation in civil society that sounds less like coming together to build “social 
capital” and more like the fractious politics of Madison’s Federalist Paper writings.58 
Robert Putnam’s Bowling Alone argues that maintaining America’s social networks 
and cooperative civic-mindedness is important because “our schools and 
neighborhoods don’t work so well when community bonds slacken, that our 
economy, our democracy and even our health and happiness depend on adequate 
stocks of social capital.”59 Such claims may be empirically justifiable, but they are 
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also generic to the extent that the goods are uncontroversial and the means by which 
the goods are achieved are not specified.  
Putnam’s work, Rawl’s political theory, and civil society authors who stand 
for some sort of liberal egalitarianism prioritize a commitment to standards of justice 
and equality aimed at divining a polity that negotiates the priorities of liberty and 
equality. However, on issues of genuine political conflict, particularly on issues 
where one group is likely to win absolutely or lose absolutely, these scholars appear 
to have faith that their rules will somehow be the final appeal. As William Galston 
notes, liberty and equality form a tension and, “it is not possible to establish a 
generally valid lexical ordering between them.”60 The tensions between liberty and 
equality promote certain types of conflicts in and of themselves. Many attempts to 
promote values of equality are seen as claims that come at the cost of someone else’s 
liberty, and vice versa. Furthermore, the promotion of “value pluralism” is supposed 
to create an environment in which individuals are free to cultivate their own particular 
point of view, and that these varieties of point of view are supposed to overlap with 
alternatives to the point where reasonable discussion is still possible. In practice, 
when it comes to maintaining a reasonable society of diverse opinions, it has been 
difficult to keep the lid on opinions developed that are hostile to all other points of 
view.  
The switch from reasonable pluralism to unreasonable pluralism requires only 
that some group obtain a temporary advantage. Will Kymlicka writes “many liberal 
egalitarians hoped that conflicts between state and civil society would be limited and 
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temporary. However it is now clear that this was too optimistic.”61 It is at times 
difficult to tell whether or not diversity of opinions matter so long as certain people 
want things and will go to great lengths to get them at the expense of others. 
Liberalism, by itself, cannot negotiate the challenges this problem presents. 
 The importance of understanding concepts of civil society in relation to 
abortion escorting relates to an observation by Warren, who writes, “[T]he forces and 
capacities distinctive of the state are increasingly overlaid by numerous other forces 
and contingencies, so much so that the terrain of politics is no longer focused solely 
by state-centered institutions, organizations, and movements.”62 The more that these 
“forces and contingencies” alter the terrain of politics and, perhaps more to the point, 
alter our ability to understand this terrain, the more difficult it becomes to navigate 
politics. In practical reality, there is an ongoing negotiation of power that occurs once 
individuals engage in activities that spill out into the world and affect one another.  
 A question arises—how are supposedly “free and equal” citizens to cope with 
this ever-changing terrain of the political world where authority is located in nebulous 
or contestable hands? Civic association has been the long-storied answer, but the 
answers here are varied and carry with them some legitimate doubts regarding their 
explanatory power. Both the aims and the practical advantage of civil association 
appear suspect.  
 Nancy Rosenblum challenges what she calls the “Logic of Congruence” that 
exists in much civil society literature. Rosenblum wonders if the values learned in 
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civic associations are necessarily carried outside of their respective associations and 
into more general democratic practice. Furthermore, she wonders whether or not it is 
feasible to suspect that what makes one successful in associational life necessarily 
will be the values one would want spilling outside of the organization anyway. In 
other words, the concern Rosenblum is raising here is that overlapping consensus 
may not be overlapping at all when people form ties in civil association. Rosenblum 
writes that associations “fail to serve moral development if they cannot create the 
conditions for effective rules and roles and settled expectations.”63 Rosenblum 
describes a liberal standard of moral development that sees, as Rawls and Putnam 
both seem to see, civil associations as practice grounds where one cultivates the 
habits of being governed effectively by a liberal regime.  
Furthermore, to say as Stephen Holmes does, “A liberal nation is a nation 
which keeps the worthier aims of liberalism steadily in view”64 is not particularly 
illuminating when groups can stake out a place to defy liberal expectancy and 
exercise various sorts of authority in a variety of societal domains. As a group, 
abortion protestors are not engaging in reasonable pluralism, but instead a form of 
intimidation by which they mean to scare people away from clinics with the reminder 
that “God is watching them.” Their threat is reinforced by the more concrete reality 
that even if God is not watching, the protestors themselves certainly are. Abortion 
escorts “push back” against this group leverage, and there is, in its own special sort of 
way, an enforced equilibrium between the two. The equilibrium has little to do with 
mutual respect, toleration, overlapping consensus, or any other of the “liberal 
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expectancies” from civil society, and much more to do with simply the limits each 
side reaches with what they can practically get away with in the presence of the other 
side.  
Abortion is an issue that is of moral and political relevance to many 
Americans, most of whom frequently appeared divided primarily by nothing more 
than commitments to slogans and cliché. While this divide may give classical liberals 
heartache, there is much more behind the commitments to pro-choice and pro-life 
positions than the stock arguments for one side or the other. Kristen Luker’s Abortion 
and the Politics of Motherhood explains that doctors who were eager to form 
professional associations that would distinguish medically credible physicians from 
others first politicized abortion in the mid-nineteenth century. Luker emphasizes, “[i]t 
is in the context of this drive for professionalization that the political activity of 
American physicians against abortion must be understood.”65 In its contemporary 
context, abortion activists still view the issue as emblematic of  their larger political 
agenda. Faye Ginsburg’s interviews found many contemporary pro-life activists who 
believe that legalized abortion is “a sign of growing narcissism in American society, 
symbolize by the unwillingness of women to carry an unwanted pregnancy to term.”66 
For those in favor of legalized abortions, Luker gives the following overview: 
If the first abortion controversy was a reaction to the declining economic value of 
large families to nineteenth-century Americans, then the second abortion controversy 
can be seen as a reaction of the increasing economic cost of children to women in the 
twentieth century. When women wanted control over their own bodies, they wanted 
control over the number, and more important, the timing of their births because an 
untimely or unintended birth could have dramatic consequences for their lives.67 
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In short, to say that abortion is simply a disagreement over moral and political points 
of view seems to minimize the account of this disagreement. Acting upon the world 
changes its conditions for others. Ultimately, abortion is not only a battle over ideas; 
it is a battle for terrain. How we practice and govern such battles may say as much or 
more about our polity than do our ideals.  
Proceeding Chapters 
 
Chapter two argues that abortion escorting does not fit into the standard 
accounts of civil society, and thus explores alternative ways to understand its 
significance. Chapter two argues that civil society scholarship is an important, but 
limited line of inquiry into the workings of the political world. Further, the 
assumption (which I argue is a false one) that abortion escorts are part of civil society 
reveals that civil society does not justify comprehensive “thin democracy” liberal 
doctrines, as most civil society theorists quite casually assume they do. Much civil 
society literature focuses on the beneficial value of developing norms and values in 
accordance with the principles of “tolerance” and “overlapping consensus,” concepts 
most famously explained in the works of John Rawls.68 Rawls’ theories on liberty and 
equality, according to William Galston, “are the defining features of the citizens 
whose agreement is required to constitute a stable, well ordered society.”69 Instead, I 
argue that this view of civil-society-theory-as-comprehensive-doctrine fails because 
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one can look at abortion escorts as an example that such accounts are, in fact, not 
comprehensive. In short, a model of liberalism as the public philosophy with civil 
society as a theory of liberal practice is not a description of the political world that 
could credibly called complete, precise, or accurate. The chapter concludes arguing 
that in order to explain abortion escorting, one is better off using the language of 
republicanism.  
Chapter three makes a similar argument, but uses the example of abortion 
escorting to reveal the limitations of activism scholarship when it places its narrow 
empirical research in the context of a “transmission belt,” “thin,” “politics of virtue,” 
etc., vision of democratic politics. This critique is not intended to marginalize the 
importance and relevance of social movement, protest, and contentious politics 
research.  Scholars who work on such subjects hold an important place in 
contemporary scholarship in describing the behaviors of activist movements with 
increasing clarity.70 Nevertheless, the normative implications of their descriptions as a 
complete one of political practice, or as a complete description in combination with 
civil society, are problematic. While the above-mentioned sociologists do not 
explicitly integrate their work into a broader conception of the political, Iris Marion 
Young tried to make this integrative move. Her work and the criticisms following it 
demonstrate her difficulty in creating a cohesive story while linking deliberative 
virtues to epistemic virtues. As David Estlund, Cheryl Misak, and Robert Talisse 
highlight, she is unable to reconcile the value of communicating together with the 
object of communicating together. Finally, the chapter concludes arguing that s 
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where neither civil society nor activism explain  the significance of abortion 
escorting, neither can then claim individually, nor taken together, to be a complete 
account of meaningful political activity.  
 Chapter four argues that where “thin democracy” theories cannot explain 
abortion escorting, we must turn to Arendt for answers. Arendt gives us a simple 
explanation for our troubles in the first two chapters—the “thin” accounts of human 
behavior do not adequately explain the acts of abortion escorts because behavior is 
not the same as action. Arendt elaborates her view in The Human Condition, On 
Revoultion, and On Violence. She specifically tried to ground her ideas in the real 
world in “Reflections on Little Rock,” “Lying in Politics,” and of course, Eichmann 
in Jerusalem.  
Some of Arendt’s commentary in these essays has proven incorrect. As a 
result, political thinkers have drawn away from her theoretical work. In chapter four, I 
set out to rescue some of Arendt’s theoretical work and demonstrate its ability to 
explain and help us understand the importance of the political participation that the 
abortion escorts undertake. While Arendt may have made flawed comments in both 
Eichmann and “Reflections on Little Rock,” chapter four focuses on Arendt’s 
theoretical work.  
In “Reflections on Little Rock,” Arendt wonders why no one in Little Rock 
saw it as their responsibility, as a law-abiding citizen, to walk African American 
children to school so as not to subject them to an angry mob alone. Arendt refuses to 
believe that our potential for political engagement has been reduced to the “passive 




have dismissed Arendt’s thoughts here as ridiculous. They wonder why regular 
citizens would want to stick their neck out to help others and stand up to the pressure 
of a mob of protestors. While this seems to be a compelling objection, it cannot 
explain the existence of abortion escorts.  
Arendt’s thoughts on Little Rock also call for basic decency in the face of 
psychological pressure that disrupts political freedom. Liberalism acknowledges the 
potential power available from the psychological element in making order out of free 
citizens. Hobbes’s Leviathan regime is founded upon the idea that a fear of grim and 
untimely death will compel all to join a monarchy that will protect them. John Stuart 
Mill and Alexis De Tocqueville famously wrote about the dangers of mass public 
opinion, with Mill writing that the “demand that all other people shall resemble 
ourselves grows by what it feeds on.”71Hannah Arendt’s theory of action, ad her 
criticism of both “the mob” in the form of segregationist protestors and the 
administration of force by Federal troops is meant to serve as a call to action that 
resists the growth of society. In both the power of society and of the administrative 
state is there the dangerous tendency for each to “grow by what it feeds on,” and in 
the process, to swallow up the particulars that Arendt claims to be at stake when 
human beings do politics. Arendt’s claim is one that appears to be verified by the 
deeds of abortion escorts. 
Chapter five advocates bringing political action back into our understanding 
of the constitution of good political regimes. Hannah Arendt argues in the Origins of 
Totalitarianism that the imperialist ethos of Western Europe “boomeranged” back 
                                                




around into the ethos of Europe itself in the form of totalitarian ideology.72  Arendt 
makes the case that a constitution of political regimes that turns its back on the 
importance of action completely and pretends that there is only behavior likewise 
“boomerangs” back in ways that are damaging to the fundamental relationships of 
human association that we found meaningful enough to care for governance in the 
first place. Likewise, the contrary is also true. A society that provides space for 
political action, even on the smallest scale, reminds citizens of their power, and of the 
virtue of living in an isonomic polity, one where they “rule and are ruled in return.” 
This effect has the potential to positively “boomerang” all the way through the 
constitution of the polity.  
In chapter five, I try to offer the case for why abortion escorting privileges an 
account of the meaningfulness of politics on a local, participatory level because if its 
ability to disclose ourselves as meaningful, individual human beings. I advance the 
idea that Abortion escorting is a type of political action that reinforces to Phillip 
Pettit’s notion of “freedom as antipower,” and supports Sheldon Wolin’s account of 
“fugitive democracy,” the idea that true democracy is spontaneous, episodic, 
participatory in nature and concerned with “one’s stake in public happiness.”73  
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Finally, I highlight the importance of episodic acts that reinforce citizen’s 
stake in “the political”74 by asking what life would look like without political action. 
This chapter explores Arendt’s discussion of thoughtlessness, and both hers and 
Wolin’s development of theories of organizational power first worked through by the 
likes of Max Weber and Robert Michels.75 The fears expressed by Arendt and Wolin 
reveal what is at stake in maintaining the isonomic status of participatory citizens. 
Arendt calls this “the twofold gift of freedom and action.”76 This chapter concludes 
with a new narrative—one that ties the work of Arednt, Barber, Elkin, Isaac, Pettit, 
Sandel, and Wolin together with the political practice of abortion escorts. There is a 
relationship between citizen and the state that we ignore at our own peril … and in the 
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Chapter 2: The Limits of Civil Society 
 
When I started researching abortion escorting and political participation, one 
of my first experiences in the field was going to observe a Washington, D.C. abortion 
clinic on the anniversary of the Roe v. Wade decision. It was, in almost every way, an 
exaggeration of what it is actually like outside of this abortion clinic on most 
Saturday mornings. On this morning at the clinic, there was an uninterrupted row of 
people lining the sidewalk the entire length of the property on the street and all along 
the walkway leading into the clinic. The crowd mostly consisted of protestors, but 
there was an escort clad in an orange penny every so often, spaced out one for every 
few protestors along the line to ensure a consistent presence. Two tall chain-link 
fences on both sides of the walkway closed off the grass on the property. They 
formed two large square metal cages in which nothing was contained, but pushed all 
those who were outside of them up against its perimeter.  
When I arrived that morning, the escorts who were designated the site 
captains77 for the day welcomed me and generously gave me a spot to observe near 
the door. This allowed me to be where most of the action was and made it appear as if 
I was just a “site observer,” someone brought in by either the protestors or the escorts 
to document possible inappropriate behavior by the other side. The presence of these 
observers was rare, but not unheard of. However, the Roe v. Wade anniversary was an 
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exceptional weekend on the calendar, and so I could stand outside the site with a 
notebook and no one would really be all that surprised or feel the need to bother me 
with questions.  
As I stood there trying to take notes while the snow fell, a young girl was told 
to stand beside me to my left on the fence line. I would guess that she was about 
fifteen years in age. There was a man with a black beret coordinating the protestors’ 
efforts—he told her to stand there next to me. He was constantly on his cell phone 
getting information and giving out instructions and he was coordinating the actions of 
the protestors carefully. He seemed in constant conversation about how many more 
people were coming and when, and he even gave instructions as to who was to hold 
what signs and where.  
This girl he placed to my left came in with a small group, one that seemed of 
some importance by the way in which the man with the black beret greeted the person 
who was leading this group. Handshakes were exchanged and then a spot was cleared 
right next to me: at the good spot, where all the action is. This girl got right into 
things and started by saying a prayer or two. Then she started rocking back and forth, 
as she prayed. At first, I thought that this motion must have been due to the cold, but 
as she continued praying she started to rock faster and faster until suddenly she burst 
into tears. She was bawling. She went on like this for a good long time, crying and 
asking quite loudly, through sobs and sniffles, “oh why Jesus?  Jesus pray for us.”  
After about forty-five minutes of this at a consistent rate, she cried more quietly and 




was not that she had become bored with standing out there, but instead it seemed 
much more likely that she had simply exhausted herself with grief.  
The incongruence between such scenes out in the real world and the highly 
formalized accounts of civil society (what it is and what it does), seems to me to be 
quite striking. Politics cannot only at times be “messy,” as Judith Shklar said: it can 
be utterly bizarre.  Theories of democracy and civil society are supposed to clarify 
this “messiness” by providing a comprehensible analysis of political realities within 
some type of generalized understanding. The stories we tell about political behavior 
on a generalized level are supposed to be in a continuously reciprocal relationship 
with the realities that they explain, so that the push is towards an understanding of the 
world made more accurate. Doing so and translating it into a generalized 
understanding hopefully creates better sources of political judgment that guide our 
actions in the particulars of the world of politics. Volunteer abortion escorting casts 
some of these political stories, particularly many procedural and deliberative accounts 
of political behavior, as at best incomplete accounts because they do not seem to be 
entirely useful perspectives for completely understanding the form and substance of 
the type of political jostling that takes place between parties outside of the abortion 
clinic.    
 Civil society can explain why someone might act the way that his young 
woman did outside of the abortion clinic, and many accounts of civil society (and 
activism for that matter – more on this later) would take special notice of how 
choreographed the whole clinic protest seemed to be, replete with cameras, 




note that this crying person was likely strategically placed to take advantage of her 
wailing tendencies. Where civil society seems to run into trouble, though, is when we 
try to consider that this young woman actually genuinely felt the tears that she shed. 
Regardless of the external manipulation of the situation by others, I feel quite 
comfortable in saying that this fellow citizen rocking back-and-forth next to me 
seemed quite pained by, what was for her, the great injustice of the world. Not only 
this, but in the face of such wailing… nothing changed. Escorts kept their places, 
protestors continued their chants and songs of protest (with all due respect to 
Catholicism, I never want to hear “Ave Maria” ever again), and no one spoke to this 
young woman78 nor did she to anyone else. There was nothing deliberative about this 
gathering of people on the Roe v. Wade anniversary: there was nothing deliberative, 
not much that could be said to be economic, and not much that we could call a 
combination of the two. When such gatherings emerge, the reaction of civil society 
paradigms is to identify such scenes as “problems.”  For such approaches to politics, 
the problems in question appear to be the rare place where communication, 
reasonable pluralism, solidarity, or whatever grand principle one believes can actually 
unite everyone behind the same common cause enough to treat others with due 
respect, break down. This approach is misleading because it appears that contestation 
over political differences are frequent occurrences. There is also good reason to 
believe that they are not even problems. 
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Two Views of Civil Society 
 
Civil society is generally thought of as valuable to democratic theorists for 
one of two general reasons. The first of these general reasons is the idea that there is 
something useful about civic participation. The second reason usually boils down to 
some claim that civic association is a good in itself because it is more like a mode of 
being than it is a thing. This first reason can be further broken down into the kinds of 
goods that democratic theorists believe flow from civil association. Civil society 
scholars value different goods differently, but despite these differences, they all can 
be held to be in loose agreement about the statement, “civil association is good for 
something.” 
The second reason to value civil society understands civil society as part of 
being and is necessary condition in the fullness of human life. If man is, as Aristotle 
claims, a political animal, than the point of civil society is not as means to lower rates 
of burglary, but to serve as a habitat where humans can be humans. Hannah Arendt 
writes about this as “the human condition of plurality… the fact that men, not Man, 
live on the earth and inhabit the world.”79 This sentiment is an example of 
interpreting civil association as something born out of the natural fact that human 
beings find themselves in contact with one another.  While they may have different 
views of how this necessity comes to be and what such necessity may entail, all who 
share this view of civil society agree that some necessity brings people together in 
civil society. In other words, the case need not be made for civil society, because civil 
society is unavoidable once we have multiple and unique human beings.  
                                                




The view of civil society here is not one of treating civil association as a tool 
that gives us other benefits, but to see it as part of the “home” in which human beings 
unavoidably reside. A belief that there is something fundamental, unavoidable, and 
negotiable in civil society that is important to understand beyond its mere use-value is 
a key difference between this approach to civil society and functionalist views. 
Whereas functionalists are going to speak in a language regarding the benefits of civil 
society as if we each choose or do not choose civic engagement, this second view, 
which we might call a conditional view, is going to emphasize the realities, duties, 
and conflicts that the unavoidability of civil society asserts upon us.          
 The examples that the political acts of abortion escorts and the type of 
resistance that they face provides strong evidence that the first version of civil 
society, the functionalist version of civil society, is a far less compelling account than 
the second, conditional account. The functionalist view is forced to either omit or 
discount certain elements of the story of abortion escorts in order to fit it within its 
comprehensive political vision, or else it is forced to throw its hands up in the air and 
label such a scene a “tragedy.”  While the functionalist view struggles with the 
conflict between abortion escorts and protestors, the view of civil society as part a 
necessary condition of human life anticipates such action as both possible and 
desirable. The idea that civil society as a place where we are at home with doing 
politics as free and equal persons is able to construct an interpretative framework, 
that, unlike functionalist civil society, “supports a conception of democracy under 
which contestability takes the place usually given to consent.”80    
                                                




Three Functionalist Views of Civil Society 
The functionalist view of Civil Society can be roughly subdivided into three 
different categories: economic, quasi-economic, and deliberative. Economic 
functionalism assumes that the value of participation is for the maximization of some 
perceived benefit for the individual who is participating in the group. Thus, civil 
society is subject to the same types of behaviors and collective action problems that 
one encounters in markets. Quasi-economic functionalism attempts to split the 
difference between deliberative functionalism and economic functionalism by arguing 
that civil society has the anarchic power structure of the free market but provides the 
public goods that economic markets cannot because of civil society’s natural 
deliberative character. Finally, deliberative functionalism claims that civil society is 
valuable because the natural byproduct of civil association is a fully inclusive and 
strongly deliberative democratic society that allows for a full public conversation 
even in the political framework of a representative government.  
Economic Functionalism 
The chorus of voices that sing in unified opposition to strictly economic models of 
democratic participation is so vocal and numerous, that it is of little benefit to present 
a particularly thorough outline of the who’s and why’s of such opposition here. Seyla 
Benhabib covers the most generalized form of this criticism when she writes that it is 
a “methodological fiction” for economic models of political behavior to assume “an 
individual with an ordered set of coherent preferences.”81  Jon Elster echoes a similar 
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concern when he writes “the task of politics is not only to eliminate efficiency, but 
also to create justice – a goal to which the aggregation of prepolitical preferences is a 
quite incongruous means.”82  These comments hit upon a difference between 
deliberative democratic functionalists who are going to take issue with what types of 
political goods are being facilitated through democratic participation in general, and 
through a means like civil association in particular.  
 In regards to abortion escorting as a particular case, it is certainly conceivable 
that some imaginative person could develop an economic model that explains why 
escorts would organize and volunteer their time. However, the facts of the case seem 
more sympathetic to arguments like Elster’s and Benhabib’s insofar as, at least on 
some level, what is happening outside of the abortion clinic is a competition between 
competing visions of ideals on visions of justice, morals, and the good life. Even if 
conflicts in views on justice, morals, and the good life are ultimately going to be 
conflicts that are tied in with interests and power, there still appears to be a much 
more complicated story at work than mere social choice problems. When one scans 
the pages of Dennis C. Mueller or Mancur Olsen, it is hard to recall anything that 
even remotely resembles an explanation for the young lady bawling at my side on the 
Roe v. Wade anniversary.  
 This is perhaps, in part, because of the fact that the economic view of civil 
society is that, “Society represented not only a spontaneous and self-adjusting order, 
but a condition untroubled by the presence of authority.”83  Such a view attempts to 
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make civil society a sphere of aggregation without reference to a good beyond the 
product of what the aggregation of individual choices select. As such, “qualities of 
social action—absence of authority, spontaneousness, and the tendency toward self-
adjustment—were taken to mean that social action lacked the characteristic element 
of political action, the necessity to resort to power.”84  In contrast to this view, power 
seems to be very much “in play” with regards to the contestation between abortion 
escorts and protestors.  
 Given the problems cited above with economic functionalism, it is not exactly 
a comprehensive view of civil society that is in fashion. However, there is much 
about the economic account that it is tempting to maintain, for as much as it may be a 
“methodological fiction” to argue that values are best described by preference 
aggregation, the descriptive power of economic modeling is still too good for many 
civil society theorists to pass up on altogether. Elster may indeed be correct that 
justice is a value that trumps efficiency. Nevertheless, the genius of Robert Putnam’s 
studies on civil society is the way that he tries to combine the two values rather than 
have them in opposition.  For Putnam, the function of civil society for the state is 
going to lie in the fact that it facilitates justice efficiently, and thus he tries to have the 
best of both worlds. Putnam claims the values of the deliberative functionalist and the 
economic functionalist together in one model.    
Quasi-Economic Functionalism 
 
Robert Putnam’s Bowling Alone represents perhaps the most comprehensive 
approach to talking about civil society in terms of quasi-economic functionalism. In 





Bowling Alone, Putnam employs the phrase “social capital,” which he uses as term to 
define the general byproduct of association. Mass social energy generates this 
measure of social productivity, whose utility increases with increased participation. 
The continuation of this accumulation of this capital creates specific observable 
byproducts, such as reductions in crime for socially engaged communities85.  
Putnam’s account suggests that civil society is not an inherent good, but a good 
because of the demonstrable public goods which flow from it.  However, this 
distinction gets messy in arguments like Putnam’s because his account of civil society 
is one in which the byproducts of association are almost unfailingly positive. Putnam, 
and civil society theorists like him, link participatory value in such a tight causal 
relationship with the goods that flow from them that they, if successful, reduce the 
difference between those who value the functionalism of civil society as opposed to 
those who value the participation in civil society to a chicken-or-egg question. This 
would render the distinction between the two views, remarkably, meaningless if 
Putnam were able to pull it off. However, it is difficult to believe that Putnam has 
actually argued successfully on this count.   
  The bold functionalist stroke Putnam makes is using the term “social capital” 
to understand what flows from civic participation through a single unit of 
measurement. We may question whether Putnam’s attempt to unify all possible 
different types of use-value created by civic association under one term ultimately 
succeeds. Putnam’s task is a difficult one even in the framework of his own creation, 
much less as a more general empirical claim.  Putnam himself is not entirely faithful 
to this unitary measure when he splits this single unit early on in his work into 
                                                




bridging and bonding social capital. Putnam defines bonding social capital as “inward 
looking” and bridging social capital as “outward looking.” Where one seeks to unify 
internal linkages, the other tends to cross boundaries and cut down the distances 
between internally formed identities.86  It is not clear whether these sub-units have 
enough in common that they can be recombined into a more generalized unit called 
“social capital” in any type of meaningful way. Nevertheless, Putnam’s efforts 
exemplify the functionalist understanding of civil society in its simplest form. 
Putnam’s argument could not be more straightforward in this regard. Civil society is a 
good thing because it produces public goods that are useful to society and these goods 
are derived from civic engagement.  
The manner by which civil society manifests itself, who directly commands 
this tool, and how much leverage one who commands has at aiming it at what he or 
she sees fit is not really provided in Putnam’s account. Take, for example, Putnam’s 
data and interpretation about the relationship between social capital and pugnacity 
(via the survey responses to “I’d do better than average in a fist fight”87). Putnam 
writes, “citizens in states characterized by low levels of social capital are readier for a 
fight (perhaps because they need to be), and they are predisposed to mayhem.”88 
Here, Putnam looks at the results from survey data and jumps to an enormous amount 
of speculative value claims.  
Leaving aside possible methodological questions we could ask about the 
correlation between the “fist fight” survey and actual mayhem, there is an implied 
normative claim to consider. It is not entirely clear why the goal of having a social 
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order that is docile is somehow automatically preferable to having individuals who 
may see themselves as rugged, tenacious, and self-reliant. Putnam’s description of 
building social capital assumes that this is some sort of natural process, and then 
further assumes that this process is somehow benevolent. Putnam shows his cards 
with regard to this view when he writes things like, “Henry Ward Beecher’s advice a 
century ago to ‘multiply picnics’ is not entirely ridiculous today. We should do this, 
ironically, not because it will be good for America – though it will be – but because it 
will be good for us.”89   
Uneasiness with this theory about “the power of picnics” is not difficult to 
find. The possibility and promise of promoting tranquility in the state to the extent 
that Putnam seems to be reaching for meets resistance from numerous commentaries. 
Machiavelli writes in Book IX of The Prince that “a prince cannot base himself on 
what he sees in quiet times, when everyone has need of the state; for then every one is 
full of promises and each one is ready to die for him when death is far off.”90  The 
promises at picnics that Putnam is looking for may resemble the promises in 
peacetime that Machiavelli cautions us about placing too much faith in. Montesquieu 
wondered, “[d]oes not the greatness of genius consist rather in knowing in which 
cases there must be uniformity and in which differences?”91  When he wonders this, 
he is wondering it from the point of view not of the participatory citizen subject, but 
that of the maker of law, one who is granted authority and charged with managing the 
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order and chaos of political life directly, and not leaving it to fall out as the 
byproducts of something like civic engagement.  
A defender of Putnam might respond that characterizing his view of civil 
society as static is unfair because the very thing that Putnam promotes is increased 
activity and participation in civil society, and this certainly is a fair point. However, it 
appears a strikingly difficult challenge to uphold the point of view that Putnam can be 
for a massive increase in political interaction and identify the byproduct of this 
increased activity as just a lump of public goods that generally improves the 
disposition and quality of life of everyone. Since at least Hobbes, major strains of 
political theory have been constructed around the idea that political problems occur 
precisely when people come into contact with one another, and the more frequent 
they come into contact, the more likely they are going to find competing needs and 
differences in points of view.  
To his credit, Putnam does raise the question “Is social capital at war with 
liberty and tolerance?”92  Putnam’s answer to all of these challenges is that it is a 
deficit of “bridging” social capital, capital that reaches across groups, that is 
ultimately the culprit. He writes “for our biggest collective problems we need 
precisely the sort of bridging social capital that is toughest to create.”93  But this is a 
fallback position that is in many ways anti-political as it assumes that the process of 
reaching out will cure all and no political actors need to be specifically identified as 
necessary to use force to carry the day. The passivity of Putnam’s sentences in this 
section of his book betrays his inability to put his suggestions in a context of political 
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action. We can spot the problem by sampling Putnam’s grammar, “What if we need 
to choose,” “our biggest collective problems,” “[f]rom a collective point of view,” 
and “[h]ere a little ‘familism’…”. None of these sentences introduce subjects that are 
capable of acting upon Putnam’s political designs. This seems to imply that surrender 
to the process of increasing social capital need only be rightly understood in order to 
work, and that we need not ask any questions about the role of power and authority in 
regulating civil society’s condition.  
This observation makes the social capital analogy that Putnam uses to 
describe social engagement a much tighter analogy to its economic counterpart, for 
Putnam appears to be making a Nozickian ultra-minimalist move by making the 
realm of social capital essentially anarchic.94  Putnam’s game is then to provide the 
public goods that an ultra-minimalism cannot deliver on through state institutions 
(because that would be coercion, and for the ultra-minimalist, coercion is bad) simply 
through creating a separate market. Rather than the “parallel polis,” Putnam makes a 
“parallel economy” that can provide many of the public goods that economic markets 
to fail to deliver while pretending that coercion by the state can still be avoided.95  
This is what makes Putnam’s functionalism a “quasi-economic” one, for he is trying 
to keep his hands in both the economic and deliberative cookie jars at the same time. 
To show that Putnam’s ambition is emblematic of a wider array of civil 
society thought, consider that Mark Warren describes his vision of civil association as 
follows: “Associations promise other ways of getting things done, from supporting 
public spheres and providing representation to cultivating the virtues of citizens and 
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providing alternative forms of governance.”96  Warren makes this underlying 
approach to civil society even more explicit when he writes, “associations formed for 
a variety of goods and purposes may serve democratic goods and purposes as well.”97  
Both Warren and Putnam believe that we should see a ring of Tocquevillian 
familiarity in their conceptions of civil society. Warren writes, “The message handed 
down from Tocqueville is that social integration through associations is necessary for 
democratic institutions to work.”98   But we should pause to notice a discernable 
difference between Tocqueville’s “art of association” and the associative models 
presented by the likes of Putnam and Warren. Whereas Tocqueville seems quite 
aware of the many different coercive factors that go into the body politic, Warren and 
Putnam are trying to place the rational, liberal individual into a model of civil society 
that can properly run itself through decentralized individual participation as long as 
its value is properly understood by participants. This logically sound but realistically 
narrow conception of the participatory market falls victim to the same attack that 
Barber levies at the Nozick’s conception of the economic market. Namely, that both 
are,  
a utopia:  an argument which stands quite literally, nowhere and – like those haunted 
concrete bridges that can be found at abandoned highway projects – soars from 
midair chasm to midair chasm, a magnificent abstraction going from nowhere to 
nowhere, its dignity forever a prisoner of its uselessness.99 
 
It is utopian because “rule by no one” is an impossibility given the relationships of 
power and authority that naturally form between individuals. Michel Foucault’s 
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search for the deep foundational roots of power and the technologies which facilitate 
it serve as a profound example of why this type of anarchistic theorizing is dangerous. 
For example, in Discipline and Punish, Foucault writes that disciplinary power,  
is exercised through its invisibility, at the same time it imposes on those whom it 
subjects a principle of compulsory visibility. In discipline, it is the subjects who have 
to be seen. Their visibility assures the hold of power that is exercised over them.100 
 
If Foucault is correct, then quasi-economic models of civil association are risky 
ventures. Participants in civil society make themselves visible and reveal themselves 
(and thus expose themselves) to various forms of coercive power. This problem is, as 
Foucault notes in the above quotation, especially real when the sources of power are 
invisible or unclear. This presents a critical question to this view of civil society: what 
if this system does not reduce the influence and reach of political power as much as it 
obscures its sources and purposes?  This question presents us with a real danger to 
read into the subject-less explanation of civil society that we get from the likes of 
Warren and Putnam.  
Early theorists of civil association, like Tocqueville, were much more 
cognizant of this difference, and he makes this clear in his discussions of “democratic 
despotism”. Sheldon Wolin noted that Tocqueville was interested in repressing 
democracy by means of giving the demos a place in government, but not the authority 
to rule.101  This can be attributed to the disciplinary power that Tocqueville could see 
was quite strong in the demos. He writes,  
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In America the majority draws a formidable circle around thought. Inside those 
limits, the writer is free; but unhappiness awaits him if he dares to leave them… 
Everything is refused him, even glory. Before publishing his opinions, he believed he 
had partisans; it seems to him that he no longer has any now that that he has 
uncovered himself to all; for those who blame him express themselves openly, and 
those who think like him, without having his courage, keep silent and move away. He 
yields, he finally bends under the effort of each day and returns to silence as if he felt 
some remorse for having spoken the truth.102 
 
Here, Tocqueville sounds much more like Foucault than he does Warren, and the 
behavior of abortion escorts and protestors seems to be much more consistent with 
this more “Foucaltian” part of Tocqueville. One of the primary political moments that 
arises between escorts and protestors is essentially a pitch battle over the state of 
mind of those individuals who have chosen to visit the clinic. One escort told a story 
at a training session about how he witnessed one protestor who had followed a 
woman towards the door, leaning in close to her face and talking loudly and quickly 
at her and not waiting for her to respond to his questions. She appeared to feel 
overwhelmed and turn and left before ever getting to the door. The protestor then 
pulled out his cell phone, dialed a number, and triumphantly exclaimed, “I just saved 
a baby!”   
 This type of political engagement seems to appear as problematic for models 
of civil society that look like Putnam’s. Consider Putnam’s analysis of busing 
programs to forcibly integrate certain schools. Putnam writes,  
Proponents of busing believed that only through racially integrated schools could 
America ever generate sufficient social capital… across the racial divide. Opponents 
of busing replied that in most parts of America, neighborhood schools provided a 
unique site for building social capital…The deepest tragedy of the busing controversy 
is that both sides were probably right.103 
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Putnam does not really address the fact that when political disagreements have this 
type of dynamic, the situation is often only resolved through some employment of 
coercive forces. This takes us out of some deliberative mechanism where we may 
target our best efforts at “getting it right” and into a realm where we are simply trying 
to get our way in the face of others that we cannot convince and who are equally 
intent on getting their way.  
 We can see this as the central dynamic in abortion escorting. Perhaps it is a 
deep tragedy that we cannot rule that one view or another regarding abortion is the 
“correct” opinion,104 or that there is at least some political stance that the state should 
reasonably hold with regard to the issue. More to the point is that in the absence of 
being able to collectively carve out such political views, a transition takes place from 
talking and thinking to doing. This doing does not take on the properties of activity in 
Putnam’s general description, where a rising tide of political action seems to raise the 
social welfare of all boats. Action in this instance comes in the form of privileging 
certain conceptions of what is good for some at the cost of others. On issues like 
having an abortion, or busing a child into a different school, the competing ideas may 
be held as each intellectually powerful, but in the realm of reality, it is sometimes the 
case that there can be only one winner. The man who proclaimed “I just saved a 
baby” did not reason that woman out of an abortion, and his statement shows his 
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interest was in something much more specific and more tangible than simply making 
a minor discursive breakthrough in the marketplace of ideas.  
Deliberative Functionalism 
Another common view of the good that flows from civil society relates to the 
infrastructural importance of civil society to solidifying visions of (usually 
deliberative) democratic theory in way that solves many practical questions. In such 
cases, civil society is often portrayed as a “black box” into which many practical 
challenges that models of democracy face get sent into and subsequently never return 
back from. In some ways, that makes this type of theorizing the strange opposite of 
Putnam, who seems to send social capital into the “black box” of politics from which 
the results seem to spring magically outwards from. Seyla Benhabib uses civil society 
as a rather general justification for the practicality of deliberative democracy in 
modern politics: 
Nonetheless the reason why a deliberative and proceduralist model of democracy 
does not need to operate with the fiction of a general deliberative assembly is that the 
procedural specifications of this model privilege a plurality of modes of association 
in which all affected can have the right to articulate their point of view. These can 
range from political parties, to citizens’ initiatives, to social movements, to voluntary 
associations, to conscious-raising groups, and the like.105 
 
Benhabib uses the vast social exchange that she would have us believe takes place on 
the level of civil association to serve the purposes of mass deliberation. This 
conveniently eliminates the need for her to formally structure any type of mass 
deliberative institution or mechanism in order to facilitate her vision of deliberative 
democracy. In this same essay, her next statement is italicized to drive the point 
                                                




home, “It is through the interlocking net of these multiple forms of associations, 
networks, and organizations that an anonymous ‘public conversation’ results.”106   
 Benhabib’s claims raise two points of discussion. First, there is concern about 
how much and how effective a deliberative dialogue takes place in this “interlocking 
net” of civil association. Secondly, Benhabib’s conception raises doubts about how 
complete a treatment of the relationship between civil society and democracy her 
vision can provide. On both points, the example of abortion escorting helps 
practically navigate some of these claims a little bit easier than critically reading the 
literature alone can offer. The political activity of abortion escorts reveals that the 
mass anonymous public discussion does not feel so anonymous for those who dare to 
step out in defiance of commonly held views, and they reveal, once again, that it is 
the result of contestation, and not communication that describes the primary plot 
points of the story.  
With regard to the scope and effectiveness of Benhabib’s public conversation, 
there are questions that have been raised about how “interlocking” this interlocking 
net of relationships truly is, and what complications this may create for the models of 
democracy that assume that the interconnectivity is strong enough to support their 
claims of a functional model. Also, there are concerns that we can generally describe 
as “interfacing” concerns in having civil society fulfill some sort of mass deliberative 
purpose. These interfacing problems include problems with groups whose purpose is 
to reinforce ideas that are not up for discussion, problems of membership and 
psychological need, and problems with the variance in sophistication of the various 
parties in the “mass conversation.”  We have already mentioned how Robert Putnam 
                                                




breaks his findings on social capital down into issues of “bridging” and “bonding” 
social capital. Putnam believes that both types can be found in the world of civil 
society and that furthermore, “some kinds of bonding social capital may discourage 
the formation of bridging social capital and vice versa.”107  Given that some bonding 
social capital may potentially preclude the ability to bridge across certain groups, the 
interlocking network of public discussion that Benhabib envisions may actually be a 
set of partially, but not sufficiently overlapping group networks. If this is so, then it 
implies that large pockets of people in civil society may form in virtual isolation from 
other such pockets.  
Nancy Rosenblum writes in Membership and Morals that types of 
associations can be formed so that they do not “bridge” across to other types of 
people, and she further notes that groups have fought many controversial legal battles 
to explicitly prevent this bridging. Take a legal case that Rosenblum cites to support 
this claim, Corporation of Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-
Day Saints v. Amos. In the Amos case, a janitor was fired from a non-profit Mormon 
gym because he had not kept with the tenets of the Mormon faith. Rosenblum notes 
that the district court “found the Desert Gymnasium indistinguishable from any other 
health club operated for profit, and the janitor’s job similar to jobs in those 
facilities.”108  The Supreme Court overturned the lower court ruling on the grounds 
that, as Rosenblum writes, “any risk of having to demonstrate the religious nature of 
any activity would effect the groups ongoing ‘self-definition’, and is too risky.”109  
This grants organizations broad powers of self-definition through the exclusion of 
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those who they define as dissimilar. Regardless of the legal value of the opinion, it 
seems to countermand in practice what many deliberative democrats assume ought to 
be happening.  
Rosenblum’s examples get even more anti-foundational for deliberative 
democracy than this when she discusses the large numbers of cults, racist, sexist, and 
anti-liberal paramilitary and political organizations whose collective purpose is to 
advocate an active disdain for “the other” that scholars like Jürgen Habermas and 
John Rawls are trying so hard to forcibly include. While democratic theorists of this 
sort try to come to terms with “the fact of pluralism,” there exist a wide variety of 
groups that simply do not wish to play along. Rosenblum notes that, “there is an 
incredible array of hate groups and objects: rabid lesbian feminists, ‘men’s liberation’ 
groups, racist-environmental groups, even an organization of homosexual Nazis.”110  
While Habermas concludes, “Hence the public use of reason, legally institutionalized 
in the democratic process, provides the key for guaranteeing equal freedoms”111, 
Rosenblum warns  
Romantic militarism thrives on the discipline and homoeroticism of a military-style 
brotherhood; hate groups exhibit their superiority and loathing and are prepared at 
least for violence; separatist communities must defend themselves from hostile 
outsiders and millenarians must prepare for the final conflict and triumph.112 
 
Such anti-foundational views and tactics, whether reasonably or unreasonably held, 
present a tremendous difficulty for a liberal deliberative politics that organizes itself 
towards accommodation of private values and equal access into the public for all. The 
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types of groups that Rosenblum is describing would take advantage of such 
accommodations and mutual respect for the purposes of undermining and destroying 
it.  
More generally, this view of politics gets forced to make difficult choices 
about who is even allowed into the public conversation. If it can be established that 
there are those with fundamentalist convictions strong enough to willfully ignore all 
attempts to rationally persuade them that they are wrong, and who stay in the public 
conversation only to try to persuade others, then the fundamental assumptions of 
deliberative theory are called into question. This exemplifies another important part 
of this discussion; one that relates to the problems of creating a deliberative model 
where people engage one another communicatively as reasonable equals. There are 
legitimate questions as to whether the assumption that either deliberations amongst 
equals or rational deliberations can form coherent long-term institutional 
expectations. These two problems listed above echo Jon Elster’s comment, “that even 
in the good society, should we hit upon it, the process of rational discussion could be 
fragile, and vulnerable to adaptive preferences, conformity, wishful thinking and the 
like.”113  This is to say that, even if the problems of making civil association more 
“bridging” than “bonding” were to be addressed, there are still persistent challenges 
to precisely how democratic such deliberation would be in terms of either being 
democratic in and of itself or good for democratic government. William Galston 
writes 
On the practical level, very few individuals will come to embrace the core 
commitments of liberal society through a process of rational inquiry. If children are 
to be brought to accept these comments as valid and binding, it can only be through a 
                                                




pedagogy that is far more rhetorical than rational. For example, rigorous historical 
research will almost certainly vindicate complex ‘revisionist’ accounts of key figures 
in American history. Civic education, however, requires a more noble, moralizing 
history: a pantheon of heroes who confer legitimacy on central institutions and 
constitute worthy bodies of emulation. It is unrealistic to believe that more than a few 
adult citizens of liberal societies will ever move beyond the kind of civic 
commitment engendered by such a pedagogy.114 
 
This quote recommends quite a bit about the limitations of being able to deliberate as 
equals. One of these limitations is that it suggests that civic education is going to be 
constrained by the practical necessity of securing complicity from most citizens 
through the use of “magnificent myths” which only a few will be able to move 
beyond and maintain an allegiance to the body politic for more complex and 
principled motives. This begs the question as to how deliberation between the 
enlightened few and the enchanted many is supposed to work.  
 This also speaks to one of the concerns that Elster has about the value of 
deliberative unanimity, which “were it to be realized, might be due to conformity 
rather than to rational agreement.”115  The quotation by Galston from above indicates 
that civic conformity can be manufactured in much of the populous for the purposes 
of practical necessity, and there are echoes of Walter Lippman in Galston’s 
understanding of how education engenders a civic appreciation. Those who see civil 
society as a space where the public conversation takes place in a deliberative 
democratic model in some form or another seems to be ignorant, at least in part and 
perhaps willfully so, of Lippman’s claim 
The creation of consent is not a new art. It is a very old one which was supposed to 
have died out with the appearance of democracy. But it has not died out. It has, in 
fact, improved enormously in technic, because it is now based in analysis rather than 
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on rule of thumb. And so, as a result of psychological research, coupled with the 
means of modern communication, the practice of democracy has turned a corner.116 
 
A significant problem emerges from the “manufacture of consent”. The problem 
relates back to Galston’s claim that it is difficult if not utterly unrealistic to expect 
that most democratic citizens will be able to answer such attempts to manufacture 
consent. At least not with enough sophistication to see their way through. Citiznes are 
not likely to be even willing to accept sophisticated critiques of such manufacturing 
leveled by others who appeal to them for support or understanding.  
 Abortion escorting lends itself as a relevant case in talking about this account 
of the relationship of civil society to public discourse and its criticisms. There is not 
much going on in particular between escorts and protestors that could be thought of as 
deliberative in the ways that the likes of Benhabib, Habermas, and Manin use the 
term. I have attended a couple of the workshops that escort groups put on to teach the 
new volunteers. While it is made clear that communication is not expressly forbidden 
between escorts and protestors, new escorts are told they do not have to talk to the 
other side. It is mentioned that conversation can help “rehumanize” the other side in 
yours and their eyes, however it is also stressed that talking can potentially escalate a 
situation.  It is suggested that one’s political views on abortion and abortion related 
issues are exactly the sorts of things that is best for one not to talk about with their 
opposite numbers.  
 The veteran escorts, I have noticed, push this advice as far as they can. 
Perhaps it is because they have more experience in knowing the consequences of such 
statements, but the veteran escorts oftentimes like to talk quite loudly about politics. 
                                                




They would sometimes solicit my opinion, and rather than remain silent, I would try 
to respond in benign factual claims. If someone would ask me about Catholicism, I 
would try to reply somewhat blandly with some phrase such as “You know Augustine 
wrote…”  These neutral facts would quickly get twisted, again, usually at a volume 
enough that those protestors not preoccupied by reading the rosary, praying out loud, 
or singing “Ave Maria” would be able to hear them.  
One escort wondered out loud to me once why anyone would want to be 
Catholic. I informed him that many members of my extended family were in fact, 
Irish-Catholic. Rather than backpedal, he asked, again in loud amazement, “and 
you’re okay with that?”  I responded with some attempted witticism about all of the 
standing and sitting one has to do at a Catholic wedding, but even this seemingly 
harmless joke was taken by a couple of the escorts to be evidence of why religious 
beliefs are “stupid”.  
 At this point I should note that I have encountered and talked with escorts who 
in fact are religious, and in fact, one of the site captains who volunteers at that 
particular clinic also comes from a Catholic family background (though she was not 
there that morning). The point was not really that the escorts were trying to make 
truth claims with any sort of accuracy when they would say things like this. Instead, 
they were employing communication in ways that are borderline nightmarish for the 
likes of Benhabib or Gutmann and Thompson. Political conversations amongst 
escorts tend to serve three purposes. The first thing to note is that it serves as a means 




happening. The protestors sing quite a bit to serve this end, but for everyone else who 
is listening, this is generally not a pleasant way to experience time passing.  
Conversation serves not only as a diversion, but it also serves as a sort of mini 
internal pep-rally for their political views. Most escorts beliefs fall under what we 
would call the “political left” in America. I have asked many escorts that I have 
interviewed if they knew of anyone who was pro life that volunteered as an escort and 
the general response was to look at me as if I was crazy for asking such a thing. Most 
escorts appear to see eye to eye on most political issues, and they often use talking to 
one another as a means to reinforce their political opinions and also as a means of 
validating their resolve for standing outside for six hours on a Saturday morning. 
Whereas Gutmann and Thompson argue that deliberation “can help participants 
recognize the moral merit in their opponents’ claims when those claims have 
merit”117, the internal and partisan self-validation that flows from these conversations 
amongst the escorts tends to have the opposite effect inasmuch as it is to provide 
reassurance in political conviction through an expression of solidarity.      
 The other purpose of conversation, and again, this is particularly a tool of the 
well-practiced abortion escorts, is to try to get under the skin of the protestors by 
talking loudly about political opinions that they know are at least moderately 
offensive to their opposite numbers. This is why outlandish proclamations about 
religion are boldly expressed within earshot of the protestors and also why other 
escorts who may be offended by such statements in another setting do not even raise 
an eyebrow in this one. 
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Abortion escorts often have a couple of different motives for using these 
conversations for irritating protestors. Sometimes these conversations are meant to 
serve the same purpose as “trash talk” does in sports. Abortion escorts and protestors 
fight a non-contact (mostly) battle for physical positioning near the patient as they 
walk towards the clinic, and to some extent, it is a game of skill to get to the optimum 
positions around a person entering the clinic before someone else does. Once 
someone is in position, one cannot impede their natural forward progress down a 
public sidewalk because that is against the law. So, like in many sports, once in a 
certain position one is entitled to a certain amount of space that no one else can 
violate without committing a foul. This early positioning becomes important for the 
success or failure of a protestor getting access to someone entering the clinic. When 
the escorts execute perfectly, the protestors get essentially shut out of any chance of 
reasonably direct contact. Because this is so important, the last thirty minutes of 
escort trainings often resemble sports teams practicing various plays and formations. 
It also implies that any verbal jabs that can get inside the head of one’s opposites, like 
in a sporting event, can maybe, just maybe make them a half step slower and gain the 
other side one extra little slight advantage in doing their job.  
 Another motive is born out of what we might call a perverse sense of 
reciprocity. From the escorts’ perspective, they must endure the songs, prayers, 
pamphlets and general proselytizing of the abortion protestors week in and week out. 
Loud statements regarding their own political views, some escorts have told me, 
strikes them as simply giving the escorts “a taste of their own medicine”. This motive 




same protests over and over again, week in and week out, for up to six hours at a 
time. It indicates that the protestors are able to get under the skin of the escorts from 
time to time as well. I have been told that it does not take long to find the “n 
hundredth” time one has heard “Ave Maria” sung off key more than a little irritating 
to listen to. Escorts often look to irritate without escalating the situation in return. 
It should be noted that none of these motives look at all like a goal “to 
promote mutually respectful processes of decision making”, which is a goal that 
Gutmann and Thompson specifically relate to the political issue of abortion in its 
practical significance.118  Mutual respect is supposed to flow from deliberative 
processes because of how controversially irreconcilable moral views of abortion 
appear to be to so many people. However, whatever political friendship exists 
between the two sides that meet outside of the abortion clinic, it exists out of the 
mutual understanding of what it means to volunteer and to be out there in those 
conditions. It does not in the slightest way appear to stem from enlightened discourse 
with one another.  
As for communication with those trying to gain access to the clinic, the 
communication again serves largely strategic ends. For the escorts, the goal is to 
provide comfort, support and solidarity.  Escorts are also encouraged, as one training 
document suggests, to “[t]alk to a patient as a distraction, when appropriate.”119  This 
document further recommends that an escort should  
Avoid asking for personal information and posing insensitive questions, i.e. asking 
‘how are you?’ if the patient is visibly upset. Good topics include: the weather and 
the trip to the clinic; telling a patient that she doesn’t have to listen/talk to the antis; 
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reassuring the patient that the clinic is open; urging the patient to keep walking 
forward when the door is only ‘x’ feet away120 
 
The protestors try to get in close to the patient, hand pamphlets to the patients, and 
talk fast. The pitches I have heard made by protestors and the pamphlets that I have 
recovered reveal a “good cop/bad cop” routine within the appeals of the protestors. 
On the one hand, protestors try to communicate help, comfort and alternatives. On the 
other hand, they also try to push their moral position that abortion is murder. The 
former takes the form of offering places for the mother to go and the possibility of 
adoption or ways to afford raising the child at home through various public and 
private assistance programs. Pamphlets offer such statements like “Maybe YOUR 
child will grow up to find the cure for HIV or cancer,” or promising that certain 
volunteer agencies are “a network of love” and “a refuge from the storm.”121  On the 
other hand, protestors also sometimes suggest that God will exact revenge upon those 
who get abortions. Pamphlets, sometimes the same ones that have the softer message, 
often contain pictures of aborted fetuses, and generally, they tend to opt for the 
pictures that show fetuses covered in as many bodily fluids as possible for maximal 
dramatic effect. It is unclear where discussion crosses the line between rational and 
irrational, but one suspects that it is not genuine persuasion that is invoked when one 
gives a person a picture of fetuses covered in blood while they nervously wait in the 
sitting room of a clinic.  
 The “soft message” portion is also an example of where communicative value 
seems to break down. Again, the escort training document offers this advice regarding 
the pamphlets, “If the patient has accepted a pamphlet from the antis, advise her that 
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its information is unlikely to be medically accurate and offer to dispose of it for 
her.”122  I had more than one interviewee suggest to me that it is not just that the facts 
regarding abortion that are misstated in the pamphlets, but that it was their impression 
that the offers of help and support are actually disingenuous. They claimed that the 
protestors simply want to turn people away from the clinic and that these offers of 
help are an enticement to do so and nothing more.  When I asked escorts what made 
them believe this, rather than source this claim empirically, they all opted for 
explaining the logic of why this made sense to them that this was what the protestors 
were doing. In other words, they created a logic that satisfied themselves, and thus 
looked no further.   
So, as for communication with patients is concerned, one side must make 
quick, “sloganized” banal statements because their audience affords them little time 
to do much more while the other side talks deliberately about banal topics for the 
purposes of creating a comforting “white noise” to make it harder for the protestors to 
be heard. Banal forms of dialogue are usually judged based on their content, and in 
turn judged to show a type of political thoughtlessness. In particular, political theory 
tends to still grapple with these types of “banalities” in terms Arendt’s evaluation of 
Adolph Eichmann, and the relationship between thoughtless statements, thoughtless 
deeds and how they come to service mass inhumanity.123 In this case however, seeing 
the banal forms of dialogue outside of the abortion clinic in this way misses a critical 
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point: that abortion escorting is a realm where action triumphs over articulation. This 
brand of civil association is contentious, tactical, and about force and power in very 
real ways. It does not require participants to have detailed understandings and 
articulate explanations because the adversaries involved do not engage one another on 
such grounds.  
 If we return to Galston’s claim about how surface-level stories satisfy most 
people about being secure about acting upon their convictions, we seem to find a 
suitable home for this concern outside of the abortion clinic. Individuals only need to 
know enough to be out there to act. Once they arrive, they will find plenty of 
reinforcement for their previous held views through activities of support by peers and 
resistance by opposites that seems to reinforce rather than bridge. Thus, a situation 
that appears intractable in terms of public opinion opens up the possibilities of 
political action. In this particular case, political action tends to boil down into nothing 
more than various attempts to intimidate people so that they do not want to go into 
abortion clinic and attempts to make people feel safe and supported as they enter and 
exit the premises.  
Civil Society as a Necessary Condition 
There is an argument that is usually thrown into almost any defense of a 
particular model or type of model of deliberative democracy or civil society: 
“Model/theory x is not perfect, but consider the alternatives.”  This argument is 
usually made in a way that follow the logic through to the exclusion of all such 
alternatives and thus favors model/theory x. In thinking of civil society as a necessary 




exclusion of all the earlier models of civil association and democratic practice. 
Instead, I have attempted to consistently carve out a position that something is clearly 
missing in these earlier views. I have also advanced the position that abortion 
escorting serves as an example of what that hole looks like and why it is important.  
 Civil society as a necessary condition holds that the “fact of pluralism” is an 
important statement about the reality of the world that human beings find themselves 
inhabiting. What separates it from deliberative models that take the fact of pluralism 
seriously is that civil society as a necessary condition places a greater emphasis on 
pluralism leading to conflict in political moments rather than just conflicts in political 
values. These conflicts in political moments are situations in which political events 
turn in one direction or another based upon action as much as on reason. Thus, issues 
of reasonable and even unreasonable disagreement are contentious not simply as 
ideas but because the manner by which these issues play out in the real world is going 
to be subject to actual contestation. Benhabib makes this distinction herself when she 
says that she departs from the likes of Arnedt, Barber, Connolly, and Mouffe because 
she is interested in “closely tying normative foundations of democratic legitimacy to a 
general moral theory based on a discursive model of validity.”124 
 Here there is particular interest in Benhabib’s difference of opinion with 
Barber and Arendt, who exemplify the idea of civil society as a necessary condition. 
Benhabib writes on Arendt that her “political philosophy is ultimately rooted in her 
‘phenomenological essentialism,’ and cannot clarify the normative foundations of 
democratic politics.”125  About Benjamin Barber’s Strong Democracy, she makes the 
                                                





claim that it is “like Hannah Arendt’s, based on an opposition between moral theory 
and political philosophy that is conceptually overdrawn and politically unrealistic.”126   
 This critique helps bring out the difference between thinking of civil society 
from a functionalist perspective and civil society as a necessary condition. Arendt and 
Barber’s take on civil society cannot clarify “the normative foundations of democratic 
politics” because they do not advocate understanding politics through a set of 
unchanging normative foundations. The “phenomenological essentialism” of Arendt 
is a commitment to thinking about politics as a relationship to necessity as it imposes 
itself upon human beings in the form of reality. When Arendt writes about the events 
that lead to the signing of the Mayflower Compact, she argues it was signed because 
“they obviously feared the so-called state of nature, the untrod wilderness, unlimited 
by any boundary, as well as the unlimited initiative of men bound by no law.”127  
 Benjamin Barber’s strong democracy is “particularly sensitive to the element 
of necessity in public choice” in a similar manner to Arendt’s view “because it is 
rooted in participatory action and in a keen sense of the public character of 
politics.”128  Both of these views share a participationist commitment that “sees 
power as inevitable.”129  The general argument that both Barber and Arendt represent 
on behalf of views of civil society as a necessary condition is that politics involves 
many changing things in nature, some man made, some not, some within the control 
of human beings and some out of control. This presents a view of politics that is 
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inherently dynamic and will be virtually impossible to reconcile with political views 
that aim at more formalistic philosophical foundations.  
In this regard, the charge of “unrealistic” can be hurled in either direction 
between deliberative and participatory democrats. The difference that I would suggest 
here is that abortion escorting serves as a clear example that Benhabib’s claims that 
Barber and Arendt’s foundations for politics are “unrealistic” appears to be incorrect. 
This is not to say that there may not be troublesome or unrealistic parts of the work of 
Barber, Arendt, or even other similar projects in various facets of their construction. 
However, in this instance, it is clear that Benhabib is criticizing the fundamental, 
foundational values of this approach. For her audience to find her own project 
persuasive, she has to do this. If the fundamental statements about politics put 
forward by Arendt and Barber are convincing, it leads scholars to depart from the 
deliberative view on these critical issues, as Jeffrey Isaac does in Democracy in Dark 
Times. He issues the following critique of the deliberative approach, “they 
overemphasize the democratic potential of a politics rooted in civil society, and 
underemphasize the challenges posed to democracy by the cross-purposes and 
antagonisms that are endemic to social life.”130  While Isaac claims “close affinities” 
to Habermas, Benhabib, Cohen and Arato, his criticism cited above is an indication of 
a major break away from their theoretical approach and towards the approach of the 
likes of Arendt and Barber.131    
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John Rawls correctly characterizes the viewpoint of civil society as a 
necessary condition even as he criticizes it as a “fundamental opposition” to 
functionalist views. Rawls writes, 
For as a form of Aristotelianism, it is sometimes stated as the view that man is a 
social, even political, animal whose essential nature is most fully realized in a 
democratic society in which there is widespread and vigorous participation in 
political life. Participation is not encouraged as necessary for the protection of basic 
liberties of democratic citizenship, and as in itself one form of good among others, 
however important for many persons. Rather, taking part in democratic politics is 
seen as the privileged locus of the good life. It is a return to giving a central place to 
what Constant called the ‘liberties of the ancients’ and has all the defects of that.132 
 
Rawls rejects this description of civil society as a necessary condition by saying that 
it will only be true for some that they will “find their most important good in political 
life.”133 Rawls believes that the belief in the fundamental importance of thinking of 
civil society as a place where action takes place is insufficient to be assigned priority 
because only some and not all value it. As will be discussed in the activism chapter, 
there is reason to believe that Rawls’ criticism here is an example of him trying “to 
have it both ways.” Rawls claims that he can accommodate a different fundamentalist 
view of the public good under a thin, functionalist view of liberal politics while at the 
same time denying the legitimacy of the ground that this fundamental commitment is 
based upon. In trying to “have it both ways,” Rawls may be crowding out the view of 
civil society as a necessary condition in practice more than he claims to, and the 
expression of the difficulties entailed by functionalist views of civil society in this 
chapter seem to evidence this claim.      
Abortion escorting seems to provide empirical cause to side with 
understanding civil society as a necessary condition. The obvious tactical strategy and 
                                                





contentious political action that takes place outside of the abortion clinic is a clear 
example of “cross-purposes and antagonisms” that are not going to be resolved in 
theory through discussion. Nor will they disappear from the politics of the real world 
simply through agreement not to talk about them or by adopting a position of 
philosophical fallibility. To understand this type of political confrontation, we need 
suggestions that are more substantial than those offered by functionalist models. 
While the particulars of different views of civil society as a necessary condition need 
to be further explored, it seems like it is comparatively the most ideal starting place 
for a theoretical investigation into the types of political actions taking place just 
outside the abortion clinic.  
Conclusion 
I have attempted to lay out an argument for how we can think about different 
models of civil society based on how they combine empirical observations with 
normative claims about civil society’s value to politics. In the process of doing this, I 
have attempted to show that all of the various “functionalist” approaches tend to view 
civil society as serving a functional purpose that tends to drive some sort of larger 
political theory for each of the authors who advances a certain functionalist view. In 
this regard, civil society becomes much more functionally useful for the theorist who 
is trying to advance their larger intellectual project than it does for the behaviors of 
those who are actually supposed to be participating in the model of civil society itself.  
With regard to the limits of the views mentioned above, neither escorts nor 
protestors seem to behave in a way that either a straight market or a quasi-market 




busing, these sorts of problems tend to get labeled as “tragedies” that have no 
solution. For the deliberative democrat, abortion escorting seems to exemplify the 
theoretical concern that they have overplayed their hand with regards to their 
emphasis on normative democratic values. While there is much about deliberative 
models of democracy that is valuable, their account of the political world is 
incomplete and leaves us to consider the possibility that deliberative models of 
democracy are at best an incomplete conversation on politics.  
Finally, this leaves open the possibility that models of politics that emphasize 
the importance of political participation and political activities that sometimes have 
uncertain consequences in an uncertain world are a better starting place to think about 
cases like abortion escorting. The contentious political environment outside of the 
abortion clinic recommends a view of politics that takes a serious look at the 
normative values of democratic politics while at the same time looking at tactical and 
behavioral incentives. Both market and deliberative views of civil society fail in this 
regard because both, in their own way, are naïve about the power relationships that 
exist in political activity. The market assumes a “rule by no one” that is fictitious, and 
the deliberative democrat assumes a rule by rational agreement where one cannot 
survive. This forces us to honestly return our attention back into the mire of a messy 
and sometimes surreal world of political participation where human beings genuinely 
interact with one another rather than conform to prescribed rules and norms of 




Chapter 3: Activism and Political Action 
 
 Activism scholarship does not constitute a complete account of an individual’s 
potential contributions to political activity. As such, the body of scholarly literature 
on activism, while important, is misread when it is interpreted to be a complete 
account of actions that do not fall within activism’s domain. Sidney Tarrow writes 
that social movement research134 often finds itself in an “intellectual ghetto,” and that 
one of the ways out of this ghetto is by “linking movements to processes of 
democratisation.”135 The activist scholar focuses on this “intellectual ghetto” because 
he or she is able to perform high-quality research within its boundaries. These 
scholars frequently leave the broader questions of political interpretation for others. 
As such, the activism scholar essentially concedes the main argument of this chapter: 
the study of activist movements is an important, but limited, field of inquiry. Because 
of this limitation, the activism scholar utilizes a certain set of assumptions about how 
activism fits into a broader domain of political interpretation. These scholars take 
their cues from the work of functionalist theorists discussed in the previous chapter. 
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Frequently, activist theorists take their research and plug it into an understanding of 
the world dominated by the views of procedural liberal political thought. In short, 
activists see themselves as part of the great “transmission belt” of politics that Nancy 
Rosenblum found such a disheartening way to view the sum of the human political 
experience. While activism scholars understandably view their decision to link their 
research into “democratic processes” as benign, they have made conceptual 
mistake.—activism scholars have accepted that Tarrow’s “democratic processes” are 
themselves a complete description of political engagement. The abortion-escorting 
example highlights this mistake by showing that both sides of the link, the theorists 
and the activism scholars, have forgotten about political action.  
 In this chapter, I explore the difference between activism and political action 
by highlighting four different objections to the general views held by activism 
scholars. Once again, the example of abortion escorts and their weekly activity serves 
as a concrete way to get at some of the critical differences between activism and 
political action. First, definitions of activism vary from author to author. Primarily, 
this variation stems from different author’s theoretical assumptions. Because activist 
authors want activism literature to accomplish different ends, the literature has not 
settled on cohesive definitional terms. Despite this variance, the literature on activism 
does agree on important themes as to what “counts” as activism and what falls outside 
of its scope. Activism’s self-described objectives fit into three broad categories: 




outcomes, and the changing major legal and political points of view.136 However, 
none of these three categories belong exclusively to the domain of what anyone would 
term activism. Moreover, there is little to no consensus about what these categories 
mean when taken together to form an understanding of an umbrella term, activism. 
For example, if one were trying to argue that abortion escorting is a type of activism, 
activism scholars would disagree as to what this would mean. This lack of consensus 
raises questions about the descriptive quality of labelling abortion escorting as 
activism.  
 Second, due to activism’s lack of conceptual clarity, activism scholarship tries 
to tie itself to thin aggregative or deliberative theoretical constructs. Rather than 
creating an activist account of politics within their “intellectual ghetto,” activism 
scholars skip this step and instead place their work in an already existing aggregative 
or deliberative schema. As was the case with civil society scholars, activist scholars 
justify a choice between the “market and the forum.” For example, market social 
movement theorists, focused on resource mobilization and formalized models of 
patterns of resistance, study the emerging trends in activism as preference-
aggregative collective choice structures. This is compared to “forum” theories, 
focused on the claims of justice, examine activism’s role in promoting deliberative 
virtues. In either case, theories of activism and activist movements can be 
distinguished from abortion escorting in either a “market” or a “forum” construction. 
Both descriptive models are interested in understanding activism as a type of 
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perpetual politics—a series of political conflicts with no end. However, abortion 
escorting limits the domain of perpetual politics and fosters an understanding that 
some concerns are, in the words of Camus, “everyone’s business.”137 Abortion escorts 
do not petition the majority or large-scale political institutions for change, they act 
within the bounds of the law on their own authority to create a space that tries to 
mitigate the effects of activism, not promote a particular type of activism. Whereas 
activists militate, abortin escorts facilitate. The actions of escorts are not directly 
linked to the perpetual politics of a particular side in an activist movement. Instead 
their actions are directed to the common business of assisting people to act within 
their rights in the face of public harassment. While it is true that actions of abortion 
escorts also privilege a particular side in a protest movement, the linkage between 
deed and movement is not enough to casually lump the two together simply because 
the actors may find common political cause. The qualitative import of the doings of 
social activist movements and abortion escorts differ substantially. Thus, abortion 
escorting resembles activism in the manner that a baseball bat resembles a stick. 
While there is some degree of similarity, their contextual value differs enough that it 
is worth considering what makes them distinct.  
 Third, theoretically overdrawn accounts of activism with a “thin” or 
“transmission belt” view of politics actually eclipse the meaningfulness of those 
episodic, rare, foundational acts that constitute what Wolin calls “the political,” 
because the excessive attention to procedure obscures them from our notice. In short, 
when accounts of activism try to subsume acts, like abortion escorting, into their 
                                                




descriptive domain, they perpetuate the incredulity about the existence of “the 
political” itself as a distinct political concept. The concern becomes that “the 
political” has not been beaten back by reasoned argument, but instead by a force of 
habit in political research that takes the form of an unintentional slight-of-hand trick. 
The trick starts with the presumption that what occurs most often (politics) must be 
most important. When we look at what happens most often, we stop looking at what 
happens less often (the political), and eventually we stop looking altogether. 
Ultimately, we conclude that the infrequently occurring events (the political) perhaps 
never really happened at all, and their distinctive characteristics perhaps do not even 
exist. Based on the categorical separation established by the three prior objections, it 
seems clear that political action, as understood by Hannah Arendt and Sheldon Wolin, 
has been elided with procedural “politics” not based upon reasonableness, but on an 
act of collective forgetting.  
 Finally, activism runs into strong objections about its democratic legitimacy in 
ways that abortion escorting does not. The debate between Iris Marion Young and her 
vision of communicative democracy, and Robert Talisse, who objects to activism’s 
violations of deliberative principles, exemplifies activism’s difficulty in claiming to 
be for justice and yet proceeding in such an epistemically immodest manner. Their 
argument highlights the tension between activism and deliberation, but abortion 
escorting avoids the debate because it takes place once the possibility for deliberation 
is gone. The activist maintains that he is capable of constantly fighting for change as 
partisan while simultaneously merely persuading as citizen at the same time. Activists 




type defined by Sheldon Wolin as, “the legitimised and public contestation, primarily 
by organized and unequal social powers, over access to the resources available to the 
public authorities of the collectivity. Politics is continuous, ceaseless, and endless.”138 
Abortion escorting, rather, is more fittingly described by what Wolin alternatively 
defines as “the political,” those “episodic, rare” moments when “collective power is 
used to promote or protect the well-being of the collectivity.”139 This distinction 
illuminates the descriptive differences between abortion escorting and abortion 
activism and why it is important to notice that the two are different parts of broader 
political constellation: one which includes both activism and political action. Also, as 
part of “the political,” abortion escorting is an activity exempt from the scrutiny of 
deliberative democratic principles because it is non-invasive activity intended to 
preserve the ground rules that deliberativists are interested in. By contrast, activism is 
trying to change a policy decided within such ground rules, and tends to take such 
ground rules as given. Since political action occurs prior to, and in preservation of, 
the space necessary to engage in deliberation and does so without interest in anything 
more, it constitutes the “what else” that Michale Walzer wonders must be necessary 
to make deliberation possible in “Deliberation and What Else?”140 As such, abortion 
escorting while an activity, and thus by nature, epistemically immodest by 
deliberative standards, still conforms to the same foundation as deliberative 
democracy, whereas activism fails this test by having no means to accept the reasons 
of others under any conditions.  
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 In sum, both aggregative and the communicative/deliberative views of 
activism run into trouble when they try and understand themselves without reference 
to a broader realm of public action with broader political concerns and possibilities. 
Activism is characterized here as an important but limited examination of political 
action, and when it forgets its limits, it runs into trouble. This can be seen when one 
looks upon any of the major currents of activist scholarship, but appears in relief 
particularly in the debate between Iris Marion Young and Robert Talisse on the 
deliberative value of activism and in the differences between the politics of abortion 
as an activist struggle and the political acts of abortion escorting. Much has been 
written about abortion activism, and there is a contrast in the accounts of abortion 
activism and abortion escorting. This contrast occurs on both the specific and 
conceptual level simultaneously. Particularly, this contrast reveals the flawed 
assumption that if we understand abortion politics, including abortion escorting, as 
simply part of the larger national abortion activism problem, then we can come to 
terms with the entirety of the politics of abortion by trying to solve the big questions 
with questions of law, moral philosophy, distributive justice, public reason, economic 
efficiency, etc. This grouping is tempting, yet incorrect. The assumption makes a 
move that suggests we just have to “solve” abortion along one of the frameworks 
mentioned above, and then we can make the controversies around it go away.  
 Clearly, attempts to “solve” abortion do not seem to escape stalemate on the 
issue. This is one of the realities of political controversy that seems to deadlock 
Young and Talisse with regards to their differing views on democratic theory. This 




because they run into the problem of how to address the presumption of a political 
authority that is allowed to enforce a solution on everyone. Their attempts to avoid 
justifying a type of coercion as acceptable equates with justifying the source of the 
coercion as legitimate. They both have difficulties getting enough of the competing 
virtues of democratic process that they need to justify their visions of the polity and 
the role of activists within it. There is good reason to believe the activist generally 
(and the abortion activist in this particular story) are interested in advancing their 
interests without desiring to consider the effect of pursuing their single-issue 
objectives in the context of a broader political constitution. Activism is primarily 
concerned with pursuing one’s preferences and justifying holding them. Oftentimes, 
activism does not involve putting much detailed thought into the actual practices that 
can ensure a legitimate execution of such values.  
 Though not institutional, the act of escorting facilitates access for those 
wishing to engage in the lawful behavior of walking into an abortion clinic. While 
every escort I spoke with felt strongly that one ought to have the right to have an 
abortion, this need not be the case. One need only believe that one ought to be able to 
do something that one is legally allowed to do without public harassment to volunteer 
as an escort—a sentiment that many escorts described as motivating their decision to 
become escorts instead as opposed to doing something else in the broader pro-choice 
movement. Motivations aside, it is what the escort does that seems to be the primary 
contrast between escorting and activism. Whereas activism petitions large 
institutional actors, either directly or indirectly, to alter policies, abortion escorts act 




clinic access law in their own community.  
 As a rule, politics is the condition of living with a plurality of individuals and 
not simply living as one amongst the masses. If one accepts this description, 
activisms’ characterization of politics is troublesome. Activism scholars militate for 
diversity in a way in which diversity usually implies membership in non-traditional or 
non-majority groups rather than individuality. The problem stems from an 
overreaching of the power of the political. Too often we think that all political ills are 
either created by or can be solved by politics, particularly the types of social 
questions that social movements contest. In return for our attempts to solve the 
unsolvable through politics, according to Montesquieu, and Arendt, we also run the 
risk of doing great damage to our political habits. Montesquieu writes that 
democracies are corrupted, “not only when the spirit of equality is lost but also when 
the spirit of extreme equality is taken up and each one wants to be the equal of those 
chosen to command.”141 Arendt writes that the push away from politics as public life, 
the reconstitution of our cultural values in an orientation towards privacy and the 
intimate emerges in antagonism to, “the levelling demands of the social, against what 
we would call today the conformism inherent in every society.”142 The very term 
“social movement” or “protest movement” recommends that the tactics at hand are to 
make the “levelling demands of the social” heard for some disadvantaged group or 
another. However justified such a movement may be, such a movement does not 
engage in politics in the same way as abortion escorts do, and thus the need to 
distinguish the two. 
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 It should not be forgotten that large-scale procedural politics have been a 
historically reliable provider and defender of benefits in the form of toleration and 
objectivity. My argument here is a quibble with the tradition that extends from John 
Locke to John Rawls to Stephen Macedo, and not an all-out row.143 Human beings 
inhabit a world of procedural and institutional politics that is richer for having such 
great intellectual energies and talents poured into questions of their fair use. However, 
we are also still “encumbered selves,” as Michael Sandel famously argued, who do 
not simply have particular preferences, but also, and perhaps more importantly live 
particular lives situated in particular relations to particular others.144 From time to 
time, no matter how many objective institutions work to secure broader political 
goods, such as equal protection under the law, the encumbered self, situated locally, 
has original jurisdiction to assert political equality and to safeguard for him or herself 
and for and from his or her fellows. Whereas activism is ultimately concerned with 
individuals using their capabilities to get involved in “the process,” whether it be to 
redistribute deliberative or more tangible resources more justly, the instance of 
abortion escorting implies that those who participate in escorting need no more 
process to safeguard local political space than to show up and act. Activism and 
liberalism, for all of their virtues, face the difficult criticism offered by Sandel in 
Liberalism and the Limits of Justice. He noted that “its vision of public reason is too 
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spare to contain the moral energies of a vital democratic life.”145 Sandel’s call for 
something beyond the traditional view of public reason, a call echoed by Michael 
Walzer, can be understood by considering it as a call to action… rather than a call to 
activism.146   
Clarity Issues in Considering Activism 
 
As was the case with civil society, the meaning and conceptual content of the term 
activism often varies from scholar to scholar. Leaving aside Iris Marion Young’s 
unorthodox understanding of activism as situated in what she calls “communicative 
democracy,” most studies of activism focus on empirical findings and leave the 
broader political meanings of their studies deliberately vague. Activism scholars 
struggle to define the term “activism.” Some researchers’ attempt to create a coherent 
understanding of activism that strives for broad, inclusive commonalities across the 
field. For example, Mario Diani concludes that social activist movements share three 
basic concepts: “networks of relations between a plurality of actors; collective 
identity; [and] conflictual issues.”147 Diani’s motivation for working out a concept of 
activism at all, even one so broadly defined, comes from his frustration that, “even an 
implicit, ‘empirical’ agreement about the use of the term is largely missing.”148 Snow, 
Soule and Kriesi provide a similar definition of social activism, writing 
social movements can be thought of as collective acting with some degree of 
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organization and continuity outside of institutional or organizational channels for the 
purpose of challenging or defending extant authority, whether it is institutionally or 
culturally based, in the group, organization, society, culture, or world order of which 
they are a part.(emphasis authors’)149  
  
While both definitions describe social activism in a manner that gives it some sort of 
shape, both would be hard-pressed to serve as clear guidelines for what does or does 
not count as social activism. The specific characteristics of “extant authority,” 
“institutional or organizational channels,” “collective identity,” and “conflictual 
issues” will cast a conceptual net of radically different sizes over a variety of human 
activities based upon each individual’s understanding of these terms.  
      Another approach to understanding social activism is one that considers what 
social activist movements do. Johnston and Noakes note that the “three broad focus 
areas dominating social movement research” have been framing processes, 
organizational resources and political opportunities.150 Denis Moynihan describes 
direct action, part of the activist’s repertoire, in the following manner, 
Direct action is more than shutting down a meeting. It can also mean boycotting a 
store, singing in the street, or sitting in at a segregated lunch counter to demand racial 
integration. It can be used to halt an event that threatens imminent harm, to dramatize 
an injustice, to gain popular support or media attention, to boost morale amongst 
campaigners, or to escalate a campaign.151  
While the description of activists and activist movements is helpful, as with the 
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accounts of activism cited above, they tend to leave the meaningfulness of such 
activity only implied. While the descriptive approach is advantageous for narrow 
empirical claims because it allows such claims to be subject to rigorous 
methodological testing, the tendency to bombard the literature with descriptions and 
narratives without any appeal to broader conceptual clarity with regards to what 
makes activism consequential or as to how activism relates more broadly to questions 
of society, politics, norms, justice, power, etc. renders this approach to studying 
activism difficult to organize conceptually.  
Giving Up on a Definition of Activism? 
 The variety of definitions and terms that scholars claim comprise the set 
“activism,” not to mention the variety of the definitions of the interplay between these 
concepts of varying dimensions, has led some prominent activism scholars to 
relinquish the goal of conceptual clarity altogether. Barbara Hobson remarks that 
“[w]hile defining something as a social movement helps to legitimate research in 
these terms, in the real world of political interaction such labels are both arbitrary and 
without political consequence.”152 However, to hold this position, the researcher of the 
social movement must hold a particular and peculiar type of epistemological view. 
For the argument above to track, it must make sense that self-definition is not a 
determining factor in guiding future acts and decision.153 Hobson’s view commits her 
to the notion that descriptive accounts of physical world-processes, such as planetary 
motion or photosynthesis, are the same as human activity. That is, she believes we 
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can explain what is happening without understanding its meaning. The problem with 
this view is that planets do not move based on their understanding of motion before 
moving, whereas activists act in a context. Activists understand the meaning of their 
actions and that understanding defines what actions are taken. From Hobson’s 
perspective, it is unclear why anyone would work in the behavioral sciences since 
Hobson believes information has no power in altering the way in which we act. 
Hobson argues that it is of no consequence to hold a currently undernourished 
understanding of social movements, but she simultaneously is herself elaborating on 
such concepts. Ultimately, we must reject this view and define activism—we can no 
longer ignore the definitional problems.  
Charles Tilly: Activism Defined in a Historical Context 
 To our aid comes Charles Tilly, who attempts to bring clarity to the “various, 
ambiguous, and sometimes sloppy uses to which the concept social movement has 
been put.”154 Tilly believes we understand social movements vaguely because they 
have a historical specificity. “[T]he recognition of the historical specificity of the 
forms of collective action is the beginning of wisdom.”155 Tilly concludes that, “the 
term social movement applies most usefully to sustained interaction between a 
specific set of authorities and various spokespersons for a given challenge to those 
authorities.”156 Tilly asks us to understand that social movements vary. What they 
look like depends upon the historical context in which they are formed. Tilly’s 
definition is appealing because it approaches social movements with a broad 
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conceptual frame while accounting for variations in specific instances.  
 Tilly’s definition leaves abortion escorting as outside of the ambit of social 
activism. It would require a strained definition of “specific set of authorities,” to say 
no less of a “spokesperson” to say that either term fits the citizen volunteerism of 
abortion escorts. Alternatively, the abortion protesters seem to fall within the scope 
of Tilly’s definition. Protesters come together to challenge state rulings on the 
grounds that they believe the state is using its coercive power to permit murder. 
Protesters gather, pray, demonstrate, sing songs of peace, and aim to convince people 
not to have an abortion through the legal means available to them. They pass out 
literature to passers by. They sometimes gather on the road or median and hold up 
signs so that cars passing by can be made aware of the fact that there is a clinic in 
their neighborhood. In short, according to the above definitional terms, pro-life 
demonstrations constitute a social movement.  
Are Abortion Escorts a Policing Frame? 
 One possible way that activism might account for the act abortion escorting is 
by thinking of abortion escorts as part of a “policing frame” in a large-scale 
evolutionary protest movement. Donatella della Porta gives an account of the 
evolution of the main themes of protest. Della Porta labels these themes the “master-
frames” of protest movements Frames are “interpretive schemes that the various 
actors use to interpret their actions.”157 And “[o]ne of the main innovative master-
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frames refers to democracy itself.”158 The idea that there is a “policing of protest” 
effect that emerges to tame the potential violence of a protest movement might appear 
to serve quite nicely as an explanation of the emergence of abortion escorts in 
response to abortion protestors. Yet, della Porta’s account of the discourse on the 
rules of protest reveal that her account is a “politics” story and not a story about 
maintaining “the political.” The evolution of della Porta’s policing stays entirely 
within the realm of procedural politics. Those who protest are not simply seeing it as 
their own business to stand by citizens confronted with the mob, but instead remain 
the formations of political groups with group political interests at heart. “In 
Germany,” della Porta writes, “the protagonist master-frame of a civil rights coalition 
that has a small presence in Parliament within the AL is that of a second society: the 
real democrats were outside the traditional party system: they wanted to affirm the 
right to demonstrate, a right that cannot be constrained.”159 The account of how well 
protest movements can be entrusted on their own with regards to self-policing is 
further demonstrated when della Porta writes about the so-called “law-and-order” 
movement: 
In Italy, the law-and-order coalition, gathered around the Socialist Party and the 
neofascist MSI, emphasized its role as law enforcer…. Coalition members were the 
‘defenders of the defenceless citizens,’ who fought drug addicts and extremists. The 
antagonists, the ‘autonomous’ groups, were considered to be hooligans who practiced 
violence for its own sake.160 
 
What is troubling about this view of the interfacing of politics and protest movements 
is that “the political,” those things which tie us together in a community of equals that 
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we recognize as our common business, such as law-and-order, are reduced to being 
just one more master-frame. Even in the analysis of protest policing, we see common 
decency is but one more set of arguments about why one group is right and another is 
wrong. Such arguments are offered up without any real sense, by either the deliverer 
or receiver of the message, that certain commitments must necessarily entail more 
than others for what Sandel called in an above quotation, the “moral energies of a 
vital democratic life.”  
The fault with policing frames lies not in della Porta’s account of her study of 
protest policing in protest movements, but with the utter dissatisfying normative state 
of the practices in which she describes so well. If it is the case that abortion escorts 
make common decency on their own, they are engaged in something alternative to 
simply framing political issues by organizational powers-that-be. The contrast 
between the two explains the satisfaction of escorts who used to volunteer as 
newsletter writers and protestors for pro-choice publications and at pro-choice rallies 
who have told me that abortion escorting feels much more satisfying: the difference 
in the two activities literally constitutes the difference between talking about 
something and doing it.  
Activism’s “Thin Politics” Alliance System 
 
 Rather than consider the deeds of abortion escorts as fitting under the 
umbrella term activism, it appears more precise to understand abortion escorts as 
acting in “the public” or what Sheldon Wolin would call “the political.” In large part, 




in our contemporary political conversation, and as such, is not in a position to define 
terms that permeate the various specialized areas of empirical work even within the 
political science discipline. It is unsurprising then that the sociologist interested in 
studying activism in the field has little wish to extend their definitions of activism far 
enough into political theory to get caught up in the normative questions surrounding 
whether or not the public matters and what such “mattering” might entail.  
 Nevertheless, the differentiation of political action and activism gives us some 
advantageous detail in our insights into the political world precisely because it 
privileges certain versions of political theory–visions concerning themselves with the 
details of the public and political action. For the participatory democrat, the places 
where the public appears are not subject to the same motives or methods as the space 
of procedural politics.161 The public, as generally conceived in this tradition, is a 
place where politics takes place as a set of relationships amongst equals who are 
always endowed with the rather anarchic capacity to act, rather than simply a set of 
“behavers” in the context of a fully institutionalised community. The public is by 
definition not just democracy, not, in Dahl’s terminology, a polyarchy.162 The 
backdrop against which abortion escorts act, a background that is commonly called 
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“public space,” is a setting where different possibilities for acting and the effects of 
such action present themselves. In the procedural sphere, the only tactics for citizen-
driven change are the methods of the activist: to disrupt procedures or get attention in 
a way that makes procedures work for one’s cause. Acting in the public realm is 
different from procedural politics because of the significance of individual acts. 
Moreover, rather than appealing to authority about how the law is executed, it is a 
space where one may shape the relationships of power in a situation based upon one’s 
actions derived solely from one’s own authority. John Dewey writes  
Liberty is that secure release and fulfilment of personal potentialities which take 
place in rich and manifold association with others: the power to be an individualized 
self making a distinctive contribution and enjoying in its own way the fruits of 
association.163 
 
Dewey’s understanding of liberty is not one of simply “joining the movement” to 
argue on behalf of principles of justice that “isolated from the community are 
hopeless abstractions.”164 Dewey warns that under such conditions “[e]quality then 
becomes a creed of mechanical identity which is false to facts and impossible to 
realize.” This is in contrast to liberty in the context of the public, “the unhampered 
share which each individual member of the community has in the consequences of 
associated acting… because it is measured only by need and the capacity to 
utilize.”165 (emphasis is mine) Hannah Arendt phrases her account of the public realm 
this way, 
The public realm, as the common world, gathers us together and yet prevents our 
falling over each other, so to speak. What makes mass society so difficult to bear is 
                                                
163 Dewey, The Public & Its Problems, 150. 
164 Ibid., 149. 




not the number of people involved, or at least not primarily, but the fact that the 
world between them has lost its power to gather them together, to relate and separate 
them.166 
 
This passage by Arendt is commonly misinterpreted as referring to separating 
individuals by identity. Neither Arendt nor Dewey intended to distinguish what is 
important about the public this way. To be concerned with identity is to already to 
slip back towards the logic that Dewey and Arendt push out against. Arendt and 
Dewey argue for isonomic action. What “relates and separates” citizens in the public 
is the content of their actions, what they can do as individuals when they show up at a 
particular place. Abortion escorts, as those who act on their own authority, act in a 
way that preserves the space outside of the clinic as not simply a territory to be 
conquered by one competing “mechanical identity” or another, but as part of a 
community.  
Activism as “Mass Politics” 
 Studies of mass politics are dangerous when they become the sole political 
inquiry that we engage in. These studies begin to distort our perception of politics so 
that mass politics is elided neatly into conceptions of speaking on behalf of all politics 
and all political possibilities—or at least all of those worth talking about. The 
temptation to understand politics this way derives from the relative ease by which 
mass politics fits the technological capacity of the social scientist to measure it. The 
important scientific values of measurability, generalizability, and predictively 
accurate claims has accompanied the study of mass politics as it has become more 
and more prevalent so that each becomes self-reinforcing to the other. Arendt writes 
                                                




that behavioral sciences overstep their domain of inquiry and, as a result, “reduce 
man as a whole, in all his activities, to the level of a conditioned and behaving 
animal.”167 The “reduction of man” in questions is the natural outgrowth of the 
organizationalism that has accompanied the ever-expanding scale on which the 
political community operates. Arendt writes earlier in The Human Condition “since 
the laws of statistics are particularly valid where we deal with large numbers, it is 
obvious that every increase in population means an increased validity and a marked 
decrease of ‘deviation.’ Politically this means that the larger the population in any 
given body politic, the more likely that it will be the social and not the political that 
constitutes the public realm.”168 While Max Weber thought this relationship between 
size and social politics inevitable, it has been the project of participatory and 
deliberative democrats alike to find ways to restore a public dominated by proper 
political, and not social, concerns.  
 Both social activism and civil society have largely run a course that lacks a 
concept of the public because, as Benjamin Barber writes, “within the liberal 
democratic tradition there has been a tendency to see politics as a thing or a place or a 
set of institutions—as, at best, something done by others.”169 Influenced by such a 
viewpoint, empirical studies influenced by this liberal tradition, no matter how 
casually, leave aside the consideration that “politics remains something we do, not 
something that we possess or use or watch or think about.”170 Even though there is 
something clearly active about activists that take to the streets, there is generally 
                                                
167 Ibid., 45. 
168 Ibid., 43. 
169 Barber, Strong Democracy, 122. 




something quite passive about their audiences, as they are members of “states defined 
by watching rather than doing—in ‘watchdog’ or ‘watchman’ states – citizens, like 
spectators everywhere, may find themselves falling asleep.”171 Without a concept of a 
public, the moments in which people are likely to engage in political action, while 
never fully impossible, become less and less likely to be realized.  
 The argument above requires a tempering consideration: activism does have 
some elements of the political in the course of its activity. I witnessed many pro-life 
activists who were empowered by their participation who seemed to be learning about 
themselves through the process of their participation.172 This is important to note 
because there is a tendency, in discussing the dangers of mass politics, to think of the 
masses in terms of what Hannah Pitkin colourfully calls the “Attack of the Blob.”  
Pitkin herself is critical of this view, but her criticism is made against a broad 
interpretation of social man as nothing more than mass-produced man, likely 
influenced by Nietzsche’s “Last Man” or Marx’s “Das Man.”  Pro-life abortion 
activists, through their membership and commitment to principles, appear on behalf 
of society, but they do not appear as literal clones of everyone else present and they 
are not automatons who are incapable of deriving pleasure from the company of 
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others or getting personal joys out of their activism.  
 I observed many different pro-life protestors, particularly young men, but also 
some elderly gentlemen and younger women who appeared very shy and not 
particularly talkative really come alive when they were engaged in trying to convince 
others not to enter the clinic. It was as if they had suddenly discovered that they could 
release this entirely different aspect of their personality through a simple act of will, 
as if their cause was compelling enough to spring them from their natural shyness. As 
soon as these moments for springing forth had passed, they mostly returned to 
looking down at their feet and not conversing much with others.  
 The protest situation opens up such possibilities for participants, and it would 
be irresponsible not to notice that there is a certain amount of disclosing of one’s self 
that activism allows even while social activist movements remain primarily social in 
their nature. Noticing this does not diminish the fact that the overwhelming nature of 
activism is still susceptible to differentiation from the overwhelming nature of 
political acts like abortion escorting. Making this distinction does not require 
reducing activists into flat, single-minded straw men to be knocked over.  
Activism and “Thin Democracy” 
 The objectives of the social activist correspond more directly to the “thin 
democracy” account of politics. The social activist attempts to move the masses to 
support or pay attention to particular causes. Social activist movements seem intent 




style.173 “If there is a single element that distinguishes social movements from other 
political actors, however, it is the strategic use of novel, dramatic, unorthodox, and 
noninstitutionalized forms of political expression to try to shape public opinion and 
put pressure on those in positions of authority.”174 In short, the social movement 
looks for novel ways into politics for no other reason than to stake a claim as an 
opinion leader. Social movements rely on non-conventional means “often because 
participants lack access to political institutions and other conventional means of 
influence or because they feel their voices are not being heard.”175  
The difficulty that the Lippman view poses, however, controlling the image 
starts to take a life of its own. The activist movements’ tactics become “so integral to 
popular views of social movements that sometimes a movement is remembered more 
for its tactics than for its goals.”176 Cook, Jelen and Wilcox’s study on abortion and 
public opinion proceeds from the strongly worded assumption “that it matters a great 
deal what ordinary citizens think and feel about abortion. In a democracy, public 
opinion is regarded as the ultimate authority, and a system cannot be regarded as 
democratic if the wishes of ordinary people are not taken into account.”177 The grand 
vision of altering social norms and mores, and even changing popularly held views 
and ill-held institutional biases takes a life of its own and becomes the “great game” 
of politics so much that it becomes difficult to discern the difference between 
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meaningful politics and trite, sentimental politics that cheaply mimics the real thing. 
In the context of this “great game” of moving public opinion, activism is identified as 
simply one more method of creating and changing the imagistic notions of political 
principles that Dewey thought “hopeless abstractions.” At the level that the activist 
holds such commitments, their only way to become a participant in the great game 
appears to be through “joining the movement” and “having the power to make 
history.”178 In the next section, the debate between deliberativists and activists 
explores the legitimacy of activist movements and their desire to change history. 
Moreover, the next section calls into question why we would ever expect them to do 
so responsibly.  
 
Activism by Another Name: Iris Marion Young’s Communicative Democracy 
 
 
 Iris Marion Young’s account of activism is unique because she places her 
view of activism in the context of a larger conception of deliberative politics. Because 
she has built an understanding of deliberative democracy that makes room for 
activism (Young calls this communicative democracy) her view deserves special 
attention. Moreover, other deliberative democrats, most notably Robert Talisse, 
challenge Young’s communicative democracy. The two disagree as to whether 
activism can remain committed to truth claims.  Activist groups start from the default 
position that their positions fail to become incorporated into policy for a variety of 
unfair reasons, but never on the grounds that they may be actually wrong. Young has 
                                                




difficulty straddling deliberative democracy and activism. And her difficulty reveals 
the limitations of activism as an instrument for ensuring good political arrangements. 
Simultaneously, however, Young correctly highlights the good activist movements. 
The existence of these movements indicates that deliberative democrats too are 
perhaps incapable of creating a comprehensive account of how to secure a good 
polity. The political action of abortion escorts might bridge the gap between Young 
and Talisse and create a more complete account of a working politics in the midst of 
their discussion.179 
 Iris Marion Young identifies political activism’s purpose as twofold. First, 
political activism must attack problems of structural inequality that seem unavoidable 
in liberal democracies. Second, activism is supposed to assist democracy in achieving 
politically fair outcomes.180 These two objectives work together in Young’s view 
because problems with structural inequality undermine ideal democratic practice. She 
writes that democracy is ideally “not only a means through which citizens can 
promote their interests and hold the power of rulers in check. It is also a means of 
collective problem-solving which depends for its legitimacy and wisdom on the 
expression and criticism of the diverse opinions of all the members of the society.”181 
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If one assumes a democratically-oriented society, then eliminating structural 
inequality ought to lead, in Young’s view, towards politically fair outcomes.  
 Young’s view of activism aims for compatibility with a conception of 
deliberative democracy, instead of an aggregative model of politics. While Young 
calls her view “communicative” rather than “deliberative” for reasons that will be 
discussed shortly, her model rejects the notion that preference seeking is the only 
activity within democratic politics. She simultaneously rejects the concept  that 
political activism is simply interest group politics by another name. Young’s 
interpretation of the activist’s actions can be distinguished from interest group politics 
because she defines activism based upon aims, rather than procedures. In Young’s 
view, it is incorrect to say that activists are involved in interest group politics because 
activists do not aim to pursue their own ends, but are, in real and important ways, 
focused on pursuing universal goods. In Young’s view, a more equally inclusive 
society that reaches outcomes that can be characterized as “more fair” is not simply 
an interest, but fighting for what is right by some objective standard of justice. Young 
argues forcefully that there are two differences between the activist and the interest 
group that are visibly different in this regard. First, while interest groups, “simply aim 
to win the most for their group and engage in power politics to do so,” the activist 
“sacrifices his time, career advancement, and money for the sake of the causes to 
which he is committed.”182 Second, the activist, while not strictly deliberative, is still 
communicative. The activist believes that their respective “activist-political 
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engagements aim to communicate specific ideas to a wide public.”183 
Communicative versus Deliberative Democracy 
 Communicative democracy, in Young’s view, differentiates itself from 
deliberative democracy insofar as communicative democracy includes methods of 
communication like demonstration, narrative, and rhetoric that would, for most 
deliberative democrats, not meet their standards of reasonableness for valid methods 
of political communication. Young believes that the deliberativist draws too narrow a 
conception of deliberation. She argues, “The ideal of communicative democracy 
includes more than deliberative democracy, because it recognizes that when political 
dialogue aims at solving collective problems, it justly requires a plurality of 
perspectives, speaking styles, and ways of expressing the particularity of social 
situation as well as the generalized applicability of principles.”184 Young attempts to 
demonstrate that the deliberativist/interest group relationship is a false dichotomy—
one can pay attention to communication that discusses the agonistic elements of the 
political realm without having to rely on either pure power politics or on highly 
formalized communicative methods.  
Activism is supposed to work with this communicative middle ground Young 
creates. Yung’s argument is that activism’s aims are always to communicate injustice 
on behalf of those who do not have the access or level of articulation to engage with 
decision-makers. Young thinks that traditional deliberative democrat is not practically 
committed to reasonableness when a group, like a board of directors or some other 
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elite like IMF or World Bank, exists with a power monopoly on a given political 
issue. Against such controlling interests, Young writes, “The activist eschews 
deliberation, especially deliberation with persons wielding political or economic 
power and official representatives of institutions he believes perpetuate injustice or 
harm.”185 But she also characterizes the activist’s belief that sometimes, “the most 
morally appropriate thing for them to do is to try and stop business”186 as nothing 
more than “other action which he finds more effective in conveying his criticism and 
furthering the objectives he believes right.”187 Young’s suggestion, though, sets up a 
difficult legitimacy question for the political activist who has taken the right to stop 
business into their own hands and may not be supportive of others who claim the 
right to do the same.  
Maintaining a balance between agonistic politics and communicative ethics 
requires that Young does not delve too deeply into the coercive aspects of “furthering 
ones objectives” by “stopping business.” While she acknowledges that activist’s have 
to limit the coercive impact of their actions when they cause extreme damage, she 
writes, “I do not here wish to enter these debates.”188 She then assumes that her 
account of activism contains activists who will adopt a somewhat Mill-like “harms 
principle”189 approach to their activism. In doing so, she first begs off the debate. 
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Later, she writes as if the debate she has begged off has been settled, taking the stance 
that it is an obviously unobtrusive standard for all activists to set the limit of coercion 
by activists as “not physical harm.”  
Young’s approach is problematically nonchalant. According to Young, 
activists seek to right power imbalances. Activism is needed because those in power 
are not convinced by reason to change their ways. However, should the activist 
triumph, there are no mechanisms to check the successful activist once he or she 
assumes power in the agonistic arena. If reasonable principles of fairness could not 
check the powerful in boardrooms and the halls of government, why would they be 
good enough to restrain the political activist? In the context of abortion politics in 
America, Young’s line has been crossed on multiple occasions. Journalist Jerry Reiter 
recalls the following conversation with pro-life activist Donna Bray, 
I know it sounds harsh, but you have to remember we’re only trying to protect the 
unborn. The problem with most pro-lifers is that they say they believe that abortion is 
murder, but they don’t act like it. It’s time that we start defending innocent children. 
We can’t let them keep killing thousands of innocent babies each and every day and 
not try to stop it. We’ve tried all the legal means—the marches, the protests, the 
letters to the politicians-but now it’s time to defend the babies, even if that means 
some people will have to use whatever force is necessary.190 
 
Reiter attributes this attitude exhibited by some on the fringes of the anti-abortion 
movement to the fact that “[t]hose who had started down the path of illegal activity 
by trespassing and blocking clinic doors now no longer had the moral authority to 
stop those who wanted to go to the next step, and the next step, and so on.”191 In sum, 
once an activist believes that justice cannot be achieved through the current means, 
one has dangled the fruit in front of Tantalus who will remain always tempted to find 
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some way to reach a little bit further in the hopes that it will get them what they want.  
 
 Young’s attempt to place activism in a model of “communicative democracy” 
that is neither strictly “deliberative” nor strictly “aggregative” also must defend the 
position that the aims of “universal justice” are, in the first place, justifiable aims. 
Young’s vision of activism is not the sole one faced with this difficulty. Both the 
deliberative and more agonistic positions have quite the arsenal of arguments against 
this position. To whom do we appeal to separate the good activists from the bad ones 
if their legitimacy is based upon “universal ideas of justice?” Who gets to decide this? 
The activist’s claims to universal truths about justice and fairness still appear suspect. 
Ian Shapiro notes that the agonistic political theorist can counter, “people with 
opposed interests are not always aware of just how opposed those interests actually 
are. Deliberation can bring differences to the surface, widening the political divisions 
rather than narrowing them.”192 Shapiro’s observation seems to be confirmed in part, 
by a recent study by Schkade, Sunstein, and Hastie, which concluded from a 
“deliberation day” experiment that  
On Deliberation Day, liberals became more liberal and conservatives became more 
conservative. On the large issues of the day, discussions by like-minded people 
fueled greater extremism, and also increased divisions between liberals and 
conservatives. At the same time, both liberal and conservative groups became more 
homogenous; deliberation reduced internal diversity.193 
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This conclusion supports Ian Shapiro’s claim that communication actually brings 
disputes into relief. This analysis also goes one step further and implies that what 
consensus does arise from such “conscious raising” may actually derive more from 
conformity than from consensus. To the extent that Young’s appeals for fairness and 
“universal justice” have a distinctly Rawlsian tenor,194 it should be noted briefly that 
Rawls has been subject to criticisms similar to Shapiro’s. Linda Hirshman makes the 
compelling case that the “overlapping consensus” on principles of justice that Rawls 
identifies really exist due to a consensus amongst alliances that have both sexist and 
racist feelings that, if challenged, would likely cause this “really existing” moral 
consensus to collapse.195 Hirshman’s claim mirrors Shapiro’s in that the Rawlsian 
“overlapping consensus” of justice as fairness requires exaggerating agreements 
while at the same time burying other injustices and inequalities that make the original 
agreement possible in the first place. Hirshman argues that, “[i]n restricting the 
application of justice as fairness, Rawls has essentially reinvented historical 
liberalism.”196 Hirshman then details the differences that likely would come to the 
surface to disrupt Rawls’ historical liberalism, if only they could,  
 
Christian fundamentalism weighed in on the political scene almost to the day that the 
Internal Revenue Service of President Jimmy Carter withdrew federal tax exemptions 
for white Christian segregated academies. If Christianity was born-again in America 
in the mid-twentieth century, race was its midwife. And gender is its incubator. The 
religious right has been less outspoken recently about the segregation agenda that 
revived it politically in 1978 than about what it accurately perceives to be the more 
vulnerable target—women… The point of this lesson in contemporary history is that 
even the problem of accommodating religion in liberal democracy –Rawls’s chosen 
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focus for his efforts—cannot be separated from the problems Rawls chooses to 
ignore.197 
 
The lesson form Hirshman’s statements above appears to be quite damaging to our 
image of an activist fighting for inclusion and fairness in some sort of impartial 
manner. If inclusion can only garner consensus by focusing on certain points of 
agreement rather than others, it would seem that little that could be called “universal” 
about the aims of the activist. Bonnie Honig is also sceptical of Rawls’ formulation of 
reasonable pluralism and its possible undercurrents of intolerance,  
Rawls disciplines offenders and reasons with eccentrics. In each case, he confidently 
reassures (but also warns) us that the responsibility for the dissonance is not 
institutional but personal, not political but psychological.198 
 
Hirshman’s and Honig’s argument against Rawls is that the universal cannot be found 
in Rawls’ particular view. Even though Rawls attempts to provide a really 
generalized account of principles we can all live under, Hirshman and Honig suggest 
they are still not general enough to be sufficient, and at least Honig would go as far as 
to say that this is because nothing could be so general as to accomplish Rawls’ 
project.199  
 While we might not want to equate the activist with self-interested lobbying, 
we still are to acknowledge that the activist is engaging in a lot more trade-offs 
regarding questions of justice than Young’s model may lead us to believe. 
Interestingly, the Shapiro’s critique and the study by Shkade, Sunstein, and Hastie are 
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aimed at deliberative democrats, but the deliberativist position is also critical of the 
activist in the same manner. The deliberative democrat believes that the only way 
these questions of justice can be reasonably understood is via a strict reasonableness 
standard. Young has relaxed the reasonableness standard as she moves away from the 
deliberative model to her communicative model. In the eyes of the deliberative 
democrat, her activist cannot shield herself from the criticisms of Shapiro, Sunstein, 
et al., in the same ways that the deliberativist can.  
Robert Talisse and the Deliberativist Repsonse 
 Robert Talisse argues forcefully that “Young’s activist is opposed, not only by 
deliberative democrats, but also by persons who call themselves ‘activists’ and who 
are committed to a set of policy objectives quite different from those endorsed by 
Young’s activist.”200 Since Young’s communicative, democratic activist has 
abandoned reasonable deliberation for a broader array of attention-getting methods,201 
his views are “adopted by activists of different stripes and put in a general service of a 
wide range of policy objectives, each claiming to be just, liberatory, and properly 
inclusive.”202 The problem then is that the communicative democrat “has no way to 
deal with opposing activist programs except to fight them off, or if fighting them off 
is strategically unsound or otherwise problematic, to accept a Hobbesian truce.”203 
This is the point where such modes of thinking lead to analyses like Putnam’s—that 
the tragedy of busing programs were that both sides were right. Putnam’s analysis, 
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and the reason it is problematic is because being right about the fairness of a policy 
issue does not appear then to be sufficient justification to engage in the rather bold 
step of “stopping business” until others recognize one’s claims as true—if one’s 
opponents can make the exact same claim, it is not clear how activism moves us past 
such an impasse through any means that are reasonable. Instead, it is likely the winner 
will be determined by size, resource mobilization, and organizational strength. In 
short, the winner of such impasses is decided through coercion and not consent. This 
may not be a tragedy in the real world of politics, but it is an outcome that is 
unacceptable for Young’s articulation of communicative democracy, just as it was for 
Putnam’s view of civil society. 
 The antiabortion movement embodies this problem. Carol Maxwell’s study of 
those who engaged in anti-abortion direct action revealed a membership inclined to 
believe that “[t]actics that did not expose activists to arrest seemed complimentary 
rather than focal.”204 Based on my observations, Maxwell’s description of anti-
abortion protesters refers to a bygone age of the antiabortion movement. 
Nevertheless, Maxwell’s study of those who engaged in direct action in the abortion 
movement as protestors raises two interesting concerns. First, the actions of protestors 
in the protest era before the FACE Act do not reflect Iris Young’s communicative 
account of activism.205 Second, the protestors’ behaviour outside of the clinic has 
shifted, not because of an internalised sense of restraint based upon the need to 
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preserve communicative virtues, but instead because the law changed in a manner 
that put anti-abortion activists in a less dominating position over those entering the 
clinic and those who engage in abortion escorting. 
  Even on the theoretical level, it is difficult to see why the activist has to 
remain committed to reasonableness. Given that, according to Young, the activists 
believe they are not getting their way due to the system containing inherent structural 
inequality, it remains unclear when or how the activist can ever admit they have been 
defeated in argument under fair conditions. It seems as if the activist can always 
simply equate not getting their way as predetermined evidence that the political-
economic system is unfair, and will only admit to it being fair when they get their 
way and when those they oppose do not. Like a partisan fan at a sporting event, there 
is great temptation for the activist to say they only lose the game when the referees 
are unfair. Conceived this way, any political issue for which activist groups claim to 
be pursuing justice in non-overlapping ways produce legitimacy crises, and crises that 
may come from nothing more than the tacit refusal of any of the sides to ever adhere 
to a standard of reasonableness that recognizes that they could lose under fair 
conditions. In the context of abortion politics, Kristen Luker puts the point in these 
terms: 
While the militants on both sides would have us believe that the abortion 
debate is actually very simple, such simplicity is both a necessity and a 
luxury for them. A necessity because we must believe the things about which 
we are passionate are either clearly good or clearly bad.206 
 
Luker recognizes, seemingly in accordance with Talisse’s objections to Young, that 
“the belief in simplicity reduces any possibility of dialogue or learning or coming to 
                                                




terms with real human dilemmas, it is a luxury that neither society nor the debate 
itself can afford.”207  
Abortion as a Problem that Democracy Cannot Solve 
 Once we give everyone a voice on an issue like abortion, it may prove to be 
the case that the controversies cannot be settled through deliberation. This inability to 
reach consensus may happen because of the potential for reinforcing differences 
within communities that Sunstein, et al., suggest can happen in deliberative situations, 
or because the differences in the issue are, as Kristen Luker suggests about abortion, 
“not about ‘facts’ but about how to weigh, measure, and assess facts,”208 or perhaps 
because of a combination of both reasons. Regardless, deeply controversial political 
issues, as Mark Graber suggests, are controversial problems best negotiated by 
compromise until the changes over time in the political landscape erode interest in the 
controversy.209 Graber writes with regard to the Constitutional questions surrounding 
slavery in the 19th century, but the questions surrounding abortion can be compared to 
the slavery debate.210 Namely, both positions are embedded in a network of norms 
and social practices. Those living with these norms have a deeply rooted interest in 
protecting them. Again, Luker highlights this phenomenon noting that abortion 
movement politics “[are] so passionate and hard-fought because [they are] a 
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referendum on the place and meaning of motherhood” (emphasis is author’s).211 
Loretta J. Ross argues that the identity issues at stake can be broken down further into 
subdivisions of identity, noting, “many African-American women did not join 
mainstream pro-choice organizations, despite the visible black leadership.”212  Carol 
Maxwell notices that antiabortion protestors are cognizant of these structures of 
meaning. Maxwell writes that “[m]ost direct activists argued that ‘secular humanism’ 
has eroded the former ethical basis of the United States and replaced it with a social 
relativism that gives free reign to selfish tendencies inherent in human nature.”213 
When political issues appear to be binding to one’s constellation of a meaningful 
identity, it becomes difficult to reason with someone in a way in which they will 
allow you to pull their constellations apart. 
 In contrast to the debate between Young and Talisse, Graber and Luker appear 
to agree that norm changes make controversies disappear, and not deliberation and 
public discourse. Graber writes, “The last best hope of mankind is that the conditions 
of an initially unjust settlement will suffice to bring about a better world over time. 
Contemporary constitutionalists who prefer fighting to the death in the name of 
justice will likely only rid the world of human depravity only by ridding the world of 
human beings.”214 Likewise, Luker argues that,  
As more and more women work ad the economy shows no sign of returning to the 
good old days, the struggle between the supporters of exclusive motherhood and the 
supporters of working mothers may very well become moot for all but a tiny minority 
of women. But given the history of abortion in America, none of us should be too 
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surprised if, by the turn of the century, technological changes were once again to 
make abortion a battleground for competing social, ethical, and symbolic values.215 
 
Each author claims that abortion and slavery were not simply, or primarily, political 
questions as such. Instead, the problems are social problems, and changes in societal 
norm seem the best possible hope to correct the problem.  
 Hannah Arendt’s writings lend support to the position of Graber and Luker. In 
On Revolution Arendt discusses a mistake made by the French Revolutionaries in 
promising relief for the impoverished. Arendt believed that Revolutionaries were 
overreaching in promising to solve poverty. She did not believe politics could provide 
this type of justice. The French people became disolusioned with the Revolution 
“once they had discovered that a constitution was not a panacea for poverty” and they 
“turned against the Constituent Assembly, as they had turned against the Court of 
Louis XVI.”216 Politics is not responsible for all the world’s problems, nor can it 
solve all of them. Politics can, however, provide the space for coexistence. This space 
exists outside the abortion clinic.  
Activism, Deliberation, AND Action 
 
 Todd Gitlin writes, 
So activist, though not a lovely word, is a useful one because it reminds us 
that the world not only is but is made: Human beings make history, though as 
brilliant but monomaniacal prophet once wrote, not in conditions of their 
own making – and, I would add, not always with the results they prefer, to 
put it mildly.217 
 
However, there is good reason to suspect that such a conception of joining the masses 
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to change the world is almost certainly always monomaniacal. This view seems to 
boil politics down merely to understanding principles of justice in advance and then 
creating acts of collective will necessary to realize them. The activist committed to 
“making history” under such conditions appears to be committed to the possibility 
that any facts that contradict their cause simply are facts left to be altered by history 
until they are right. This position then faces two serious critiques. First, neither in the 
context of making the future nor reading into the truth of the past is a relationship 
with history a particularly democratic activity. The activist is a foundationalist on his 
or her views of justice, and “can be said to be ineducable and thus immune to 
democracy for they now their truths up front and have nothing to learn from the 
democratic process.”218 Second, if an activist believes in the necessity of victory for 
one’s movement, he may decide to do whatever necessary to stay historically 
relevant. Arendt argued that the French Revolutionaries made this very mistake. The 
Revolutionaries “had acquired the skill to play whatever part the great drama of 
history was going to assign them, and if no other role was available but that of the 
villain, they were more than willing to accept their part rather than remain outside the 
play.”219 The revolutionaries of France and Russia can be distinguished from activist 
groups because of the amount of power they had at their disposal, but not necessarily 
by what they intended to do with it. The activist sides with a Platonic, rather than an 
Aristotelian view of citizenship, and Sheldon Wolin explains the difference between 
the two: 
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By transforming power into principle, Plato could define the citizen as one 
who shared in the benefits flowing from that principle. This stands as a 
contrast to the Aristotelian notion of the citizen as one who shared in the 
power of the polis. In Plato’s scheme, there was no power to share; what was 
sharable was the Form of the Good written into the structure of the 
community. The results of this line of argument were two-fold: the idea of 
citizenship was severed from the idea of meaningful participation in the 
making of political decisions; and the idea of the political community, that is, 
a community that seeks to resolve its political conflicts from internal 
methods, is replaced by the idea of a virtuous community devoid of conflict 
and, therefore, devoid of ‘politics.’220 
 
This is ultimately the perspective of any movement that derives its legitimacy from its 
own particular vision of justice. The activist seems utterly unwilling to concede the 
right of fellow citizens to disagree, and unwilling to recognize that those who 
disagree ought to have a meaningful role in the decision-making of the community.  
 If Graber, Luker, and Arendt correctly assert that problems surrounding class 
standing produce either stalemates or solutions based entirely upon coercion rather 
than the Young or Talisse model, we are then forced to confront the idea that the 
manoeuvring of the factors that constitute the public sociology always depend upon 
factors beyond political engagement for their specific content and character. This 
manoeuvring of the public sociology, which is always composed by its history, 
geography, economy, technology, and previous held opinions prior to any particular 
political question, can direct and narrow the scope of the public conversation in 
advance of any exchanges involving reason-giving. Rickie Sollinger implies this view 
noting: 
[W]hen a subject is given its history—when the abortion controversy and 
abortion practice are examined with a historical framework—it becomes 
unsettlingly impossible to think about the subject in a fixed, static way or to 
                                                




claim universalised, decontextualized meanings for abortion and its satellite 
issues.221  
 
This historical view Sollinger mentions above leaves both Young’s claims about the 
scope of the importance of the activist and the deliberativist in doubt. Neither appears 
to have the resources to move the public in particular directions unless the stars align 
so that those factors of political constitution that public wilfulness cannot control do 
not object to their projects.  
 In raising his objections, Talisse rightly moves us away from Young’s account 
of the activist—but Talisse’s move is to reject all activism that isn’t expressly 
communicative—and thus, he is looking to push Young’s activist all the way back 
into our last chapter’s discursive models of political behavior. Talisse recognizes that 
activism is primarily defined, not by its goal, but by its effects. Activism is coercive 
by its nature. Young tries to control this coercive nature by hitching it to legitimating 
objectives, and Talisse seems to find places where her attempts to do so fail. Talisse 
concludes that only a fully inclusive deliberative procedure that adheres to 
deliberative virtues as best as possible can create legitimate coercion—all other 
coercion is thus, by definition, not legitimated.  
Turning Power into Principle 
 Both the deliberativist and the activist seem wedded to the concept of 
“transforming power into principle.” Yet, the arguments advanced by Graber and 
Luker insist that we are always at the mercy of external coercive forces from the 
world, which shape the problems that interest us in the first place and recommend 
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some suggestions as more feasible than others. Thus, both the deliberative democrat 
and the communicative democrat have to deal with the coercive forces of the shared 
world that bend and form our public sociology. This in itself is not necessarily the 
problem for either the deliberative or communicative democrat. The problem appears 
when both the deliberativist and the communicative democrat recognize that there are 
a myriad of non-political ways to participate in changing the landscape that shapes 
this sociology prior to deliberation. Trends in economic activity or moving to a city or 
a region experiencing a rapid population growth can change the grounds on which 
political questions are raised and take place. As Michael Walzer states, 
“Deliberation’s proper place is dependent on other activities that it doesn’t constitute 
or control.”222 Deliberation cannot take a stand on such practices, and activism 
engages in them in ways in which deliberation, as has already been noted, is openly 
critical. Further, the ways that deliberative democrats have been critical of activism 
reveals that activism cannot be engaged in the business of “social politics” with the 
specific virtue set that Iris Marion Young would like to attribute to them.  
 While Young’s vision of activism seems to have trouble justifying itself, it is 
still noteworthy that activism has a place in politics. After accounting for Young’s 
position, it appears that activism must be more agonistic than Young is willing to 
concede. The antagonistic that Young is trying to avoid is perhaps not the tragedy she 
seems to think it is. Levine and Nierras write, “Nevertheless, organizing a 
deliberation is also an exercise in power. It requires making substantive decisions that 
                                                




can be controversial.”223 The fact that challengers of such decisions do not engage 
purely in reason giving does not fundamentally corrode its importance. Lynn Sanders 
writes in support of Young’s position that “[d]eliberation requires not only equality in 
resources and the guarantee of equal opportunity to articulate persuasive arguments 
but also equality in ‘epistemological authority,’ in the capacity to evoke 
acknowledgement of one’s arguments.”224 But Sanders argues further that “what 
happens when American citizens talk to each other is often neither truly deliberative 
nor really democratic. This is partly, but not only, because the material prerequisites 
for deliberation are unequally distributed.”225 Activism’s value in addressing problems 
of deliberative inequality comes not simply through communicating this problem, but 
by organizing and challenging it through whatever organized means are available. 
Michael Walzer adds,  
Deliberation is not an activity for the demos. I don’t mean that ordinary men 
and women don’t have the capacity to reason, only that 100 million of them, 
or even 1 million or 100,000 can’t plausibly ‘reason together.’ And it would 
be a great mistake to turn them away from the things they can do together.226 
 
One of the activities that “they” do together is to engage in activism that challenges 
ignored practices through disruptive actions. In doing so, the activist engages in a 
participatory arena rather than a deliberative one. Young mistakenly attributes 
deliberative virtues to an activity that is not deliberative. Instead, activism appears to 
be a means by which citizens confront coercive action with coercive action. There is 
always an element of coercion in every social movement that goes well beyond 
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“persuasion.” Martin Luther King’s “direct action” in Birmingham was not simply 
involved in “persuading” people, nor is a “peaceful demonstration” of White 
Supremacists walking through the streets of predominantly Jewish Skokie, Illinois. 
There is something that is always either implicitly or explicitly ominous about such 
gatherings. They communicate more than benign and cheerful solidarity, they 
communicate to others that, in effect, “we are here, we are organized, and we can see 
you.” Such demonstrations are never simply a communication of ideas; they are a 
demonstration of power in and of themselves.  
 Martin Luther King used such a demonstration of power to his advantage. He 
landed in a Birmingham City jail because African American leaders had already 
negotiated with local businesses and those businesses had backed out of their 
agreement.227 King was no longer interested in persuading local businesses to keep 
their agreements; he was interested in making them do so. The Civil Rights 
Movement, particularly as expressed by King in “Letter from a Birmingham Jail,” did 
not hold onto, as Chantal Mouffe calls it, “the typical liberal illusion of a pluralism 
without antagonism.”228 Michael Sandel notes that the “struggle to win these rights” 
of the Civil Rights Movement, “displayed a higher, republican freedom—the freedom 
that consists in acting collectively to shape the public world.”229 Sandel further argues 
that, “The formative aspect of republican politics requires public spaces that gather 
citizens together, enable them to interpret their condition, and cultivate solidarity and 
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civic engagement.”230 Mouffe strikes a similar note, writing that “[i]nstead of trying 
to erase the traces of power and exclusion, democratic politics requires bringing them 
to the fore, making them visible so that they can enter the terrain of contestation.”231 
Political action implies a different set of political values than the social movement: 
action brings these considerations and contestations forward into a place where the 
arrangements between peers are in question, where activism moves organized causes 
in an organized world to provide social benefits for those who deserve, but do not 
receive. Both are laudable; both are important. Both are also distinct. 
Can We Act and “Hear the Other Side?” 
 Participation and action’s relationship to democracy is further complicated by 
the differences between talking and doing insofar as those who talk and those who do 
tend not only to have different objective, but they also often seem to be different 
people. John Dryzek argues that, “oppositional groupings can only be included in the 
state in benign fashion when the defining interest of the grouping can be related quite 
directly to a state imperative.”232 Dryzek believes that without such state imperatives 
groups “will be co-opted or bought off cheaply,” exchanging the goals of their 
movement for access.233 The activist movement must strike a balance between joining 
the public conversation and yet keeping one’s distance if it wishes to keep its goals. 
Diana C. Mutz’s recent work on the tension between participatory and deliberative 
democracy explores this tension. Mutz concludes,  
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Although diverse political networks foster a better understanding of multiple 
perspectives on issues and foster political tolerance, they discourage political 
participation, particularly among those who are averse to conflict. Those with diverse 
networks refrain from participation in part because of the social awkwardness that 
accompanies publicly taking a stand that friends or associates may oppose.234  
 
Mutz’s research confirms that those who engage in activism, in general, are not 
individuals who are interested in hearing the other side because listening to 
opposition only decreases one’s commitment to militate against perceived injustice. 
As soon as activists become embedded in mixed, polite company, they find it difficult 
to justify disrupting business for their cause. There have been attempts to establish 
deliberative forums to raise such awareness. The group Common Cause, for instance, 
attempts to engage activists groups. However, these deliberative conversations take 
place away from the place of contestation, which continues on.235 Mutz concludes that 
participatory democracy and deliberative democracy cannot coexist.236 Activism is not 
interested in reasonableness, but reasonableness is not particularly interested in 
acting. To the extent that abortion escorts and protestors have come to find peace 
amongst one another, it is from a mutual understanding that develops around 
familiarity with one another and not, from a bridging of one another’s point of view.  
Abortion Escorts and the “Ismene Problem” 
 
 Given its lack of commitment to reasonableness, activism is about power 
politics. Dryzek, Tilly, Diani, Young, and Mutz understand activists as like-minded 
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individuals militating against either prevailing opinion or elites perceived as 
legitimately having sole discretion to make decisions that activists would like access 
to make. Clearly, activism has an element of coercion, though it is less clear that the 
coercive nature of activism automatically reduces politics to nothing more than 
“Hobbesian truces,” as Talisse concludes. Since activism is a movement of like-
minded individuals unlikely to esteem alternate views, it is difficult to understand 
activists as engaging in something other than a “mob politics.”  It appears activism is 
taken up by people who lack a social life broad enough to feel conflicted by the costs 
that may be accrued by damaging such a social life.237  
 Social activism’s coercive aspects highlight the reasons why political action, 
like in the instance of abortion escorting, must part definitional company with 
activism. Political action, like abortion escorting, requires no greater authority than 
one’s own judgment. Political actions clears a space that asserts the limit of social 
movements whose legitimacy may be questionable, and may push for justice within 
their narrow interest at the expense of broader concerns for which they show less 
concern. The abortion escort is not an activist, but acts in opposition to other activists. 
The abortion escort does not support the movement directly, but supports those who 
need shielding from the activists-protestors’ coercive power. Mutz’s agrees noting 
that “[c]learly not all citizens feel they can speak their minds freely without 
repercussions for their public or private lives.”238 Those who belong to a cloistered 
enough portion of society, like pro-life advocates, have no problem speaking freely. 
They gather to try to heighten the “repercussions” for others who wish to engage 
                                                





freely in what they are legally entitled to do. Even then, protestors are not assembled 
to discuss abortion, it sufficient for them to appear in a manner that makes appearing 
otherwise daunting. Thus the abortion escort’s presence is not practicing the same 
type of power as the activist movement across the sidewalk: it is instead diffusing the 
power projected by their opposites.  
 As soon as politics tries to settle political disputes by inviting a level of social 
power that distorts the potential good political arrangements between citizens who 
disagree, we encounter the serious problem that we are not likely to reason it off its 
course. Setting activist movements against one another does not solve any impasse, 
since such a move would involve pitting cloistered ideologues against other cloistered 
ideologues. The conflict of social movements is characterized as a conflict between 
citizens and their views of justice, but this is an incomplete account.  
 Social movements are organizational entities. They have, to various degrees of 
sophistication, managerial elite’s administrative support and technicians in the form 
of protestors, PR staff, and activists. In contrast, abortion escorts have a single 
checking account and an email list. Activism’s organizational structure generates 
organizational interests and pressures, the reinforcement of ideas, the unconscious 
trade-off of ideals for operational efficiency. This must set it apart from political 
action. Joining an activist movement, as with being part of the civil society construct, 
is to be involved in the quintessential Durkheimian formulation of being nothing 
more than a voluntary “organ of society.”239 The promise of isonomy rests in that 
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there is something different about the human experience in living amongst others than 
the promise that if one works really hard, they may be permitted to be the gall bladder 
of their community.  
“And what life is dear to me, bereft of thee?” – Ismene, Antigone 
 Activism poses a similar difficulty to that in Sophocles’ Antigone. Antigone 
and Creon are committed to their views of justice, are locked into the “correctness” of 
their views, and refuse to compromise their commitment or their willingness to 
defend their conceptions of right. Haemon asks Creon to listen to the opinions of 
those who have been talking in the city, but Creon rebuffs him. Later when Haemon, 
the speaker for deliberation and democracy, attempts to kill Creon, he finds himself to 
weak to do so, and he destroys himself instead. Meanwhile, the other major character 
in the play, Ismene, counsels her sister Antigone to consider the wider world of 
people rather than just care about this narrow conception of justice. But Ismene, like 
the socially well-adjusted person in Diana Mutz’s study, does not dare act herself. 
Transitioning back to the realm of theory, we have devoted much attention to the fact 
that we cannot expect Haemon to come to our rescue when such forces collide. Thus, 
our only hope in resisting such tragedy in politics is to devise ways to empower our 
Ismenes to remind us of a wider world. Abortion escorts remind us of Ismene: they 
help us recognize a wider world beyond our pursuit of justice along one narrow 
dimension.  
                                                                                                                                      
authoritative intellectual historical commentary on the systematic notion of how we have 
come to be concerned with and embracing of the “rise of the social” that prioritizes social 
movements and eclipses political action. A topic that Arendt believed that she saw manifest 
in the politics of her time and the topic of discussion in chapter four. Wolin’s commentary on 




 Reasonable escorts and reasonable protestors are not interested in exploring 
whether the other person’s point of view on abortion may be correct. They are those 
who appreciate the work of their opponents and enjoy seeing them on the weekends. 
They appreciate their doppelgangers’ presence and their commitment to act within the 
law’s boundaries. In short, the reasonable ones recognize a wider world beyond their 
ideological commitments to abortion politics even while engaging in abortion 
politics. Even by this standard, not everyone outside the clinic could be defined as 
reasonable. Escorting creates a barrier between protestors and clinic users that 
eliminates the more unreasonable methods of activism that take place when they are 
not present. Abortion escorting is the activity of an active Ismene. 
 The next chapter will explore the value of political action. Political action is 
valuable because it helps individuals maintain their relationship with the world 
around them. This chapter examine the work of abortion escorts through the lens of 
Hannah Arendt’s, “Reflections on Little Rock.”  For now, it suffices to note that 
abortion escorting does not resemble any of the versions of activism explored in this 
chapter. Abortion escorts attempt to preserve “business as usual” where activism 
would try to stop or alter that course. Abortion escorts diffuse social power and arrest 
the resources of employed by activist networks in ways and in places where activists 
would gather and employ such resources. Abortion escorts block the communication 
of activists where they demand that their voice be heard. Abortion escorting preserves 
a space of controversy despite the work of protestors to seize this space and capture it 




 In short, the abortion escort is not engaged in activism. Whatever activisms’ 
virtues and dangers, and whatever its place in a well-ordered political society, 
abortion escorting is separate from activism. The networks of civil society and the 
methods of social activism shape our political world in ways that deserve attention 
and care. However, there must be recognition of a wider political world in which 
political acts, like abortion escorting, play their part. In the context of either the 
participatory benefits of civil society or the goals-oriented aims of social activist 
movements, political action represents something outside either of these political 
structures. In contrast to either of these two conceptual structures, action appears to 
reaffirm that the brick-and-mortar relationships that are still at bottom of good 
political arrangements. In short, political action is the doing of people who 
acknowledge they are living in a shared world with others through various attitudes 
and activities. While civil society and activism literature excites us by noting that the 
citizen can force change, political action reminds us that localized arrangements and 
attitudes in the world are worth preserving, and they deserve our defense. To the 
extent that we are all Ismenes, all people embedded in a particular and plural world, 
we all owe certain commitments to those with whom we share our life. To assert such 
a thing, and to act on its behalf and its defense, is not to deny the potential importance 
of the causes for which activists militate. Instead, it is to serve as a reminder that such 
causes are not everything in the world, not even everything of value in the political 
world. It is because abortion escorts can take advantage of the reality that they inhabit 
a shared world inhabited by plural beings that they are able to “win” simply by 




abortion-protest movement.240 This anti-power is not so strong that it forces the 
protestors away or renders them meaningless, or somehow crowds out their legitimate 
right to assemble. The escort is not trying to triumph over the abortion protestor, nor 
are they trying to win them over. Instead, escorts simply prevent any one particular 
presence from being dominant.  It is the political act that constitutes both a capacity 
for making a meaningful use of power while at the same time upholding the virtues of 
respect and reasonableness that activists, and communicative and deliberative 




                                                




Chapter 4: Understanding Abortion Escorts I: Reflections on 
Little Rock 
 
Hannah Arendt thought a great deal about the role of the citizen as an active 
participant in self-government. In “Reflections on Little Rock,” Arendt examined the 
power of the active participant to stand up to the dangerous aspects of broad 
procedural forces that were too invested in their broad interests to remember their 
fundamental political obligations to democratic consent and law-abidingness. Yet, 
even the most devoted Arendt sympathizers often treat “Reflections on Little Rock” 
as an essay that is to be avoided or explained away. It contains controversial 
comments on race relations in America and addresses what was a defining political 
question at the time in what many considered a highly esoteric way to make 
judgments. This is because Arendt’s comments on integration itself are actually 
incidental to the purpose of her writing the essay. “Reflections” is (and was intended 
to be) a critical essay for explaining the value of political action and why it is 
necessary for a healthy public life. Rather than bury “Reflections,” the Arendt scholar 
ought to opt for a more careful and selective reading, because the essay is an 
important piece of understanding Arendt’s theory of action. Further, for the purposes 
of understanding abortion escorts, the insights in “Reflections on Little Rock” are 
critical.  
 Specifically, Arendt suggests that regular people should have seen it as their 




were caught up in the swirling forces of state and society outside of Little Rock 
Central High School, they must have been overwhelmed by the fact that the simple 
act of going to school could cause all of the rules of civility to fall by the wayside. In 
escorting children to school, regardless of how one felt about integration, citizens 
would have acted politically in a manner that signified that children are not to be 
pushed around by “adult mobsters.” Arendt argues that such an action would have 
been far from trivial, it would instead have been an action that facilitated some fairly 
common-sense judgments. One needs only to think that mob rule should not dictate 
the way laws are executed and that young children should not be standing alone 
between Federal troops and an angry mob for the purposes of advancing social causes 
to find this option an appealing one. For a political community that continues its 
bizarre devotion to the idea that one person can “make a difference” by casting one 
ballot out of hundreds of thousands: here was a chance to show humanities 
difference-making capacity. In the process of making a difference, one could have 
shown that politics leaves more possibilities opened to the concerned citizen than 
merely siding with the “passive resistance” of the Federal government or the 
“massive resistance” of the mob outside of Little Rock Central High School.  Instead, 
this opportunity lapsed.   
 Perhaps this seems like a set of concepts and motivations too abstract for one 
to realistically expect them to motivate the average citizen. Average citizens, it might 
be said, are self-interested and not willing to stick their neck out in front of the mob 
just to deter harassment. More than this, critics who decry Arendt’s emphasis of the 




citizens for not sharing Arendt’s supposedly dated views of politics. There would 
seem then, on paper, a lot of reasons to be skeptical that people would ever engage in 
such a type of volunteer escorting in a situation like what Arendt is talking about… 
except for the fact that through the example of abortion escorting, we already know 
that they actually will. 
  Abortion clinic escorts walk along side people entering abortion clinics for 
the direct purpose of easing the anxiety and feelings of harassment for those entrants. 
In doing so, their acts minimize the power that intimidation can have in the execution 
of public policy. Their acts also implicitly assert that citizens have the ability through 
their capacity to act, in claiming their own share of public power and using it within 
their rights. Escorts accomplish this by using their power to appear in public as a 
means of defusing the power that protestors have over the situation outside. The 
connection to “Reflections on Little Rock” should seem clear: abortion escorts are an 
example of a similar type of political act in a similar type of situation that serves a 
similar set of purposes to that which Arendt had wished citizens had taken up in 
“Reflections on Little Rock,” but did not happen.     
This comparability is significant for a number of reasons. For political theory, 
the fact that Arendt’s criticism that political action was missing at Little Rock Central 
seems justified once we can find a comparable type of political action that 
corroborates her account. This (I hope) comes as good news for Arendt scholars who 
believe Arendt has meaningful things to say about political theory. It is also, 
hopefully, good news for one interested in understanding political practices more 




them. Arendt ‘s theorizing presents such a language. To the extent that Arendt’s 
language is vague or unclear, the example of abortion escorting can perhaps 
illuminate certain difficult points in her theory as well.  
Introducing Arendt’s Thought: The Social and the Political Realms 
One of the trickier portions of Arendt’s political theory is that she divides the 
world of human activity into realms. In particular, she divides life into the public, 
private, and social realms in The Human Condition.241 She describes the realm of the 
social as a place where life functions are accommodated by various types of processes 
that literally “deliver the goods” to those who need them. Some of these processes are 
learned, provided for and enforced culturally. With greater and greater frequency, 
these processes are being performed by some combination of industry and the state, 
both in the form of organizational power.242   In turn, these processes tend to demand 
unquestioned repetition and similarity for the sake of efficiency. When these 
processes are providing goods that are truly necessary for life-sustaining purposes, 
such as transportation, clothing, and food, this is not a terrible thing.  However, the 
larger the capacity to mass-produce becomes, the more the social has the potential to 
overstep its bounds and treat things (like living in a racially segregated society) as 
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necessary life-sustaining arrangements even when they might be unnecessary and 
even undesirable. Arendt writes that the social realm also replaces acting with 
behaving because of our increasing discoveries about the power of administrative 
technique privilege behavior,  
It is the same conformism, the assumption that men behave and do not act with 
respect to each other, that lies at the root of the modern science of economics, whose 
birth coincided with the rise of society and which, together with its chief and 
technical tool, statistics, became the social science par excellence. Economics—until 
the modern age a not too important part of ethics and politics and based on the 
assumption that men act with respect to economic activities as they act in every other 
respect—could achieve a scientific character only when men had become social 
being and unanimously followed certain patterns of behavior, so that those who did 
not keep the rules could be considered asocial or abnormal.243 
 
The conformity that ensures quality control in life-essential goods is not a positive 
force in the world of politics. The increasing amount of general rules, whose logic 
improves the technique of administration, is inescapable in its claims of efficiency. 
Max Weber thought that the logic of administration was modern man’s “iron cage,” 
and that the only choice for organizational power is “administration or 
dilettantism.”244  This explains why administration is necessary, but it does not justify 
why it ought to be all consuming. The radical possibility of action is not helpful in the 
automobile assembly line, but Arendt’s point in “Reflections on Little Rock” will be 
that the assembly line mentality is also not useful when we try to settle political 
questions like the integration controversy in the American South.  
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Passive v. Massive Resistance 
“Reflections on Little Rock” mourns the fact that the local citizen in this 
instance seemed by and large incapable of choosing any other options to pursue 
outside of giving themselves up to the non-participatory forces of what she calls 
either “passive” or “massive” resistance. One either supports administrative 
measures, Federal Troops being sent in, or one supports/joins the angry mob who use 
the tried and true technique of social pressure. Arendt writes that integration, “Like 
other race questions, it has a special attraction for the mob and is particularly well 
fitted to serve as the point around which a mob ideology and mob organization can 
crystallize.”245 In spite of this attraction, Arendt believes there was an alternative: 
reject the power of the mob or the Federal bureaucracy (of which the military is a 
conspicuous member) and take it upon one’s self to make sure that “children are not 
left to adult mobsters.”246  
Political Action as Opposed to Justifying the Use of State Power 
This political act was available to citizens and not seized upon despite the fact 
that such an act requires nothing more than walking the children into school. In 
advancing this claim, Arendt provides a nuanced argument as to why such an activity 
would have been so meaningful. Given the similarities between this proposed 
escorting outside of Little Rock Central and escorting individuals into abortion clinics 
in present day, Arendt’s analysis deserves full attention. In particular, Arendt believed 
she saw two disturbing developments at Little Rock. The first of these problems is 
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what Arendt refers to as “the rise of the social,” the realm of human affairs that is 
neither public nor private but, in modern times, has seemingly intruded upon and 
usurped human preoccupations that ought to be public or private.247  The second 
problem that Arendt sees is described by a formulation of the differences between 
two different but related phenomena that she termed “power” and “force.”  Whereas 
power is something that exists when people come together to act in concert, force can 
be exerted upon people through the careful manipulation of events or structures of 
power to achieve a desired result.248  The first appears primarily in the form of a 
protest mob and the second in the form of Federal troops ordered to contain the 
protestors an Executive branch order. Arendt argues that the political disputes at 
Little Rock were fought through means that were unhealthy for and potentially even 
hostile to vigorous political life.  
Arendt is deeply interested in constitutional questions, and she uses 
“Reflections on Little Rock” to apply some of her more profound theorizing to actual 
political practice. Arendt’s constitutional thought may not obviously appear as such 
because she radically reworks many political concepts in terms of both definition and 
use. Arendt scours history, philosophy, literature and culture, looking back in time to 
ancient examples and definitions to develop an understanding of the present. In doing 
so, she is being faithful to the idea that concepts employed to understand political life 
are not constants but change over time. Specifically, Arendt was deeply aware of the 
constitutive ruptures that transpired in the times that she lived in. The moral, 
philosophical, and technological upheaval of the early twentieth century ripped out 
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many of the foundations that had rooted political practices in times that came before. 
Arendt’s political theory proceeds from the perspective of looking out at a new world 
of political arrangements by taking lessons from how governments and theorists in 
the past had tried to answer constitutive problems while at the same time developing 
an understanding of the changes that took place in her time.  
Power and Force as Defined by Arendt 
When Arendt turns her attention towards the previously mentioned problems 
of “the rise of the social” and the difficulties associated with the relationship between 
“force” and “power,” she sees such problems as ones that have important constitutive 
significance. Early in “Reflections on Little Rock” she states bluntly that, “The point 
at stake, therefore, is not the well-being of the Negro population alone, but, at least in 
the long run, the survival of the Republic.”249  The “survival of the Republic” is at 
stake in understanding such political moments not because such moments require an 
interpretation of questions of justice, but because they force inspection of the actual 
and potential workings of a variety of complex human relationships. In On Violence, 
Arendt writes, “The extreme form of power is All against One. The extreme form of 
violence is One against All. And this latter is never possible without instruments.250” 
In such definitions, Arendt is describing types of human relationships that can be 
created, maintained, altered, destroyed, and reformed again.  
According to Arendt, the more “extreme forms” of violence and power were 
both amassed at the scene outside of Little Rock Central High School. The protestors, 
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“the angry mob” as Arendt describes them, utilizes the “power of all against one” in 
the form of intimidating African-American children as they go to school. The 
assembled protestors utilize an exclusionary power that derives from the society’s 
power to declare something or someone “abnormal.”  On the reverse, the calling upon 
Federal Troops by the Executive represents the other side of social relationships. The 
use of the instruments of bureaucracy and the powers of the administrative state are 
deployed in a manner that countermands the protestors in something that resembles 
“one against all.”   
Both the force of the mob and the counter-force of the state are seen by 
Arendt as part of the social realm and not the political realm because they are 
different forms of regulated behavior as opposed to full and free human activity. 
Whereas Federal Troops behave according to the rules and procedures of the various 
institutions which put them into motion, the mob behaves according to the rules and 
procedures of norms reinforced through the pressures of conformity. Arendt is 
working through this problem out of a concern for the effects of “society’s victory in 
the modern age, its early substitution of behavior for action and its eventual 
substitution of bureaucracy, the rule of nobody, for personal rulership.”251  In fact, the 
crux of her fears about Little Rock can be found in a passage in The Human 
Condition a page or two prior to the above quotation, “In reality, deeds will have less 
and less a chance to stem the tide of behavior, and events will more and more lose 
their significance.”252  For Arendt, the escort at Little Rock Central would not simply 
have been standing up to protestors – the escort would, more importantly, stand up for 
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the idea that the fate of one’s own political community needs at times to be decided 
by the deeds of its members rather than by rules of behavior. Arendt gives an example 
of why this claim by the escort is so important in On Violence,   
To claim, as is often done, that a tiny unarmed minority has successfully, by means 
of violence–shouting, kicking up a row, et cetera—disrupted large lecture classes 
whose overwhelming majority had voted for normal instructional procedures is 
therefore very misleading… What actually happens in such cases is something more 
serious: the majority clearly refuses to use its power and overpower the disruptors; 
the academic processes break down because no one is willing to raise more than a 
voting finger for the status quo.253  
 
Arendt worries that law-abidingness in America has moved from something derived 
from the law as an “intimate connection” (its original meaning, lex, in Latin) to 
something that seems to be nothing more than processes of enforced behavior.254  
These processes are threatening because, as Arendt says in finishing her classroom 
example, “The merely onlooking majority, amused by the spectacle of a shouting 
match between student and professor, is in fact already the latent ally of the 
minority.”255  The onlooking majority need not agree with either the state or the mob, 
although when it came to Southern attitudes, the political views of the mob were 
overwhelmingly more popular. Arendt was aware of this fact herself, and she points 
to the results of a Virginia public opinion poll at the time showed “that 79% denied 
any reason to have to accept the Supreme Court’s decision as binding.”256  Yet, most 
were neither protestors nor Federal troops, but were, in fact, “merely onlookers” to a 
political scene of enormous importance. Arendt discouragingly notes that, “The so-
called liberals and moderates of the South are simply those who are law-abiding, and 
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they have dwindled to a minority of 21%.”257  Everyone else favored the violence of 
enforced ostracism of segregation, and were apparently willing to condone any means 
to protect it as necessary, as they were unwilling to do anything to ensure that 
protestors would not cross any lines of what might be considered common decency.  
Arendt’s conceptual understanding of violence and power in their purest and most 
extreme forms provide her foundation for making judgments about the meaning of 
events like the contestation at Little Rock Central High School. Arendt, in reflecting 
on this issue as she has, is eager to contemplate how to make space for those actors 
who will do more than “raise a voting finger” in order to preserve what is at stake for 
self-rule. Arendt is interested in how to clear out the war between different forces in 
society and assert the power of the political (or public, she uses them 
interchangeably) realm.  
Arendt’s public realm is a place artificially created to preserve our equality as 
human beings and to allow us to distinguish ourselves amongst one another by virtue 
of our actions.258  This is a decidedly non-modern way to think about the importance 
of politics, but it is, in Arendt’s mind, a way to assert the values of political equality 
while appealing on pragmatic grounds, rather than on comprehensive moral doctrines. 
By Arendt’s logic, segregation is an evil because it destroys the possibility of a space 
where all can come together as equals and participate in public life. However, she 
remains critical of “forced integration” because the resistance to segregationist forces 
comes in a way that asserts administrative power, and pushes citizens to choose sides 
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on points of view they hold in their minds, rather than on obligations they might owe 
each other by virtue of actually sharing the world with one another. The simple act of 
escorting the children into the school would have resisted the mob directly and 
asserted the political realm by acknowledging the obvious fact that everyone in Little 
Rock, no matter how hard the law works to perpetuate a lie, share a world together. 
As it was, people showed up in their capacity as family members, members of the 
segregationist cause, or as members of a military or law enforcement institution. The 
only people who showed up as themselves were the children, and while there were 
many groups around them, they showed up as themselves all alone. Had someone 
developed the courage and insight to walk children in their community safely to 
school, they could have walked through those doors with the children, all of them as 
themselves, together.  
Some of the most difficult moments in politics often occur when law-
abidingness itself becomes something the public is willing to sacrifice for the short-
term expediency of their political objectives. If the importance of finding ways to 
effectively “raise a voting finger” were absent from the scene at Little Rock Central 
because there were no people who volunteered to escort, then this is not the case 
outside of abortion clinics where escorts are present. The comparison between the 
two situations forces a recognition that abortion escorts are standing for more than 
their policy perspectives, but are literally standing for the value of the public realm 
and, in the terminology of Arendt, “personal rulership.”   
In taking their place out in the plain view of protestors, patients, clinic staff 




deed in and of itself, and not for the broadening of some policy aim. Escorts engage 
in an activity that is political but is standing outside of, and usually against, the 
modern forms of administration and mass opinion. This formulation gives a context 
in which we can judge the value of deciding to become a volunteer escort not along 
dimensions of joining, choosing, or persuading, but instead to judge the merit of the 
actual doings of such escorts.  
Critics of Arendt’s Political Theory 
There is a further complication to this story. Contemporary understandings of 
the philosophical categories that Arendt employs are widely interpreted by academic 
scholarship as “highly idiosyncratic and internally incoherent.”259  Prominent 
theorists like Seyla Benhabib argue that  
What has been irritating to commentators about the Arendtian art of making 
distinctions has its sources in a more basic dimension of her philosophical 
methodology, namely, her “phenomenological essentialism.”  This is Arendt’s belief, 
particularly prominent in The Human Condition, that each type of human activity has 
a proper “place” in which it can be carried out.260 
 
Criticisms of this variety about Arendt’s theoretical understandings need to be dealt 
with critically if there is to be any value in taking “Reflections on Little Rock” and 
comparing it with abortion escorting. These criticisms will be dealt with as they come 
up, but to respond more generally for now, the major criticisms that can be found in 
the commentaries of the likes of Benhabib, Kristeva and Pitkin all proceed from a 
common misunderstanding of Hannah Arendt’s political theory, which is exemplified 
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by the cited passages above. They all are inclined to believe that Arendt’s categorical 
distinctions, such as her realms of the private, social, and political that she primarily 
explains in The Human Condition, are sturdy and inviolable taxonomies of human 
activity that should suggest constant and easily definable laws and boundaries.  
Even the most sympathetic commentators on Arendt’s political theory seem to 
believe that this is the case and tread carefully when it comes time to address these 
boundaries. Bonnie Honig, in using Arendt to push a conception of feminist political 
theory, writes “Notorious for her rigid public/private distinction, Arendt protects the 
sui generis character of her politics and the purity of her public realm by prohibiting 
the issues of social justice and gender.”261  Even Jeffrey Isaac, in looking to be 
charitable to what Arendt is trying to do with her taxonomies, still begs off, “wishing 
to defend many of Arendt’s dualistic formulations.”262     
 But one ought to find something instantly curious about a critical approach to 
seeing Arendt’s realms and divisions in this manner since critics are also quick to 
point out that Arendt herself does not use these distinctions as “rigidly” as she is 
supposedly “notorious” for in her own studies. Rather than pursue the possibility of 
this being indicative of an interpretative failure, Benhabib and Pitkin in particular (but 
not alone) push the conclusion that the fault is Arendt’s for being inconsistent. This 
is, in fact, the thesis of Hannah Pitkin’s Attack of the Blob, where she writes that 
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Arendt’s concept of “the social” was “confused and her way of deploying it at odds 
with her most central and valuable teaching.”263   
 Perhaps the commentaries have confused some things in their readings. The 
evidence that these authors provide that Arendt intended her distinctions to be “rigid” 
comes largely from cited passages where Arendt makes declarative statements about 
what she means when she says “social,” “public,” or “private.”  From this, many 
theorists race to the conclusion that we should believe that her concepts are 
interpretable only via the various carefully defined interpretations they have gone to 
great pains to assemble through careful reading of Arendt’s work, even though 
Arendt herself clearly does not use these concepts in this way. This leaves theorists 
mystified when they look at Arendt’s essays on timely political topics.  
Benhabib seems practically aghast in her reaction to what Arendt writes in 
“The Crisis in Education,” asking about Arendt’s claims in the essay, “If this is so, 
are not the walls that Arendt sought to erect between the public and the private more 
porous and more fragile than she would lead us to believe?”264  Arendt herself has a 
response to this question indirectly in On Violence. When writing about the 
differences between “violence,” “power,” “force,” “strength,” and “authority,” she 
writes, seemingly in recognition of Benhabib’s confusion, 
It is perhaps not superfluous to add that these distinctions, though by no means 
arbitrary, hardly ever correspond to watertight compartments in the real world, from 
which, nevertheless they are drawn… Moreover, nothing, as we shall see, is more 
common than the combination of violence and power, nothing less frequent than to 
find them in their pure and therefore extreme form. From this, it does not follow that 
authority, power, and violence are all the same. (Italics are mine in both instances)265 
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It is clear from the selection above that these conceptions are not attempts to draw out 
analytically tight concepts akin to Rawls’ and Nozick’s attempts to define justice in 
their seminal works. Instead, these concepts look to distinctions between things as 
they appear in the real world and are used to draw out perceptive differences through 
the use of contrast.  
Seen this way, such these categorical contrasts are important especially when 
the subject matters at issue appear complicated or confused. Arendt does not believe 
that it is useful, or even possible, to get one’s story straight in the abstract before 
going out and using theoretical constructions of thought to talk about the real world. 
The logic behind this comes from a long and complicated set of arguments and 
philosophical commitments, but for our purposes here, it suffices to say that Arendt 
sides with the compelling argument that the theoretical and political worlds do not 
ever line up so neatly for the practice of the perfection of abstract design to be of any 
real value.266   
A more practical way of interpreting Arendt’s theoretical work the perhaps 
should start with looking at how she actually uses all of her various 
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“phenomenological categories” to look at a complicated and dynamic world. In 
surveying her work in this manner, it appears that Arendt’s categories are used more 
as primary colors than as realms with rigid boundaries.  
Just as the artist is aware that there exist more colors than just red, yellow, and 
blue, such knowledge does not diminish the importance in her understanding the 
primary colors and their properties. Nor does it diminish their importance for her 
ability to see how the other colors might be seen as composed in combination. From 
this perspective, Pitkin’s critique that Arendt’s concept of the social undermines her 
“most central and valued teaching” would logically follow no more than saying that 
the concept of blue is undermined by the existence of blue-green. To paraphrase our 
earlier quotation from Arendt: it does not follow from the fact that these interpretative 
devices appear in combination that they are in fact the same. They can in fact be both 
together and distinct at the same time, and indeed, this is the type of parsing that 
Arendt does in “Reflections on Little Rock.” For the project of looking of developing 
the political significance of abortion escorting, this method seems to recommend 
much in terms of a practical method of observing complex dynamics in the real world 
that carry with them a vast array of histories, physical realities, and autonomous 
individuals that are all simultaneously present at the scene.  
Arendt’s Reflections 
 
In one critical paragraph in “Reflections on Little Rock”, Hannah Arendt 




than change passive into massive resistance.”267  Arendt writes further that the “sorry 
fact” of the Little Rock crisis “was that the town’s law-abiding citizens left the streets 
to the mob, that neither white nor black citizens felt it their duty to see the Negro 
children safely to school.”268  These passages illustrate that Arendt’s criticism here 
moves beyond the particular political issue at stake and aims directly at the political 
practices of the town’s citizens who had, in Arendt’s words, “decided that 
enforcement of the law against mob rule and protection of children against adult 
mobsters were none of their business.”269   
Political Means versus Political Ends 
Rather than frame the actions of the participants and non-participants around 
the issue of integration, Arendt asks us to focus on the wisdom in accommodating 
unacceptable means to a political end. As mentioned earlier, Arendt notes that the 
overwhelming number of citizens in the South opposed integration and even opposed 
their responsibility to respect the decision of the Supreme Court. She moves our 
attention, with statements like the ones cited above, towards methods of rule-making 
and rule-following and the ways in which they can be carried out responsibly. In On 
Reovlution, Arendt argues that the genius of the creation of the American 
Constitution lay with the fact that the American Founders did not try to generate 
power by virtue of law, but instead opted for the Roman formulation of “power in the 
people, authority in the Senate.”270  This formulation is one whereby the institutions 
of the state have the authority to make the law, but the power that grants such rule-
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making resides in the hands of the people. The importance of such relationships is 
that they prevent laws from being only pieces of paper with writing on them. With 
regards to Little Rock Central, the relationship between power in the people and 
authority in the Senate has broken down substantially. One is either with “the people” 
insofar as a vast majority of White Southerners rejected the authority of the Supreme 
Court or they are with “authority” in the form of the agents of the state. No one, in 
Arendt’s view, seems particularly concerned with attempting to preserve the 
relationship between the two.  
Arendt asserts in “Reflections,” “the crucial point is to remember that it is not 
the social custom of segregation that is unconstitutional, but its legal enforcement.”271  
While this may read as if it is a statement on the limitations of state interference in 
social customs, the statements cuts just as strongly in the other direction. The 
unconstitutionality of the legal enforcement of segregation is a barrier that limits the 
ability of social customs to legislate public practice through formal lawmaking and 
formal law enforcement. Given that one of society’s primary powers is its ability to 
discriminate, it needs to be contained by law more often than not. When social 
custom is not permitted to assert itself through law, it pursues the avenues that its own 
powers and devices, and this can include vigilante behavior. 
When this relationship between law and custom is strained by political 
disputes, (for example, prohibition on alcohol), the vigilantism in question may only 
consist of small, secretive acts of law-defiance that can facilitate a general failure of 
public enforceability. However when the boundaries between social customs of 
association and political rights are less clear, as is the case with public schools, 
                                                




politicians and locals who were attached to social customs may become emboldened 
to resist more openly. Arendt also notes that when disputes are over subjects that 
seem to unquestionably belong to the domain of politics, law seemingly has the 
advantage in making custom submit. To exemplify the latter, Arendt notes that, “in 
the case of that part of the Civil Rights bill regarding the right to vote, no Southern 
state in fact dared offer strong opposition.”272   
Arendt is not trying to argue that segregation ought to be preserved. She 
quotes William Faulkner, who wrote once, “enforced integration is no better than 
enforced segregation.”273  The difference that adding the word “enforced” makes is of 
considerable importance because it frames Arendt’s quarrel not with the idea of 
integration, but instead with the means of achieving such aspirations effectively. Her 
claim about combating segregation is not about its importance, but instead that  
Segregation is discrimination enforced by law, and desegregation can do no more 
than abolish the laws enforcing discrimination; it cannot abolish discrimination and 
force equality upon society but it can, and indeed must, enforce equality within the 
body politic.274   
 
The state’s efforts in this case, in Arendt’s eyes, cross over from “abolishing the laws 
enforcing discrimination” into the realm of trying to “abolish discrimination itself and 
force equality on society.”  Southern society tried to leverage the fact that the state 
cannot practically cross over this line and claimed that they no longer were obligated 
to recognize the legitimacy of preserving the rule of law when it did not suit them. 
The former problem of enforcing equality creates problems for an administrative state 
that cannot realistically solve such problems via administrative politics. The latter 
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problem of de-legitimizing the law creates an untenable precedent of pursuing policy 
aims through movements of collective peer pressure.  
  
 The values of individuality, judgment, and autonomy are nowhere to be found 
in forces of either “passive” or “massive” resistance. A choice between either giving 
one’s self to mob mentality or else calling the Federal government and waiting for the 
massive power and organization it brings to respond to the problem leaves little 
meaningful space for each individual to consider themselves “self-governed” in such 
a context.  Nor do the means of enforcing a political decision in such ways represent 
themselves as realistically “self-limited” by the types of political practices that are 
being called upon to enforce such decisions. The choice between the mob and state, 
Arendt argues, is a choice between either too little or too much power in defense of 
the law. Rather than remind the protestors at Little Rock of their obligations to the 
rule of law, Arendt makes the case that the State overwhelmed them with the specter 
of physical force instead.  
The Elements of Politics  
To understand Arendt’s argument a little more clearly, it may help to think 
back on her first major work. When Arendt wrote The Origins of Totalitarianism, she 
wrote to cast about, as Seyla Benhabib reminds us, “for the ‘elements’ of 
totalitarianism; for those currents of thought, political events and outlooks, incidents 
and institutions, that once the ‘imagination of history’ gathered them together in the 




context.”275   Arendt explores these currents as a means to make practical judgments 
about political problems. Arendt does this work of looking for currents of thoughts, 
events and institutions in all of her work, and not only The Origins of Totalitarianism. 
What she does in essays about American politics like “Lying in Politics” and 
“Reflections on Little Rock” requires an understanding that the currents she examines 
change in their appearance and have different significance in shaping different 
historical events. Even so, the method of understanding remains similar and is simple 
at its core. Arendt is trying to get an understanding of how elements that appear in 
different combinations shape different events and movements in political history, and 
she has a couple of passages in the preface to Part One of Origins that help guide us 
to this conclusion. In one such passage, she emphasizes the importance of how these 
various elements of the past combine to bring out something new: 
nearly all elements that crystallized in the novel totalitarian phenomenon; they had 
hardly been noticed by either learned or public opinion because they belonged to a 
subterranean stream of European history where, hidden from the light of the public 
and the attention of enlightened men, they had been able to gather an entirely 
unexpected virulence.276 
 
Arendt suggests that when we look at a political story that emerges and reveals to us 
many of the themes of the past that crystallized into a newly constituted present. 
Arendt, in the spirit of the “new science” of Montesquieu, Tocqueville, and the 
American Founders, is clearly thinking constitutively about the moments worthy of 
our study.277  Arendt also wants to use these exercises as a means to sharpen our 
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political judgment so that we can see the “subterranean streams” in the present day, 
which might crystallize into the moments of the future. Thus, repeated inquiries into 
the crystallizations of political events sharpens the political judgments we make so 
that we may better, to put it in a Machiavellian way, anticipate the changes in fortune 
that a polity may face. Arendt warns us about misinterpreting these elements as well,  
Since only the final crystallizing catastrophe brought these subterranean trends into 
the open and to public notice, there has been a tendency to simply equate 
totalitarianism with its elements and origins – as though every outburst of anti-
Semitism or racism or imperialism could be identified as ‘totalitarianism’.278 
 
Arendt is using a method that works on a broader level of analysis than discerning 
simple causal chains. When all of the elements that Arendt studies in Origins of 
Totalitarianism come together, they do so in the form of totalitarian regimes. 
However, Arendt’s thinking about the elements of totalitarianism is carried out 
carefully and subtly. Not all elements involved in crystallizing into modern 
totalitarianism are necessarily “totalitarian elements.” Further, the same constellation 
of elements in a slightly different setting, may not produce totalitarianism in the same 
form, and possibly might not even produce totalitarianism at all. Such a 
methodological move does not give up on the importance of the “normal science” 
elements of political science, but rather, is meant to supplement the work of “normal 
political science” by noticing that some problems of great import appear because they 
are the outcome of an incredibly complex sequence of combinations.   
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A Critical Element: The Modern Potential of State Power 
Returning attention to “Reflections on Little Rock,” it may seem off-putting 
by suggesting that the “subterranean elements” she digs out in the essay ought to grab 
our attention as more urgent than the plight of African-Americans in the segregated 
American South. Arendt’s case may read as “philosophy with its head in the clouds,” 
but the fact remains that African-Americans pushing for political equality were by-
and-large fighting for inclusion into the American political regime, and the Founders 
of this political regime paid serious attention to similar subterranean elements in 
crafting America’s political constitution. Perhaps there is no more famous example of 
this than James Madison’s Federalist Number 10, where he writes of two dangers that 
seem in accord to Arendt’s comments in “Reflections.”  On equality, Madison writes, 
“Theoretic politicians… have erroneously supposed, that by reducing mankind to a 
perfect equality in their political rights, they would, at the same time, be perfectly 
equalized in their possessions, their opinions, and their passions.”279   On the ruinous 
effect of faction, he writes, “The inference to which we are brought, is, that the causes 
of faction cannot be removed; and that relief is only to be sought in the means of 
controlling its effects.”280  Madison’s argument regarding controlling the effects of 
factions mirrors Arendt’s concerns regarding discrimination. Arendt worries that 
others have “erroneously supposed” that equality can cure more ills than it actually is 
capable of curing and that attempting to eliminate discrimination, like attempting to 
eliminate factions in Madison’s famed article, would be a “remedy, that is worse than 
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the disease.”281  Both Arendt and Madison seem to have fallen back on 
Montesquieu’s position that “democracy has to avoid two excesses: the spirit of 
inequality, which leads it to aristocracy or to the government of one alone, and the 
spirit of extreme equality, which leads it to the despotism of one alone, as the 
despotism of one alone ends by conquest.”282   
The state always has to take up concerns about realizing its own practical 
potential, and this problem is one that is more difficult to come to terms with the 
more innovations that appear on the scene that change the horizons of what is and is 
not possible for the state to actually do. Sheldon Wolin wrote about the relationship 
between the state and its own power: 
Like any human organization, a government has a limited amount of energy. When it 
is extended too far, when it tries to do too much, it trails off into impotence. This 
means that one of the continuing tasks of statecraft is to discover at what points 
disagreement, conflict, and variety may be tolerated without their endangering the 
supporting framework that makes waywardness possible.283  
 
In particular, the relationship between the state-as-institution and its own power has 
been radically transformed at an astounding pace since industrialization. As 
technological capacity increases, a growth in political-economic capacity follows. 
When this economy of political activity grows rapidly, the state oftentimes loses any 
real sense of where the limits of its own power reside. Such limits are usually only 
understood through the experience of testing them, and the history of the twentieth 
century endured many ill-fated attempts by states to push the limits of their newfound 
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powers towards imagined new frontiers that they believed to now be possible in the 
new political economy of their age.  
 Arendt clearly understood that there were serious consequences that came 
with dramatic changes to political economy. Her understanding of this apparently 
dramatic expansion in the energies of the state is a frequent launching point for many 
of her major works. The Human Condition, which is usually interpreted as more 
philosophical than the rest of her canon, begins with the following lines 
In 1957, an earth-born object made by man was launched into the universe, where for 
some weeks it circled the earth according to the same laws of gravitation that swing 
and keep in motion the celestial bodies – the sun, the moon, and the stars. 
 
This event, second in importance to no other, not even to the splitting of the 
atom, would have been greeted with unmitigated joy of it had not been for 
the uncomfortable military and political circumstances attending it.284   
 
In a similar vein, On Revolution introduces to us the prospect that political economy 
has changed to the extent that, “To sound off with a cheerful ‘give me liberty or give 
me death’ sort of argument in the face of unprecedented and inconceivable potential 
of destruction in nuclear warfare is not even hollow; it is downright ridiculous.”285  
The first paragraph of On Violence contains this passage:  
The technical development of the implements of violence has now reached the point 
where no political goal could conceivably correspond to their destructive potential or 
justify their actual use in destructive conflict.286 
 
What follows from these observations on state power are two conclusions that Arendt 
investigates. The first conclusion is that state power is reaching the point where we 
can almost no longer afford the costs of any one state testing the limits of its power. 
The second conclusion is that states faced with this problem must somehow learn to 
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engage crises in the political world with an awkward middle temperament when it 
comes to unleashing their capabilities to achieve political objectives. A frustration 
emerges in Western politics when the state can potentially exert incredible destructive 
power with such little cost, but the catastrophic results of doing so would be so 
terrible as to be practically unconscionable. In addition to Wolin’s point that the state 
must fear overreaching its energies to the point of impotence, the modern Western 
state must also deal with the dangers of spending their energies too easily.  
 With this theme in mind, Arendt explores the change in communications 
technology and the advancement of the art of public administration, amongst other 
things in her essay “Lying in Politics,” book Eichmann in Jerusalem, and also, in 
“Reflections on Little Rock.”   As the state can turn its energies more and more 
towards things that once were done politically by citizens through non-state means, 
Arendt shows an interest in what happens to citizens who once used their own power 
and political skills to accomplish tasks now increasingly taken up by the state 
apparatus.287  In short, the extension of state power should not only be concerned with 
the practical question of “can it achieve the ends it sets out to pursue?” but it also 
needs to be aware of the question, “will the pursuit of such ends undermine the 
regime itself?”  With regards to the state’s actions at Little Rock, Arendt believes that 
it fails on both counts when trying to force social equality upon Southern citizens. 
Beyond this, the individual needs to find and use space to act politically regardless of 
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the actions of motives of the state apparatus or civil society. When the escort is 
actually in the act of escorting, he or she is neither the state nor the society, but the 
individual whose ability to self-rule has moved them to act in a manner that is in 
accord with his or her vision of political obligation.  
Political Obligation As Assailed by Modern Society 
 
 Political obligations are formed between people who make the decision that 
they are bound to one another, and Arendt lays out her case for this most specifically 
in On Revolution. Arendt traces the original root of the Roman word for law, lex, and 
writes “The original meaning of the word lex is ‘intimate connection’ or relationship, 
namely something connects two things or two partners whom external circumstances 
have brought together.”288  While Hobbes, Locke, and Rousseau credit different 
reasons for driving such partners into making agreements, Arendt attributes it to 
nothing more than being thrown into similar circumstances and the basic fact of 
isonomic relationship: all have the ability to act and be acted upon in return. Arendt 
points out that the signatories of the Mayflower Compact “obviously feared the so-
called state of nature, the untrod wilderness, unlimited by any boundary, as well as 
the unlimited initiative of men bound by no law.”289  Arendt argues that from the 
early American experience, the idea that power actually does come from the people 
was important. Arendt argues that those who formed the American political 
constitution, “they did not think in terms of fiction and an absolute, the nation above 
all authority and absolved from all laws, but in terms of a working reality, the 
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organized multitude whose power was exerted in accordance with laws and limited by 
them.”290  The recognition of “the multitudes” as a source of absolute power, 
unbound by law and moved by pity and rage, was, in Arendt’s view the important 
contrasting characteristics to the French and Russian Revolutionary experiences. The 
extreme character of the multitudes played out Montesqueiu’s prophecy with dismal 
precision: it served as a justification for nothing more than rule by the one over the 
many.291   
Modern times have meant new challenges that only further illustrate the 
importance of self-limitation and law-abidingness.   One of Arendt’s many chilling 
passages about the “banality of evil” that she saw in Adolf Eichmann reads,  
Eichmann claimed more than once that his organizational gifts, the coordinations of 
evacuations and deportations achieved by his office had helped his victims; it had 
made their fate easier. If this thing had to be done at all, he argued, it was better that 
it be done in good order.292 
 
The specter of political regimes like Nazi Germany, with their unchecked, unlimited 
abilities to rule with such recklessness and brutality, is horrifying enough. That they 
further can draw upon the complicit skills of the talented and ambitious office 
manager in assisting, who may then shield his own conscience with simple platitudes 
and false dichotomies, allows oppressive regimes to rule ruthlessly with a precision 
and organization not possible before.    
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 The language of the state, as well as its actions, is also subject to the modern 
bureaucratic systems and their expertise. Walter Lippman’s Public Opinion 
uncovered just how powerful and systematic it can be to lie to the public through the 
careful manipulation of their preconceived stereotyped understandings. Lippman 
wrote,  
For the most part we do not first see, and then define, we define first and then see. In 
the great blooming, buzzing confusion of the outer world we pick out what our 
culture has already defined for us, and we tend to perceive that which we have picked 
out in the form stereotyped for us by our culture.293 
 
This manipulation is not simply in regards to how the public sees information it 
receives, but it also affects the policymakers as well. This is the primary topic of 
Arendt’s essay on “The Pentagon Papers,” which she titled “Lying in Politics.”  Aside 
from deceiving the public, Arendt emphasizes that the policymakers of the Vietnam 
War were also quite skilled at deceiving themselves by employing models of thought 
and reasoning that were more stereotype than reality. Arendt explains this problem in 
a passage of the essay’s first section,  
Men who act, to the extent that they feel themselves to be the masters of their own 
futures, will forever be tempted to make themselves masters of the past, too. Insofar 
as they have the appetite for action and are also in love with theories, they will hardly 
have the natural scientist’s patience to wait until theories and hypothetical 
explanations are verified or denied by facts. Instead, they will be tempted to fit their 
reality—which, after all, was man-made to begin with and thus could have been 
otherwise—into their theory, thereby mentally getting rid of its disconcerting 
contingency.294 (Italics are author’s) 
  
The problem with getting rid of “disconcerting contingency” is that contingency is the 
byproduct of the human ability to “act.” Since action is spontaneous and derives from 
the sovereign capacities of being one human being, the elimination of contingency 
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strikes directly at the capacity for political action. However, action appears to be an 
innate human faculty. If it is true that we all are endowed with the capacity to act, 
then the complete elimination of contingency is impossible. Arendt develops her 
political thought the way she does and uses “Reflections on Little Rock” as a means 
of communicating her views because she is worried about the growing trend that 
when people gather together for meaningful action, their first instinct is to move 
towards organizational power. Organizational power promises the efficiency of 
administrative logic, but is also the same type of power whose “iron law” is 
oligarchy.295  It is a type of power that suppresses the capacity for action by people 
via literally “organizing” them; reducing them to use functions.  
The growth of organizational power results in a shackled, conformist polity 
and a bureaucratic regime that continually miscalculates the effects of its designs. Just 
as certain “subterranean elements” crystallized to bring about totalitarianism, 
Arendt’s work post-Origins can be seen on its whole as a normative project about the 
elements that must crystallize to form an active and free polity. The normative polity 
Arendt envisions is comprised of people who are given the space to act and live 
amongst institutions, a political culture and a public philosophy that does not deal 
with the contingency of action by trying to suppress it and pretending that it is not 
real. Here, Arendt agrees with the likes of Madison, Montesquieu and Machiavelli 
that political practice must be preserved,296 and this is why activities like abortion 
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escorting can transcend questions of how “right or wrong” legalized abortion may be 
viewed. The abortion escort preserves a space for political practice that keeps the 
subterranean currents of capable self-governance alive through direct application. 
Such an act stands in direct contradiction to the forces that threaten the spaces that 
make it possible. Such an act may be small, episodic, and rare, and thus out of the 
context of normal political discussion, but what they lack in frequency they make up 
for in their fundamental importance.  
The Rise of the Social 
 
Arendt addresses the problems posed by society and the growth of the social 
realm explicitly in “Reflections on Little Rock.”  Arendt writes that society “is that 
curious hybrid realm between the political and the private in which, since the 
beginning of the modern age, most men have spent the greater part of their lives.”297  
Arendt believes that the social realm poses real problems for political life, particularly 
as the domain of the social has grown in the modern age. The expansion of the social 
into what was once political territory means that the dangerous element of 
conformity, a disciplinary power that regulates social behavior, is a plausible, and in 
some cases, a preferred means of regulating political questions as well. Arendt writes 
that society “always demands that its members act as though they were members of 
one enormous family which has only one opinion and one interest.”298  Thus, whether 
or not the society is “mass society” or a more localized type of society, like a group of 
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people in the same profession, behavior is coordinated through norms that must be 
adhered to in order to belong. Arendt speaks directly to this point near the end of 
“Reflections on Little Rock” 
Mass society – which blurs lines of discrimination and levels group distinctions – is a 
danger to society as such, rather than to the integrity of the person, for personal 
identity has its source beyond the social realm. Conformism, however, is not a 
characteristic of mass society alone, but of every society insofar as only those are 
admitted to a given social group who conform to the general traits of difference 
which keep the group together.299  
 
Conformism need not always carry a negative connotation, particularly if it is in a 
vocational setting. That all brain surgeons have much in common in thought and 
training is probably not something that one would consider unattractive. However, 
when conformism slips into the world of the political, its troublesome effects have 
garnered serious attention on its suppression of human activity. John Stuart Mill 
famously lamented “Who can compute what the world loses in the multitude of 
promising intellects combined with timid characters, who dare not follow out any 
bold, vigorous, independent train of thought, lest it should land them in something 
which would admit of being considered irreligious or immoral?”300  Further, Alexis 
De Tocqueville feared that conformity drove majority tyranny in democratic regimes, 
observing, “In America the majority draws a formidable circle around thought. Inside 
those limits, the writer is free; but unhappiness awaits him if he dares to leave 
them.”301 
Modern times offer us more reason to dread the effects of conformity, not 
only upon one’s thoughts and free expression, but also in regards to the ability to link 
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our thoughts and our values to our own actions. Phillip Zimbardo’s near-legendary 
“Stanford Prison Experiment” suggests that conformity can override the deepest 
moral principles of actors if the forces of conformism are felt strongly enough.302  
Christopher Browning’s Ordinary Men, a study of a reserve police battalion that 
participated in the Nazi campaign of mass murdering innocents cited peer pressure as 
a principle motivator in terms of explaining many of the individuals’ willingness to 
participate in such horrific acts. Browning quotes one interviewee as saying, “If the 
question is posed to me why I shot in the first place… I must answer that no one 
wants to be thought a coward.”303  In such contexts, when the power of conformity is 
properly leveraged, its ability to override the will of the individual seems chilling.  
Arendt credits Rousseau for first theoretically investigating “society’s 
unbearable perversion of the human heart”304 and she later argues that, “Society is the 
form in which the fact of mutual dependence for the sake of life and nothing else 
assumes public significance.”305  This feeling of mutual dependence for survival that 
seems to drive the conformist urge in Browning’s account of why the German 
Reserve Police Battalion he studied participated in rounding up and murdering 
innocents during the Second World War.306  However, one’s livelihood need not 
actually be threatened in order to feel the pull of the social. The actual pull of the 
forces of the social are often times both strong and real while the sense of danger 
which might facilitate its necessity are often vague and ill-defined.   
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 It is in this context that Arendt felt escorts would have been valuable at Little 
Rock Central. The appearance of fellow citizens with no private or social connections 
to the target of this ostracizing power, whether it is outside of the all white school or 
outside of the abortion clinic, serves as a direct means to dramatically lesson the 
influence of social pressure. The appearance of escorts instantly communicates that 
other people are willing to show up in the face of such pressures and are willing to 
place their own persons under the same gaze from the crowd. This alliance alleviates 
the pressure, presumably because it redirects and diversifies the number of targets of 
ostracism from societies original target.   
Michel Foucault believed that the combination of isolation and feeling that 
others were watching and judging was a powerful type of disciplinary power.  
Foucault saw this evidenced in Jeremy Bentham’s vision of the panopticon, a prison 
design from which a prisoner may be seen at all times but cannot see his watcher, and 
thus, never knows if he is being watched. This principle spreads across modern 
society. Foucault details, “A few years after Bentham, Julius gave this society its birth 
certificate.”  Speaking of the panoptic principle, he said there was much more than 
architectural ingenuity’ it was an event ‘in the history of the human mind.’”307  No 
longer did society find itself to be in a civilization that was about “spectacle,” in the 
words of Foucault, or of “thoughts and deeds,” in the words of Arendt. Instead, there 
has been a transition to, as Foucault describes, “a society in which the principal 
elements are no longer the community and public life, but, on the other hand, private 
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individuals and, on the other side, the state, relations can be regulated only in a form 
that is the exact reverse of the spectacle.”308   
On What it is About Politics that the “Rise of the Social” Threatens 
Foucault conceptualizes this discipline similarly to Arendt’s idea of the social. 
He writes that “‘Discipline’ may be identified with neither an institution nor with an 
apparatus; it is a type of power, a modality for its exercise, comprising a whole set of 
instruments, techniques, procedures, levels of application, targets; it is a ‘physics’ or 
an ‘anatomy’ of power, a technology.”309  Foucault separates what institutions make 
use of from the institutions themselves and considers carefully the elements of 
political sociology that have changed over time and exploited various power 
relationships between people. The relevant similarities in approach with Foucault 
here clear up some of the confounded commentaries on Arendt’s work in this area. 
For example, Seyla Benhabib asks 
When Arendt criticizes the eclipse of the public-political life, and laments the “rise of 
the social”, she is criticizing the transformation of political life brought about by both 
a capitalist market economy and by the rise of mass society. But is her critique 
merely an exercise in nostalgia?310 
 
The answer to Benhabib’s question depends upon Arendt’s objective in criticizing the 
crowding out of political life by the social. Many commentators interested in social 
and political equality gains of the last one hundred years look at Arendt with a wary 
eye. They fear that her looking back at the Greek polis, at older understandings of 
heroism, are implicitly hostile to such gains by the way they seem to sensationalize a 
past that also celebrated aristocracy, subjugation of women, and even slavery. While 
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this fear is understandable, it misunderstands some finer points on compiling Arendt’s 
thoughts.  
 As a point of comparison, Stephen Elkin writes about James Madison’s work 
on the subject of regulating various personal interests for the sake of the public 
interest is intended to be understood as, “the subject of lawmaking, not a description 
of how it should work.”311  Elkin suggests that Madison’s understanding of regulating 
the public interest has a general “aspirational” component to it that Madison believed 
must be our guide through the complex realities of actual lawmaking. Elkin further 
argues that Madison 
said surprisingly little about the content of the permanent interest of the community. 
This quite possibly, is because he thought that very little of a precise nature could be 
said. The concrete meaning of the public interest at any given moment must reflect 
the circumstances of lawmaking. To attempt to spell out the public interest in detail 
would not only be impossible, because impossibly complex, but also unwise.312 
 
This “unwise” attempt to spell out a coherent account of the public interest is, by and 
large, what many critics of Arendt find lacking in her writing. Arendt’s comparability 
to both James Madison and Michel Foucault should not be surprising, as both of these 
thinkers were interested in questions about how arranging power through institutions 
and social practices were possible. When Arendt writes in aspirational terms about 
topics like the human condition and the founding of freedom through revolution, we 
should expect her account to illustrate what her arguments, rather than have them 
spelled out in precise, technical terms. Arendt’s examples of concepts in practice 
should not be mistaken for the exact substance, if there is such a thing in the first 
place, of what she would recommend in a particular present day situation. 
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 In her recent book, Why Arendt Matters, Elisabeth Young-Bruehl recalled 
what it was like to be one of Arendt’s students,  
Whenever I imagine to myself how Hannah Arendt—who was my teacher—might 
have judged some phenomenon and brought clarity to it for others, I hear her heavily 
German-accented voice carefully saying: ‘Vell, vell, on one hand… und den on 
another hand… Und, look here, consider it this way…’ Then she pauses, and you can 
actually see in her face how much she is mentally enjoying what Kant referred to the 
‘enlarged mentality’ of opinion sharing, consulting, paying calls on other points of 
view: ‘Aber shen Sie mal! [But look sharp!] Here is the other side, another 
perspective.’ There were never any sound bites.313 
    
This anecdote reveals that any attempt to find an overtly essentialist version of 
Hannah Arendt’s political thought is necessarily a doomed project. Arendt was not 
the type of thinker who would write an essay entitled, “On the Public Realm and 
Little Rock Central,” but instead, “Reflections on Little Rock.”  Arendt is casting 
about for ways to “look sharp.”  To suspect a deeper motivation or project is a 
mistake.       
How Abortion Escorts Diffuse Disciplinary Social Power 
 The importance of this theorizing on disciplinary power becomes clear in the 
context of escorting situation. Abortion escorts almost unfailingly mentioned that 
clinic staff informed them that there were visible differences in patient nervousness 
when escorts were present outside.  They also mention at trainings that doctors have 
reported to them that it was their general experience that measurable indicators, like 
pulse and blood pressure, were lower on days when there were escorts outside. I 
never had an occasion to speak with any of the medical staff, but I was able to ask a 
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clinic director if she heard these claims from her doctors, and she told me that escorts 
had an “obvious effect” on lowering the stress levels of patients. 
 On most days outside of the abortion clinic, the protestors do not count more 
than twenty people, and sometimes there is only one person out there. This is 
particularly likely to be true on the Wednesday mornings at the downtown clinics. 
However, without the presence of escorts, having even one protestor present might 
make a patient unsettled. In general, just three or four abortion escorts seem to make a 
difference in limiting protestor impact. When escorts take people into the clinic, 
escorts employ a variety of tricks to distract patients from focusing on the protestors 
outside. Idle chit-chat and calm instructions are the primary tools of such distraction. 
Escorts usually inform those entering the clinic that they do not have to take any 
material from the protestors and that they do not have to listen to them if they do not 
wish to. If patients do happen to take materials, they are usually informed of a 
receptacle just inside the building where they can leave their newly acquired handouts 
before having a chance to look at them. Judging by how full the receptacle tended to 
be at the end of the day (this receptacle was a treasure-trove for the researcher), not 
very many of these handouts ever made it past the bin.  
 On a theoretical level, this brings back to an appealing aspect of what Arendt 
argues in “Reflections on Little Rock.”  Once political differences are “taken to the 
streets” in a way that represents the bullying form of social pressure, the task for 




inclusion.” 314 The question can be asked: inclusion into what?  When abortion escorts 
or protestors actually start talking to the other about abortion, it is unfailingly because 
the speaker is either trying to upset someone or because they themselves are upset. 
There appears, at least between escorts and protestors, to be no meaningful 
conversation that can take place about abortion. Instead, there is the single voice of 
the protestors, usually engaged in collective readings or singing “Ave Maria” off-key, 
and the work of the escorts, who try to keep the protestors occupied with their 
gamesmanship and the clinics patients as free from interference as possible. The 
actions of the protestors are legal, and as Arendt argues, it is difficult to perceive a 
way in which the state could successfully interfere with private discrimination of this 
type without infringing upon such important political qualities as free speech and 
assembly. The presence of the escort diffuses a difficult political problem without the 
state overstepping its bounds.    
Abortion Escorts as Using Their Share of Public Power 
 The reason that Hannah Arendt felt the lack of escorts at Little Rock was a 
“sorry fact” has everything to do with her view on responding in the appropriate way. 
The more appropriate way of citizen escorts is one that negates the influence of the 
tactics of societal politics without sacrificing political space and values needlessly by 
responding with brute strength. In other words, escorting is an alternative to “passive” 
or “massive” resistance, because it is literally “active” resistance in Arendt’s 
parlance. Abortion escorts are not engaged in the type of politics that consists mostly 
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of talking or contemplating what others ought to do on their behalf, but instead they 
take up their own capacity to act to solve problems. This is not only an exemplary 
means of political action for the way it stands against the growth of the mindset of the 
social, and all of the conformist pressures that extend from its growth, but also in 
terms of the view that more and more of the political world should be “produced” by 
institutions and the legitimate state apparatus. The attempt to produce a political 
result by the state on abortion has had just about as difficult a history as its attempts 
to produce non-discrimination. Each case suggests lessons about the limits of what 
state institutions might be able to successfully do. Further, the situation poses the 
question about whether or not the state has lulled citizens from its comprehensive 
administration that it dulls their desire to act to solve such problems by which local 
action would be a more attractive remedy. 
 Arendt and Wolin are not lone voices in believing that administrative 
solutions can be crippling to a political community. Michael Sandel argues that it was 
the discovery of the strong impact of monetary and budgetary policy, an art of 
administration, as a quick remedy to economic downturns that caused American 
public philosophy to turn away from questions of the structural relationship between 
citizens, economies, and the state. In the late part of the New Deal, when the 
Roosevelt administration turned to budgetary policy to stimulate economic recovery, 
“the political economy of citizenship gave way to the political economy of growth 
and distributive justice.”315 This in turn gave rise, Sandel argues, to a “procedural 
republic” that was, “born at a rare moment of American mastery.”316  Sandel’s 
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argument about a procedural republic whose political economy is primarily interested 
in growth and distributive justice is a historical account of a state whereby the social 
has eclipsed the political.  
 Rather than politics as a space for distinction, which is to say in both Arendt 
and Montequeiu’s language, a space where equality means ruling over and being 
ruled in return by equals, we have a political economy characterized by 
Montesquieu’s definition of extreme equality. The state administers solutions; the 
society demands that their desires are fed. Conflicts take place when the desires of 
society conflict with the administration’s, and, while the administration may claim to 
be on the side of right by forcing integration, they do so with blatant disregard for any 
possibility that integration could be about citizenship rather than social justice.  
Concentration of Force; Separation of Power 
 
Somewhat late in her career, Arendt tried to work through her understandings 
of “violence,” “force,” “strength,” and “power.”  Arendt writes, “[p]olitically 
speaking, it is insufficient to say that power and violence are not the same.”317  She 
was later pushed to further clarify what she meant by this point in an interview, and 
she responded,  
In all republics with representative governments, power resides in the people. That 
means that the people empower certain individuals to represent them, to act in their 
name. When we talk about loss of power, that signifies that the people have 
withdrawn their consent from what their representatives, the empowered elected 
officials do…. In order to maintain the system, the empowered ones begin to act as 
rulers and resort to force. They substitute force for the assent of the people; that is the 
turning point.318  
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Arendt never explicitly makes the connection, but these distinctions explain another 
critical dimension of her reaction to the Federal Government’s handling of the Little 
Rock situation. Arendt asks us to consider what it means when the state has to use 
force against it own people. While the presence of Federal Troops at Little Rock did 
not reach the level of violence that Arendt refers to in the citations above, the specter 
of the state using coercive physical force if necessary is very much present.  
 There was, of course, also good reason to fear violence without the presence 
of Federal Troops. The history of violence in the South seems a possible reason why 
people would not risk to see it their “simple duty” to walk African-American children 
to school. Yet, there have been instances of violence outside of abortion clinics and 
abortion escorting persists. Even in the domain of my local research, the specter of 
violence lurks. At one point, this threat got close to home when I was notified by 
email, 
…had some excitement lately, as you may have heard (it was  
mostly local news but got some national coverage):  police detonated a  
bomb in a private home in Riverdale that was to have been placed at the  
clinic. The would-be bomber turned himself in and is in jail. It  
turned out that he was a suspicious man the escorts had photographed at  
the clinic a month earlier.319   
 
The person in question had indeed been in the papers and was reportedly intent on 
attacking one of the DC area clinics, his father telling The Washington Post “It's just 
something that he believed in fervently, and in my opinion he went way over the 
top.”320  Escorts continue to volunteer in the face of such threats of violence, asserting 
                                                
319 Email to author. Received 30 June, 2006.  
320 Eric Rich, "Md. Father Told Police of Alleged Bomb Plot," The Washington Post, 
Saturday, June 10 2006. See also Ruben Castaneda, "Pipe Bomb Suspect Quiet in Court, but 




once more that such threats are not simply a justification for state coercion, but are 
also an affront to a sense of common decency that escorts do not sit idly by and 
tolerate. 
 A question that the threat of abortion bombers and lynch mobs pose is 
whether threats to justice and safety justifies an administrative Leviathan. One of the 
points that Arendt’s analysis suggests about sending Federal Troops into Little Rock 
is that it is a different type of act than that of law enforcement. The difference 
between sending troops into Little Rock Central and acts of law enforcement is that 
when law enforcement does its work, the legitimacy of the laws that it is enforcing is 
not in question. The act of protesting, either in the case of the crowds gathered at 
Little Rock Central or in the case of crowds gathered outside of the abortion clinic, is 
designed to voice dissatisfaction with the law itself. When the state resorts to visibly 
threatening coercion in response to such protests, it is a sign that normal politics’ 
ability to solve such public problems has broken down. And while one can make a 
compelling case that employing coercion to advance the Civil Rights movement 
sounds like something worth doing, it is important to consider carefully what might 
happen to the structure of institutions, political culture, and public values once the 
wheels of political action are so greased for by the administrative power of the state.  
 Arendt once commented on the Vietnam War in an interview, “among 
widening circles, the Vietnam War has been considered illegal—not only peculiarly 
inhuman, not only immoral, but illegal. In America that has a different weight than in 
Europe.”321  Arendt attributes this to America’s political culture accepting the model 
of law that believes strongly in the idea that “potestats in populo is capable of 
                                                




inspiring a form of government only if one adds, as the Romans did, auctoritas in 
senatu, authority resides in the Senate.”322  The creators of the American political 
order, Arendt believed, understood power better than all others because they 
understood and believed the rather unconventional take on power that Montesquieu 
developed in The Spirit of the Laws. Montesquieu’s insights into how power actually 
works stand, “in so flagrant a contradiction to all conventional notions on this matter 
that it has almost been forgotten, despite the fact that the foundation of the republic in 
America was largely inspired by it.”323  The understanding in question is that in 
diversifying power, one renders it neither tyrannical nor impotent. This is why 
Montesquieu believes that equality rightly understood is isonomic: because to neither 
rule nor be ruled in return allows citizens to share in their use of power amongst 
equals while protecting all from its ill effects as best as possible. Power, when it is 
properly divided and arranged allows all to tap power’s potential without fear of 
subjugating or subjugation from others.  
 However, Arendt notices two important considerations about what can 
interfere with this model. First, she writes that “power can of course be destroyed by 
violence; this is what happens in tyrannies, where the violence of one destroys the 
power of many,” and she follows up by noting that for Montesquieu this would mean 
such regimes “are destroyed from within:  they perish because they engender 
impotence instead of power.”324  This, once again, points to the dangers that the polity 
can be rendered impotent in their capacity to act by either too much conformity of 
mind or too much large, mechanized, automatic state functions. Either has great 
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potential to render the great majority of the public indolent in regards to important 
and achievable local political action.  
Second, Arendt writes, “[p]ower, contrary to what we are inclined to think, 
cannot be checked, at least not reliably, by laws.”325  Arendt provides two reasons for 
making this point. The first reason is that, “the so-called power of the ruler which is 
checked in constitutional, limited, lawful government is in fact not power but 
violence, it is the multiplied strength of the one who has monopolized the power of 
the many.”326  Once more, we see Arendt’s similar thematic when she talks about the 
difference between legislative and executive power. To legislate is to engage in 
dialogue and to contemplate, but it is no real match for the power to act. “Legislative 
acts” are constantly threatened by the fact that any executive is inherently endowed 
with the ability to replace the will of the many with his or her own and then put such 
will into action on their behalf.  
Laws also “are always in danger of being abolished by the power of the many, 
and in a conflict between law and power is seldom the law that will emerge as the 
victor.”327  Whereas the executive has strength, the means to multiply the wishes of 
one into the actions of many, the many have power at their command. Power derives 
from their ability to act with one another for a common purpose. Both the strength of 
the executive and the power of the people threaten to disrupt the very model that 
allows them to flourish when they are put to use to assault the authority of the 
legislature.  







  “Reflections on Little Rock” is concerned with the way in which the strength 
of the one or the power of the many can be abused if not properly restrained.  
Arendt’s emphasis on the importance of these relationship goes beyond her comments 
on the transition from “passive to massive” resistance that takes place because of 
sending Federal troops. For example, Arendt claims, “[l]egally as well as 
traditionally, public education lies in the domain of state legislation.”328  Here, her 
appeal is to both the legal precedent and social custom, both of which have been 
abandoned because both law and society “give way quickly in case of emergency.”329 
Perhaps integration was an important enough political issue for which to abandon 
both legal precedent and social custom, but such a decision must be made without 
considering what the effects of abandoning such customs would possibly look like.  
Arendt also writes on the relationship between the laws and their potential 
efficacy to point out that there are serious barriers to the Federal government claiming 
legitimate domain over education. Arendt counsels explicitly,  
It would be very unwise indeed if the Federal government—which now must come to 
the assistance of more and more enterprises that were once the sole responsibility of 
the states—were to use its financial support as a means of whipping the states into 
agreement with positions they would otherwise be slow or altogether unwilling to 
adopt.330     
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Forced integration, at least in Arendt’s mind, runs counter to the notion that power 
ought to be set against power. Instead, she worried that forced integration combines 
the dangers of authority conferring a monopoly on power even when public support 
has withdrawn with the threat of violence in the form of Federal troops.  
Arendt brings all of these thoughts from On Violence and On Revolution together in 
one swift move inside of the “Reflections on Little Rock” essay itself. She writes, 
The point is that force can, indeed, must be centralized in order to be effective, but 
power cannot and must not. If the various sources from which it springs are dried up, 
the whole structure becomes impotent. And states’ rights in this country are among 
the most authentic sources of power, not only fro the promotion of regional interests 
and diversity, but for the Republic as a whole.331 
 
In this passage, Arendt defines the differences between “force” and “power” and 
suggests dangerous effects of choosing to pursue a political direction of force instead 
of power. Every time force is used to handle a political issue, it presents the 
dangerous possibility that is diminishing places where properly practiced politics 
could potentially take place. Force is, to put it in more Madisonian terms, a faction-
diminishing tool. As Madison believed that factions were necessary for liberty, it 
follows that any change in our institutional arrangements that diminishes the 
existence or strength of factions. Not just in one particular instance but also in a way 
that strikes at the efficacy and purpose of factions, must be a liberty-reducing action 
as well. Madison wrote that there are “but two methods of removing the cause of 
faction: the one by destroying the liberty that is essential to its existence; the other by 
giving every citizen the same opinions, the same passions, and the same interests.”332 
In their own ways, Arendt argues that the mob and the Presidential Administration, 
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via Federal Troops, were vying to undercut the liberty of factions by borrowing from 
both pools of what Madison thinks are destructive to their ends. The mob tries to 
enforce conformity by threatening the comfort of those who would feel free to appear 
and hold a different view. The Federal Troops are there to enforce administration 
policy as the only acceptable policy.  
 In Arendt’s mind, how the state used its ability to concentrate its resources 
and use force to carry out plans devised by the administration’s managerial elite had 
become more significant over time. When we put both the problem of the mob and 
state in context at Little Rock, Arendt seems to imply that these expanding dangers 
are possibly in some sort of reciprocal relationship that feeds off of the reactions of 
one another, crowding out the potential for political action by making us forget about 
its horizons.  Political theory has also, to some extent, gone along for the ride as well. 
Rather than take the types of structural approaches to this problem that Arendt tries to 
pursue, many political theorists have simply moved onto focusing solely on questions 
of legitimacy for either the mob or the state, and have given up on the prospect of 
political action entirely. Contemporary political theory that tries to lay out clear 
philosophical, theoretical or metaphysical systems of legitimating rules for conduct 
do so at their own peril, for they ignore the warning that laws do not fare well when 
they conflict with power.  
 In this regard, Arendt believed that had someone participated in a political act 
during the Little Rock crisis, they would have been acting on behalf of self-
governance as much as anything else. While Arendt looks past the actual concrete 




claimed to be inspired to write the essay by “a picture in the newspaper, showing a 
Negro girl on her way home from a newly integrated school; she was persecuted by a 
mob of white children, protected by a white friend of her father, and her face bore 
eloquent witness to the obvious fact that she was not precisely happy.”333  Arendt 
believed that the sight of children caught in between “adult mobsters” on the one 
hand and “Federal troops” on the other was not a pretty one. The political act Arendt 
pushed for, “seeing children safely to school,” is a profoundly political act because of 
its power. The power of escorting in this situation would have meant creating a power 
that could “rise to meet power” of those protesting outside of the clinic and possibly 
could have carried out the job Federal troops had been sent to do by the importance of 
arresting power with power, rather than granting the Executive Branch to employ 
force.  
Abortion Escorts and the Political Act 
Hannah Arendt was interested in the politics of the “council system, which, as 
we know, has perished every time and every where, destroyed either directly by the 
bureaucracy of the nation-state or by the party machines.”334  Arendt believed that the 
council system not only possessed attractive alternatives to the politics of the modern 
state, but that it posed real possibility of being a practicable guide because, 
“Spontaneous organization of council systems occurred in all revolutions”.335  In the 
final chapter of On Revolution, she focuses her attentions on Thomas Jefferson’s 
proposal to create a ward system, a subdivision of political communities and interests 
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coexisting simultaneously with the official mechanisms of the state. Arendt is 
fascinated by such a system’s potential to increase the characteristics of self-rule in 
all individuals and the effect this has on the polity. She writes about Jefferson’s plan, 
“Hence, the ward system was not meant to strengthen the power of the many but the 
power of ‘every one’ within the limits of his competence; and only by breaking up 
‘the many’ into assemblies where every one could count and be counted ‘shall we be 
as republican as a large society shall be.’”336 Without these lower-level competencies, 
this sense of everyone having to count on one another for their public life, the 
relationship between the people who hold power and authority, and those who believe 
they have the legitimate right to rule on its behalf, suffers from the various forms of 
interference previously addressed.  
 Arendt looked at council systems and, at one point, summarized her view on 
them, “In this direction, I think, there must be something to be found, a completely 
different principle of organization, which begins from below, continues upward, and 
finally leads to a parliament.”337  Arendt’s comments on council systems illuminate 
the theoretical underpinnings of her belief that some seemingly minor act, like 
walking children to school during integration, is an intensely powerful political deed 
despite how counter-intuitive the deed might seem against the backdrop of resolving 
great historical questions. Little Rock Central was a time and place where citizens had 
a chance to act without prodding or without reacting based upon habit. Instead, there 
was a moment where their own initiative could be used to show how a public relying 
upon one another to respond could be preferable to the forces of either mob or state. 
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Rather than representing principles of justice or their Southern society, people were 
presented a chance to represent nothing more than themselves, as one who believes in 
law-abidingness and has both a stake in protecting it and at least some capacity to do 
something about it.  
 Margaret Canovan believed that Arendt’s essay was “much misunderstood”, 
and it was her interpretation that Arendt was trying “to make clear the narrow course 
that political men must steer between the Scylla of determinism and the Charybdis of 
believing that everything is possible.”338  More recently, Seyla Benhabib has been 
less charitable. “The question is,” argues Benhabib, “whether these fears are the 
appropriate ones in the face of black-white relations that dominated at the time, and in 
particular with respect to integration in the schools.”339  Benhabib raises this question, 
and concludes about the essay “she projected her own history and identity onto those 
of others. The ‘Reflections on Little Rock’ essay shows not only the failure of the 
distinction between the social and the political but also the failure of the art of 
practicing ‘enlarged mentality’ in the public realm.”340  
Benhabib’s claim that “Reflections on Little Rock” is missing the bigger 
picture in regards to what is going on with the Civil Rights movement implies that 
Arendt’s thoughts in the essay are both misguided and impractical. Benhabib devotes 
her energies in this part of her book to taking up sentences in “Reflections on Little 
Rock” that could be taken on as value claims and attacking them. Benhabib is 
implicitly denying that context of concerns for how politics is practiced is of any 
relevance when taking up such arguments. This is evidenced by the fact that she 
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makes no effort to contextualize Arendt’s comments in her own words from the essay 
on the matter, but instead Benhabib surmises Arendt’s context from a couple of 
prefatory comments while ignoring vast regions of the actual essay itself that focus on 
the themes of participation, society, power and force.341  
Further, criticizing Arendt for not having an “enlarged mentality” is a 
communicative critique of the type that, as mentioned earlier, implicitly abandons 
political action in favor of questions of legitimacy for state action. Another way of 
saying this is that Benhabib’s criticism implies that the project of political theory is to 
justify why all factions in this case should hold the same point of view rather than act 
as factions. The existence of abortion escorts complicates how seriously we can take 
this position by Benhabib against Arendt. The similarities between escorting people 
into the abortion clinic in the face of a group of protestors and Arendts suggestions in 
“Reflections” extend beyond surface appearances and illuminate the various avenues 
of political importance on which Arendt wrote. Abortion escorts also bear a 
resemblance to the “council systems” that Arendt viewed as a viable alternative to 
contemporary politics in terms of the political organization. The Washington, DC, 
area abortion escorts are largely an ad hoc group who rely on the week to week 
volunteering of escorts. They have no office, mailbox, nor a phone. One longtime 
member described the group’s volunteer recruitment strategy by saying, “we just keep 
begging people.” The only privileged positions in the group consist of a variety of 
small organizational responsibilities: assigning volunteer’s to clinics, organizing a 
group’s actions on site, and organizing labor and materials for new escort workshops. 
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While some told me that the older members of the organization sometimes made 
decisions without being suitably inclusive from time to time, organizational problems 
do not rise to the level of interfering with the group’s overwhelming focus on action 
and political activity. The group does most of its work over email and does not 
engage in any fundraising. They have officers, but only because they are an 
incorporated group and their articles of incorporation require it. Finally, they have a 
small amount of money (reportedly much less than ten thousand dollars) in the bank 
that the treasurer is responsible for overseeing. Respect for others is tied most directly 
to being an agreeable and reliable partner on site more than anything else.      
All of this is to say that abortion escorts as a collective entity do not comprise 
a large enough institutional arrangement to generate institutional needs that might 
compromise or even contradict the actual activity they come together to take part in. 
Abortion escorts therefore confront the problems related to “the rise of the social” 
along both of its critical dimensions. They clearly confront the social pressure of “the 
many” posing as speaking for “the all” by providing an alternative presence to 
protestors outside of the clinic. They also confront the organizational aspect of the 
rise of the social by coming together and acting in ways that do not undercut the 
authenticity of the act.  
 Hannah Arendt’s evaluation of Jefferson’s ward system was such that she 
wrote, “the elementary republics of the wards, the only tangible place where everyone 
could be free, actually were the end of the great republic whose chief purpose in 




to protect them.”342  Abortion escorts act in this “only tangible place where everyone 
could be free.”  The actions of escorts, aside from providing psychological benefits 
for those that they assist, also breathe real life into the “basic assumption of the ward 
system.”  This basic assumption, “whether Jefferson knew it or not,” Arendt believed, 
“was that no one can be called happy without his share in public happiness, that no 
one could be called free without his experience in public freedom, and that no one 
could be called either happy or free without participating, and having a share, in 
public power.”343  Escorts claim their share of public power: they not only claim it, 
but they use it.    
This idea is what Arendt summarizes as the “Lost Treasure” of the American 
Revolutionary tradition. In noting its absence in “Reflections on Little Rock,” she was 
accused of not seeing the greater good of the questions of politics that were at stake. 
However, it does not take a detailed journey through On Revolution to realize that she 
sees a different type of “highest good” in politics than her critics do, and this highest 
good looks a lot like the possibility to participate in the types of public acts that 
abortion escorts engage in on a weekly basis. As such, abortion escorting is not 
simply good for the participants, good for those helped, and good for the polity, it is 
quite possibly, the highest end of what a good political order should protect and 
nurture.  
Conclusion 
The idea that the body politic needs to be organized to preserves spaces for 
people to act when action is necessary is not a major current in democratic theory. 
                                                





The pages of Dahl, Schumpeter, Rawls, Habermas, Gutmann and Thompson, and 
many other prominent democratic theories yield little to no treatment on the subject 
whatsoever. Despite the lack of attention, perhaps even because of it in some 
instances, Hannah Arendt wrote “Reflections on Little Rock” to raise the question of 
political space and political action. While grand economic schemes and carefully 
contemplated liberal normative positions can track justifications and describe the 
movements of government agencies and mass social movements, they cannot 
completely obscure the fact that we inhabit a world of real events. They also cannot 
completely obscure that fact that every human being who inhabits the earth has the 
ability to influence such events through their own ability to act. In failing to 
completely obscure these facts, when examples do appear before us, like abortion 
escorting, we are reminded that while Sandel’s “political economy of citizenship” has 
largely been forgotten, the questions regarding the arrangement of society and the 
trade-offs involved in structuring human organization and human freedom remain 
relevant. What the “rise of the social” represented to Arendt in real ways, was a 
reduction of both the space in which people can act for themselves and the awareness 
that human beings have such a capacity in the first place. Arendt was concerned that 
behavior would eclipse action, and that administration would eclipse politics. Indeed, 
a Schumpeterian or Rawlsian view of politics presumes that such an eclipse has 
already taken place, as they both are forms of the new political economy of growth 





My experience with abortion escorts suggests that not only is the type of 
public action that Arendt describes real, but that those who engage in it have found, 
as Arendt claimed, that they are happier for having their share of public happiness. 
Many escorts I talked to noted that escorting felt more rewarding than their other day-
to-day activites. More than one person said that it seemed “more real somehow.” 
Despite a general dismissive sentiment towards theories that argue this type of 
participatory experience is at the heart of democratic practice, the ad hoc gathering of 
volunteers who get together to see people safely into the building and nothing more 
proves to be a startlingly compelling example of the power of such participatory 
action.  
 The understanding of Arendt pieced together above advocates the idea that 
human reality is not entirely knowable through fixed principles to which standards of 
human behavior can be unswervingly attached. Neither the state, nor society can 
monopolize reality, particularly the reality of the space shared between human beings. 
When institutions and their accompanying institutional logic overstep their claims on 
this space, the results will always be as ominous as they are promising. Arendt wrote 
that freedom is useless without action, but together they make human beings “the 
author of miracles.”344   These miracles do not derive from institutions or societies, 
but instead they are the direct result of “men who perform them—men who because 
they have received the twofold gift of freedom and action can establish a reality of 
their own.”345  The participatory behavior of abortion escorts provides a real world 
example that breathes life into the relationship between freedom and action that 
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Arendt stirringly describes.  If, it is the case that this relationship may prove to be so 
real, and so vital to the quality of our political life, then we must conclude that 
theories of democratic practice that leave it out, are, as Jeffrey Isaac writes about 
Schumpeter’s Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy, answering “a set of important 
but limited questions.”346 (emphasis mine)   
This conclusion elevates certain political theories of action from afterthought 
to coequal with theories of politics that focus on behavioral, institutional, and justice-
oriented investigations into political regimes. Isaac’s quote about Schumpeter is 
importantly worded, as elevating the importance of political action in theoretical 
accounts does not aim to deny the importance of other accounts, but instead aims to 
fill in the spaces that appear to be real but are ignored in the constitution of our 
political lives. The type of action that Arendt was looking for at Little Rock and the 
type of action that appears when people engage in abortion escorting is not the 
complete and final word on politics. Still, action does seem to offer a fundamental 
piece of the good political life. Tocqueville worried that “not only does democracy 
make each man forget his ancestors, but it hides his descendants from him and 
separates him from his contemporaries; it constantly leads him back towards himself 
alone and threatens to confine him wholly in the solitude of his own heart.”347  Arendt 
has a response to this anxiety about democracy in the concluding paragraph of On 
Revolution, where she observed that Sophocles lets us know “what it was that enabled 
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ordinary men, young and old, to bear life’s burden:  it was the polis, the space of 








Chapter 5:  Understanding Abortion Escorts II: Modest 
Revolutions 
 
Participatory acts like abortion escorting are phenomena that are not easily 
susceptible to categorical understandings. Nevertheless, the fact that political action is 
elusive does not mean that it is not real or important. In general, political theory 
attempts to make political action evident by either talking about acts in bulk (in which 
case it loses the sense of particularity that makes it significant) or by attempting to 
capture descriptions of its fleeting appearances (in which case the credibility of the 
description is often doubted or ignored). Denying the existence of political action 
becomes difficult; however, when we come to understand its important role in other 
conceptual schemes that are more commonly viewed as credible. Political action is a 
capacity citizens have at their disposal when they possess what Arendt calls isonomy, 
                                                




or, as will be developed in this chapter, what Phillip Pettit calls “freedom as 
antipower.”  Political action also helps us distinguish what Sheldon Wolin calls “the 
political” from what he calls “politics,” and it distinguishes itself from “politics” 
because of its foundational and constitutional value for the whole of the political 
community rather than for narrow, acquisitive, and self-interested ends.  
 Abortion escorts are engaged in promoting the type of freedom of a republican 
variety, what Phillip Pettit calls “freedom as antipower.” For Pettit, if not all 
republicans, the concept of freedom that is at stake in the political community is non-
domination, which is then related in practice to the ability to engage in acts to defend 
one’s self from domination. Every member of the political community, while not 
equal in social standing, talents, etc., is equal in his or her ability to appear in the 
political community and act on those matters on which they ought to need no other 
authority beyond one’s own. Participating on this level is not simply valuable as a 
“for the sake of” with regards to civil society, structures of governance, and theories 
of justice, but in fact, the opposite is true. All of these structures presumably operate 
for the purpose of our own pursuit of human happiness, and are in existence to keep 
us safe and guide us away from human catastrophe as best as possible without 
suffocating the singularity and meaningfulness of being who we are in the first place. 
Political action is beneficial in helping us when it is difficult to collectively 
understand such relationships the right way around. As in Albert Camus’ The Plague, 
when the stories main characters start volunteer sanitary squads to fight the plague, 




was; that is the concern of all.”349  Political action in this regard is doubly 
illuminating: it reminds us of our own singularity and of our shared public 
responsibilities at the same time.  
 This underscores the central concern of any republican formulation of the 
public and its protection through republican values and institutions. The concern is 
that such values can be lost, easily lost, without the practice of public values and the 
encountering of singularly meaningful others in a context where they appear as such 
to one another. Pettit’s attack on the non-interference principle of freedom makes this 
point, as does the critique of what Arendt and Wolin fear is the true ascendant 
political ideology in our times, “organizationalism.”  In these broad theoretical 
accounts, abortion escorting appears to be a “street level” story about the promise that 
politics of the sort that Pettit, Wolin, and Arendt hold on to and hold out for in the 
face of its continuing marginalization. Finally, Arendt’s account of the Adolf 
Eichmann trial and her writing on the release of The Pentagon Papers demonstrate 
why proceduralism and self-interest without a sense of the public and tolerance for 
the unpredictable, anarchic, and immodest possibilities of providing space to practice 
political action is vulnerable to disaster. A society that is not only “more practiced” in 
valuing the public, but actually lives in the world with an enlarged sense of 
community stands maybe not as the only hope that human beings in the modern, 
organized world can escape either viewing themselves or viewing distant others as 
redundant, unnecessary, and replaceable. It certainly lends itself as a serious 
candidate.  
                                                




Thus, the ultimate end of this discussion is to provide a detailed theoretical 
description about just how deeply significant political acts like abortion escorting are 
for the vitality of preserving a political community worth living in. Such a claim on 
the community worth living for might make the value pluralist or the Rawls-inspired 
political liberal bristle, all I can say in defense of my position is that I see no more 
reasonable attempt to explain the value and power of abortion escorting.  The liberal 
method, to go into a detailed account about how the model of a state monopoly on 
power held in account only by some particular view of reasonable justification, 
appears to be an overly juridical. Further, it carries with it an excessively restrictive 
view of citizenship behavior given the potential dangers of administrative power and 
the apparent unnecessary restriction of the use of real political power by citizens of no 
particular rank—of which it seems clear that they are quite capable of using to 
positive effect.   
Freedom as Antipower 
Phillip Pettit’s vision of republicanism rests in large part upon a conception 
that he calls “freedom as antipower.” Pettit works on the question of freedom out of a 
dissatisfaction with the more popular contemporary liberal understanding of liberty as 
non-interference,350 which Pettit believes is both flawed and derived historically from 
justifications of monarchical and colonial subjugation.351 In talking about freedom as 
antipower, it is apparent that Pettit’s aim is to make freedom a value of political 
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participation, rather than a definition of the ways in which politics is not supposed to 
participate in you and what is yours. Pettit’s freedom as antipower also provides us 
with an account of our liberties and of their immense value. As such, non-domination 
and freedom to participate in pubic life are mutually reinforcing values that a 
conception of freedom as non-interference cannot accomplish. This is, in Pettit’s 
view, because the noninterference principle is simply not empowering enough to 
move most people to act on behalf of their liberties, and in so doing, the whole 
structure of protecting citizens from non-domination breaks down because, in the 
non-interference scheme, liberty is a private, and not public good. The 
noninterference principle treats liberty as simply another for of property. 
Interestingly, Pettit formulates freedom as antipower as a counter to this view in a 
manner that closely resembles Hannah Arendt’s understanding of action and 
isonomy, that of not ruling nor being ruled in return. .  
The overlap between Pettit’s views on freedom, Arendt’s vision of action, and 
the example of abortion escorts, together advance two important political 
understandings. First, they collectively elaborate and reinforce the possibility of 
active, participatory political values that, in contrast to the non-domination principle 
of liberty, make themselves evident as a public value pursued through the use rather 
than the restriction of public power. Second, Arendt’s theoretical work on political 
action and the example of abortion escorts allow us to raise questions about the 
political economy of freedom as antipower. This second consideration refers to 
regulating the distribution and application of antipower that allows everyone to be 




free” that negative liberals worry so much about. While Pettit raises the question of 
the trade-offs involved in procuring and preserving “freedom as antipower,” his 
answers look more systemic and institutional in nature than participatory, which is 
odd given that freedom as antipower creates a space for all to use their power 
amongst equals. In this space, Pettit manages the economy of antipower through two 
institutional mechanisms, sanctions and screens,352 as well as through the 
maintenance and manipulation of a “transmission belt” view of civil society.353  In 
contrast, the example of abortion escorts as a type of political actor in Arendt’s 
descriptive framework is engaging in Bonnie Honig’s agonistic politics in order to 
ensure civility. In other words, abortion escorting constitutes a new example of how 
to manage Pettit’s understanding of antipower. Political action provides 
republicanism with a street-level example of what antipower might look like, why it 
might be important, and how it might regulate itself in practice. 
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 Freedom as Non-Domination versus the Non-Interference Liberty Principle 
Freedom as antipower’s primary characteristic is the principle of non-
domination. The striving for non-domination is clearly central in Pettit’s thought, as 
he not only emphasizes it frequently in his own work but also offers it as a corrective 
to other republicans like Quentin Skinner and Michael Sandel.354 “Someone 
dominates another,” writes Pettit, “to the extent that (1) they have the capacity to 
interfere (2) with impunity and will (3) in certain choices that the other is in a position 
to make.”355  Pettit argues that when these conditions are met, the “someone” who 
dominates the “another” has what “amounts to an absolutely arbitrary power.”356  In 
such a circumstances, “there is no penalty, and indeed no loss, attendant on the 
person’s interference,”357 and the only limitation is “the brake of their own 
untrammeled choice or their own unchecked judgment, their own arbitrium: 
ultimately, as it may be, their own capricious will.”358   
The dangers of having the criteria for domination met in most circumstances 
appear as self-evident. The dominant and the dominated “will share an awareness that 
the powerless can do nothing except by the leave of the powerful: that the powerless 
are at the mercy of the powerful and not on equal terms.”359  This is, in short, the 
great republican complaint against those in authority when republicanism takes the 
form of a revolutionary ideology. When it carries the day as accepted public 
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philosophy, this is what it aims to defend against. The Declaration of Independence 
and the Letter from a Birmingham Jail complain of nothing that cannot, in the mind’s 
of the authors, be remedied by non-domination, and appeal not to reorder who gets to 
dominate but instead move in the direction of Pettit’s vision of what antipower is and 
what it does. Pettit asks, 
How might we guard the powerless against subjugation by the powerful?  One way 
would be to reverse roles, of course, and give them power over others rather than 
letting others have power over them. But that would only relocate the problem, not 
resolve it. The question is how we might guard people in general against subjugation, 
not how might we guard some particular subgroup. 360   
 
Pettit argues for a state power where neutrality is achieved, not through 
keeping the state and state power out of as much as possible, but through the ability 
of everyone to be able to have some mechanism to act as neutralizer when the 
prospect of domination by others. This is how, in Pettit’s view, we might arrive at the 
public-regarding republicanism of a Jefferson or a King, a Skinner or a Sandel. 
Pettit’s vision of antipower never says it so explicitly, but this ability to neutralize 
domination must be personally available to all citizens as best as can be managed. 
This link is makes Pettit part of the “Republican Revival,”361 which has its ties to 
thinking about the positive manipulation of power for public interest rather than 
attempting to wall off spaces where state power is not allowed in. In this regard, 
Hannah Arendt believes that Montesquieu made this great rediscovery about “the 
nature of power” and that his rediscovery was to be remembered during the American 
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Revolution only to become lost once more.362  However, Arendt believed that in the 
time she was writing On Revolution, “this discovery stands in so flagrant a 
contradiction to all conventional notions on this matter that it has almost been 
forgotten, despite the fact that the foundation of the republic in America was inspired 
by it.”363  Since Arendt, it has been the work of Pettit and the other “republican 
revivalists”364 to “rediscover” this understanding of the nature of power as a principle, 
and to raise our public consciousness about what might be at stake if we continue to 
forget. In “Freedom as Antipower,” Pettit attacks the “contemporary thought” in 
question in the above Arendt quotation that stands in contradiction to the principle of 
the American Founding: the non-interference principle of liberty. The defenders of 
the noninterference principle of liberty have enjoyed a position similar to how Rawls 
described the status of utilitarianism at the time he wrote A Theory of Justice: “it has 
been espoused by a long line of brilliant writers who have built up a body of thought 
truly impressive in scope and refinement.”365  The utilitarian thinkers Rawls is 
referencing in the quote were also some of the great proponents of the 
noninterference principle of liberty, and the difficulty in supplanting their 
preeminence rests, in Rawls’ mind, “Those who criticized them often did so on a 
much narrower front… But they failed, I believe, to construct a workable and 
systematic moral conception to oppose it.”366  Rawls worked to offer such 
systematized opposition to the systematic thought of utility and noninterference, as 
has the aforementioned “republican revival.”   
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John Stuart Mill defines the noninterference principle by arguing, “the only 
purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilized 
community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others. His own good, either 
physical or moral, is not a sufficient warrant”367 and Isaiah Berlin writes “I am 
normally said to be free to the degree which no man or body of men interferes with 
my activity.”368  The non-interference principle of liberty is certainly attractive, and 
even, as Mill argues, “may have the air of a truism.”369 In spite this, Pettit notice that 
the logic of this position is in accordance with Thomas Hobbes’ belief that “properly 
constituted authority establishes freedom where despotic authority destroys it.”370  
Since all law is interference, “all laws are pro tanto destructive of liberty.”371  It thus 
turns out that the non-interference concept of freedom, “is consistent with a benign 
dictator—the sort of benign dictator that the British government may have 
represented for American colonists” and that “freedom as antipower is not.”372 
Berlin’s critique of what he labels “positive freedom” is the standard response 
to those who would take up Pettit’s position. Berlin argues forcefully that Pettit’s side 
of the argument seems persuasive because “we recognize that it is possible, and at 
times justifiable, to coerce men in the name of some goal (let us say, justice or public 
health) which they would, if they were more enlightened, themselves pursue, but do 
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not, because they are blind ignorant or corrupt.”373 From here, Berlin believes that he 
has spotted the slippery slope: 
I may go on to claim a good deal more than this. I may declare that they are actually 
aiming at what in their benighted state they consciously resist, because there exists 
within them the occult entity—their latent rational will, or their ‘true’ purpose—and 
that this entity, although it is belied by all that they overtly feel and do and say, is 
their ‘real’ self, of which the poor empirical self in space and time may know little; 
and that this inner spirit is the only self that deserves to have its wishes taken into 
account.374   
 
Berlin’s belief is that the notion of freedom as self-mastery leads to a dangerous  
 
Rousseauian or Marxian view of the freedom of the will such that,  
 
Once I take this view, I am in a position to ignore the actual wishes of men or 
societies, to bully, oppress, torture them in the name, and on behalf, of their 
‘real’ selves, in the secure knowledge that whatever is the true goal of man… 
must be identical with his freedom.375 
 
This slippery slope seems a questionable one, primarily on the basis that it is unlikely 
that we can identify this republican strain of freedom as antipower as identical to the 
concept of self-mastery, that Berlin believes we have witnessed down this slippery 
slope on at least two major historical occasions: the French and the Russian 
Revolutions. Furthering the claim that freedom as antipower and freedom as self-
mastery are the same is Hannah Arendt’s On Revolution. On Revolution, particularly 
the first five chapters of it, devotes its pages to separating the American revolutionary 
experience from the Russian and French experiences based on their understandings of 
freedom and power that Berlin’s position would like to elide together.  
                                                






In fact, argues Arendt, the republican begs off the view of “the liberty of the 
will” just as much as the first pages of Mill’s On Liberty.376  It is Arendt’s view that 
republicanism’s bold insight, and particularly Montesquieu’s, is that “freedom and 
power belonged together; that, conceptually speaking, political freedom did not reside 
in the I-will but in the I-can, and that therefore the political realm must be construed 
and constituted in a way in which power and freedom could be combined.”377 
Freedom as antipower claims a fundamentally different understanding of the nature of 
power itself, and it is primarily on the validity of its claims on power and its workings 
that its defense as a philosophical opposition to the noninterference principle and to 
its opposition to “freedom of the will” ultimately rests.  
Freedom as antipower goes well beyond historical comparisons between great 
revolutionary moments, it exists in relationship between people as soon as they 
encounter one another. Arendt writes, “Power needs no justification, being inherent in 
the very existence of political communities; what it does need is legitimacy.”378  She 
further clarifies this statement by writing, “Power springs up whenever people get 
together and act in concert, but it derives legitimacy from the initial getting together 
rather than from any action that may follow.”379  The theoretical legwork that goes 
into what such statements mean was largely the task of chapter four, but what is of 
particular interest in here is the local levels at which power appears and its bearing on 
power as non-domination in the form of antipower. Arendt’s understanding of power 
coincides nicely with Pettit’s understanding of antipower, and it supplement Pettit’s 
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work on freedom in that it creates a street-level account of power that Pettit seems 
less interested in.380  
 When Pettit looks at the means of resisting antipower, his first three 
suggestions are “protective, regulatory, and empowering institutions.”381 Though 
Pettit does note that “informal social and political factors are often of even greater 
importance in promoting antipower,” his main examples of these informal factors are 
all from what we would call civil society or activism, “trade unions, consumer 
movements, prisoners’ rights organizations, environmental movements, women’s 
groups, civil rights liberties associations, and even competitive market forces.”382  
Pettit leaves out political action, and he sometimes gestures towards but does not fully 
consider that the creation of antipower might be realized simply through having the 
opportunity to act in the world. Like power, action is something that needs to be 
legitimized but not justified because we all have a capacity to act in the world. Like 
power, action is already there once we have a multiplicity of human beings getting 
together.  
Pettit writes, “It is always a difference in resources or a difference in the 
preparedness to use resources—a difference in effective resources—that enables on 
agent to dominate another.”383  However, when we contrast that with Arendt’s 
understanding of action, and with the example of abortion escorting in tow, we can 
begin to appreciate that no one is entirely out of resources to resist, to hit back, so to 
speak, as long as they still have opportunity to do so. This is why there is so much 
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emphasis by those influenced by Arendt on what is termed “political space.”  Political 
space is either a literal or metaphorical clearing where one has the freedom to engage 
in political action.  
Isonomy as Comparable to Freedom as Antipower 
Arendt’s use of isonomy, to neither rule nor be ruled in return, is really just 
another way of saying non-domination. Arendt writes agreeably about the Greek 
views of freedom and slavery,  
freedom is the essential condition of what the Greeks called felicity, eudaimonia, 
which was an objective status depending first of all on wealth and health. To be poor 
or to be ill in health meant to be subject to physical necessity, and to be a slave emant 
to be subject, in addition, to man-made violence.384 
 
More generally, many of Arendt’s and Pettit’s arguments track in similar ways. 
 Just as Pettit offers friendly amendments to Skinner and Sandel regarding the 
grounding of their republican arguments, Arendt’s theorizing of the way that politics 
fits into what she calls “the human condition” provides an intriguing friendly 
amendment to Pettit’s republicanism. Arendt approaches this human condition by 
saying, “Men are conditioned beings because everything they come in contact with 
turns immediately into a condition of their existence.”385  Arendt is not talking about 
“human nature” when she explores the human condition. She makes this clear when 
she writes, “It is highly unlikely that we, who can know, determine, and define the 
natural essences of all things surrounding us, which we are not, should ever be able to 
do the same for ourselves—this would be like jumping over our own shadows.”386   
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 The reason for this rests on philosophical arguments that run very deep, but 
the short version is that Arendt shares Martin Heidegger’s view, “Even deliberation is 
not the pure detached theoretical reflection described by the tradition. Rather it must 
take place on the background of absorption in the world.”387  The “background” is the 
idea that, as Hubert Dreyfus explains so eloquently, “the shared everyday skills, 
discriminations, and practices into which we are socialized provide the conditions 
necessary for people to pick out objects, to understand themselves as subjects, and, 
generally, to make sense of the world and their lives.”388  As human beings, we come 
into the world with a pre-existent background, rather than coming into the realization 
that the world is real through an understanding that “I think, therefore I am.”  The 
constitution of this background we come into shapes a part of our character through 
shaping our habits and our assumptions about the facts of the world that we must take 
for granted before we can genuinely start something new. The background often 
swallows us up, and we do not practice outside of this background until we 
experience a disturbance in going along with background practices. The most jarring 
of such disturbances in the existentialist tradition is the realization of the temporality 
of life. Once we realize that we are born into the world and that we will leave it, the 
background begins to feel insufficient with regards to disclosing the meaning of our 
existence.389 For Arendt, the way we come to terms with ourselves is to have a 
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foreground that we can step into from out of background practices. It is ultimately on 
these grounds that the capacity for action that makes our individuality in the world 
evident. Arendt’s splitting of labor, work and action into three different groups 
harkens back to Aristotle’s views on the higher categories of living in the 
Nichomachean Ethics, but it also is done in reference to the fact that work and action 
by and large constitute background practices. They are, to harken back to another 
Arendt distinction, behaviors rather than deeds. Deeds are done in public, and reveal 
the individuality of individuals by virtue of their acting. Arendt writes that “isonomy 
guaranteed equality, but not because all men were created equal, but, on the contrary, 
because men were by nature not equal, and needed an artificial institution, the polis, 
which…  would make them equal.”390 It is only in the space of human affairs in 
which we can come together as equals and as evident to one another can we tackle the 
problem of the meaningfulness of life.  
Arendt thinks that these deeply philosophic arguments make sense for a 
number of reasons. First, the space in which action takes place is such that we are 
able to actually use our capacity to act in the world, and to use it in such a way that 
draws in and enriches some of our other capacities such as responsibility, judgment 
and promise-making (more on this later).391  In getting to encounter ourselves using a 
fuller range of our capacities, the argument goes, we are more likely to encounter a 
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sense of meaningfulness in our lives. As important, if not more for political theory, 
when others are appearing in front of us as equals doing this, we are much more 
likely to see the lives of others as singular and meaningful as well. We know from 
Mutz, the National Conference on Citizenship, Rosenblum, and Sunstein et al., that 
polarization in civil society and in deliberative settings are common and problematic 
because they fail on this count.392 While escorts and protestors do not engage in much 
bridging or even talking in general, they are generally quite good at respecting one 
another and the limits of acceptable behavior outside of the clinic. In this way, they 
make a decent example of this abstract construction of what “appearing in front of 
others as equals” could be taken to mean.  
 Another important function of action, and the space of equals in which one 
can act speaks to the relationship between the individual and “the background.”  In 
Herbert Dreyfus’ interpretation of Heidegger’s Being and Time, he writes,  
It is this holistic background coping (disclosing) that makes possible appropriate 
details in particular circumstances (discovering). Only because, on entering the 
workshop, we are able to avoid chairs, locate and approach the workbench, pick out 
and grasp something as an instrument, etc., can we use a specific hammer to hit a 
specific nail, find the hammer too light or too heavy, etc.393 
 
  Discovering always takes place in a background context of what we assume to 
already be discovered. This understanding drives not only the existenz philosophy of 
Martin Heidegger, but also is an important cornerstone of the famous argument in 
Thomas Kuhn’s widely read Structure of Scientific Revolutions, where Kuhn’s 
                                                
392 Again, see Mutz, Hearing the Other Side: Deliberative Versus Participatory Democracy, 
National Conference on Citizenship, "Broken Engagement: America's Civic Health Index,"  
(Washington, DC: National Conference on Citizenship, 2006), Rosenblum, Membership and 
Morals, Schkade, Sunstein, and Hastie, "What Happened on Deliberation Day?." 





concept of paradigm is as a set of background explanations that “represents work that 
has been done once and for all.”394   All of this poses a question, “how are we to 
know what about us is actually us and how much is coming from this background?”  
A way to point to the importance of this question is to think about Friedrich 
Nietzsche’s argument in On the Genealogy of Morality, in which the short, vulgar 
synopsis of his main argument would be to say that he advances the claim that 
morality is dictated by the powerful, but not followed by them.395  So how can we 
take our own lives to be meaningful as such and not simply working through a set of 
embedded meanings that others have dictated to us in order to make sure that most of 
us do what the dictates of elites, societies, markets, etc. do what is best for their 
particular performances?   
The only way to explore this question, which Arendt thinks it is necessary for 
us to do in order to find a satisfying answer on how not to treat individual human 
lives as superfluous, is to engage in a community of equals. It is by creating a 
political order whereby people are not simply mauled by the relationship between 
their bodily concerns and the massive collection of organizations that can form and 
leverage these concerns and turn “the political” into something awful and empty. 
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Arendt believes that the political’s importance lies with these deep, difficult to 
discern questions about life’s meaning,  
The conviction that the greatest that man can achieve is his own appearance and 
actualization is by no means a matter of course.  Against it stands the conviction of 
homo faber that a man’s products may be more—and not only more lasting—than he 
is himself, as well as the animal laborans’ firm belief that life is the highest of all 
goods.396 
  
The contrast Arendt sets up is between man as a political being as opposed to one 
who merely makes use-objects (homo faber) and places their faith in their enduring 
quality. This view of man is as just another biological creature that lives for the sake 
of contributing to the life process (animal laborans) and man as someone interested 
in knowing who he or she is by virtue of the appearance of their words and deeds. 
Arendt explains further, “without a space of appearance and without trusting in action 
and speech as a mode of being together, neither the reality of one’s self, of one’s own 
identity, nor the reality of the surrounding world ca be established beyond any 
doubt.”397  While pro-life and pro-choice advocates take positions in their dispute 
against one another along philosophical positions on “the meaning of life,” Arendt’s 
perspective suggests that we are witnessing life’s meaning in the scene outside of the 
clinic.  
The Burden of Action as it Relates to Laws 
Arendt also wants us to remember that the general nature of action is also a 
burden because actions are “enduring” and “irreversible.”398  The irreversibility and 
endurance of action is a way of saying that, as opposed to the realm of theory, where 
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one can reverse conclusions or even start over tabula rasa, the realm in which human 
beings have to do things are at the same time real and that reality carries forward into 
an uncertain future. Acts cannot be undone, and in a sense, that makes them more 
permanent than the creations of work or labor because use-objects disappear over 
time.    
Arendt believes that action thus appears self-undermining. Our capacity to act 
appears to us as freedom, but our inability to control the consequences of our actions 
seems to strip us of our own sovereignty over our actions. Arendt writes, “In view of 
human reality and its phenomenal evidence, it is indeed as spurious to deny human 
freedom to act because the actor never remains the master of his acts as it is to 
maintain that human sovereignty is possible because of the incontestable fact of 
human freedom.”399  She follows this quote by pointing to Kant in a footnote, saying 
that, “Kant had the courage to acquit man from the consequences of his deed, 
insisting solely on the purity of his motives, and this saved him from losing faith in 
man and his potential greatness.”400  However, we do not inhabit the world of good 
intentions, so Kant’s insistence does not lend itself to a political solution. This is 
where we come back to power and antipower in Arendt’s thought, and we can 
examine how it links back, with great force, with the rest of the republican tradition. 
Arendt writes that  
power, like action, is boundless, is boundless; it has no physical limitation in human 
nature, in the bodily existence of man, like strength. Its only limitation is the 
existence of other people, but this limitation is not accidental, because human power 
corresponds to the condition of plurality to begin with.401 
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This brings us back around to antipower, and we can see how by looking at what 
Arendt says about the Mayflower Compact in On Revolution. Arendt writes “they 
obviously feared the so-called state of nature, the untrod wilderness, unlimited by any 
boundary, as well as the unlimited initiative of men bounded by no law.”402 For 
Arendt, the principle of law can be seen by the example of the signatories of the 
Mayflower Comapct, whose “obvious fear of one another was accompanied by the no 
less obvious confidence they had in their own power.”403  Law is imposed to try to 
make a world in which people can live with one another and with the possibilities and 
dangers of action and freedom all at the same time.  
Arendt cites two different ways to handle this problem that seem helpful. The 
first way is through promises and forgiveness. The second way is through law, 
understood in the context of the Latin root “lex,” which originally meant “intimate 
connection.”404  Arendt writs about the uderstanding the Romans had of law through 
the story of Aeneas’ arrival in Italy. In this story laws became necessary, “[o]nly after 
Aeneas and his warriors had arrived from Troy, and a war had broken out between the 
invaders and the natives.”405  In this context, Arendt explains, laws  
were more than the means to reestablish peace; they were treaties and agreements 
with which a new alliance, a new unity, was constituted, the unity of two altogether 
different entities which the war had thrown together and which now entered into a 
partnership.406 
  
From this we see that Arendt’s understanding of laws as intimate connection 
envisages a polity in which the rule of law constitutes a series of promises. Such 
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promises try to contain as best as possible the ill effects of the capacity of human 
action.  The polity is forced to continually confront the possibilities and extent to 
which their actions might come to effect others in ways that might not seem obvious 
or correct at first because of the disbursement of more power to more people. This 
sounds very much like Madison or Pettit, but only Arendt seems to have a full 
appreciation for the fact that we also still have action. The promises of lex, combined 
with the force of the habitual taking for granted of the world and how it works as we 
have become acclimated to it, what Heidegger calls “the background” or what 
Montesquieu would call “the spirit of the laws,” establishes a state that preserves 
human freedom. This freedom is preserved from the contestation that preserves the 
fact of human plurality. Law is, as one of its functions, supposed to serve as a set of 
promises that protects us from the actions of others when they take things into their 
own hands in unacceptable ways. However, Arendt’s point is that law is also 
supposed to, in restricting the worst possible outcomes of our deeds, also set us free 
to act in the ways that are not restricted by law. This is the ultimate end of the 
conception of freedom as antipower. Non-domination’s promise is in our ability to 
live in a world of consequence and conscience.    
Action and the Economy of Antipower 
When Pettit works through his concept of antipower, he considers questions 
that we might say are about the economy of antipower. Pettit acknowledges, “There is 




creating new problems.”407  Pettit’s view clearly considers the republican view of 
freedom as non-domination to be intrinsically tied to questions of political economy 
of a broader sort. Montesquieu writes,  
the legislator is to follow the spirit of the nation when doing so is not contrary to the 
principles of government, for we do nothing better than what we do freely and by 
following our natural genius. If one gives a pedantic spirit to a nation naturally full of 
gaiety the state will gain nothing, either at home or abroad. Let it do frivolous things 
seriously and serious things gaily.408  
 
Thus the disruption of the general character of the community must be weighed 
against the importance of protecting this character by investing each citizen with a 
certain ability to contribute to the constitution of the character of his or her way of life 
on their own. The maintenance of a society where people are free enough to 
constitute to the general spirit of their community without violating the critical 
principles of government that make such contributions possible in the first place is 
negotiating the difference between defending freedom as nondomination and 
meddling. The aim is to negotiate the tradeoffs, the political economy broadly 
understood, of promoting active government so that, almost paradoxically we may all, 
in the words of Montesquieu, “be left as we are.”409 
According to Sheldon Wolin, the “name ‘political economy’ was originally 
introduced by the founders of modern economics to describe a discourse centered on 
the desirable limits of state intervention.”410  J. R. McCulloch wrote that political 
economy “might, indeed, be called the science of values (emphasis author’s).”411  
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While McCulloch conceived of this political economy as a relationship where 
opening up material wealth was a means for collective prosperity,412 the political 
economy that Pettit is describing concerns itself with wealth more broadly to include 
political values alongside pecuniary ones. In such a formulation, realizing political 
values takes the form of engaging in trade-offs with similar constraints to those taken 
as axiomatic in elementary economic theory. In the parlance of the “dismal science,” 
it is one thing to recognize that freedom as antipower is a desirable political value, 
and it is another question entirely to ask what realizing it costs.   
 Pettit looks at the trade-offs involved in realizing freedom as antipower and 
concludes that there are “two subgoals involved in promoting antipower.”413  He 
characterizes these two subgoals and describes their relationship to one another in 
promoting antipower, 
One involves the reduction of subjugation, with the provision of the most intensive 
level of antipower available; the other involves the maximization of the domain of 
individual choice: the extension of antipower as distinct from its intensification. If 
there is a true ceiling on how far we may reduce domination—on how intensive 
antipower can be in any society—then the natural approach to the promotion of 
antipower will be first to look for the reduction of subjugation and then to see how 
far the domain of the individual, unsubjugated choice can be extended. If there is not 
a ceiling on the reduction of subjugation, then the promotion of antipower will 
require us to weigh these subgoals against each other.414 
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Pettit seems optimistic about how infrequently these goals might come into conflict. 
One might wonder if there must be some sense in which prioritizing the principle of 
reducing subjugation takes priority over expanding the domain of individual choice. 
Otherwise, it would be difficult to say what non-domination offers us over non-
interference. This is where it is helpful to remember about the “somewhat 
paradoxical,” as Hannah Arendt writes it, way in which the reduction of subjugation, 
and the diffusion of power actually creates more power.415  While reducing 
subjugation, properly managed, may indeed create a general sense of a “rising tide 
that floats all boats” for the domain of individual choice for members of the political 
community, this is not always going to be the case. Pettit thinks, “If there is not a 
ceiling on the reduction of subjugation, then the promotion of antipower will force us 
to weigh these subgoals against each other.”416  In other words, Pettit understands that 
the promotion of antipower is not intended to create new subjugating relationships in 
the name of destroying old ones. The supporter of the noninterference principle of 
freedom is likely to call such trade-offs a slippery slope. The supporter of the non-
domination principle will call it a question of responsible management.  
Abortion Escorts as an Example of Managing Trade-Offs 
How are we to manage such trade-offs when they emerge?  One possible 
answer is through a combination of action and law, as discussed previously. The 
ability of the individual to act on no one’s authority but ones’ own, what Pettit refers 
to as the “domain of the individual,” has been one of the critical concerns in thinking 
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about political action as exemplified by abortion escorting as different from civil 
society or activism. The usefulness of action in this understanding of the political 
economy of freedom lies in the fact that it is the well-spring of a “free market” of 
antipower. Individuals, sufficiently free from subjugation and able to resist 
subjugation, may engage in the daily affairs of their lives and challenge subjugating 
impediments as they find them.  
 One of the noticeable difference between abortion escorts who were veterans 
of many years and those who dropped away from doing it after a trip out or two 
rested in a real sense for the veterans that they validated their own power by their 
actions. This sense of power should was no megalomaniacal impulse, but rather a 
healthy sense of antipower. Their strong sense of satisfaction rested not in the cause 
and not even, to some extent, about the people being escorted into the clinic. The 
satisfaction rested in large part in resisting the protesters directly, and the more 
specifically one knew the protestors, and knew about the protestors, the more 
satisfaction came from resisting. The childish nicknames, the tales of misbehavior by 
protestors, stories about when family members of patients threatened to beat them up 
– all are ways that abortion escorts reminded themselves that while perhaps one 
cannot escape Weber’s famous iron cage,417 it is both possible and gratifying to rattle 
it.   
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 In so doing, the abortion escort is ensuring the distribution of antipower 
penetrates deeper into the political community than it would were we only interested 
in question, “to what organizational structures people chose to donate their 
resources?”  If citizens maintained freedom as antipower only insofar as they were 
incorporated into certain areas of civil society or only insofar as they were 
incorporated into various corporate or activist organizations, it would be hard to say 
that this freedom would look like much more than choosing which master we wish to 
serve. Even with complete choice over joining and always retaining the option to exit, 
a freedom limited to such a domain would remain a deeply de-individualized, 
unsatisfying one. If antipower is to be distributed as equally as possible to be working 
at its best, then it cannot be trusted to organizations alone to secure it, because 
organizations are ultimately engaged in dividing people into hierarchies and focusing 
members on narrow, specific tasks. This would indicate that organizations, as 
comprised of members of unequal standing, and also likely to be on equal footing 
with all other organizations, would be a place where antipower would end up unequal 
in its distribution. This is undesirable in Pettit’s view, because, “it would reduce the 
antipower of the less equal at the same time it increased that of the elite,” and thus, 
“The maximization of antipower is likely to involve the maximization of equal 
antipower, at least under the most plausible circumstances.”418 
It follows from such an understanding of antipower that the ultimate right not 
to be dominated rests with the individual. While the individual may be forced to 
engage in trade-offs to maintain this non-domination, including joining in larger 
cooperative efforts to maintain this precious freedom, there must still be at least some 
                                                




part of protecting this freedom that the individual may still claim original jurisdiction. 
If this is the case, it necessarily means that the individual retains some type of 
capacity to safeguard this by his or her own spontaneous activity.  
In its most evident form, this capacity is called “the revolution.” Here, Wolin 
and Arendt have done much theoretical work on understanding what revolutionary 
power is and why it practically disappears from our notice in the post-revolutionary 
period of a body politic. The capacity to act that revolutionary activity springs from, 
whether or not it is frequently noticed, is always existent in each member of the body 
politic, and need not always take on the form of having world-shattering political 
implications. This capacity is usually there in reserve, appearing regularly in such 
modest patterns as not to draw notice. Then, every once and a while, there is a great 
revolution that “sees in the masses ‘a huge reservoir of electrical energy’ waiting to 
be tapped; its aspiration is to rouse the sleeping giant, cause him to exchange his 
supportive role for that of positive agent.”419   
Modest Revolutionary Power Introduced 
However, there are also modest revolutions when issues of “politics,” as 
Wolin defines the term also have a substantive bearing on the shape and vision of 
“the political.”  Arendt’s examples of Eichmann’s choices in Nazi Germany, the 
deception of the American people by the Federal Bureaucracy during the Vietnam 
War, or the chance to be an escort outside of Little Rock Central High School, are 
important on this count. They represent the missed opportunities for a small, yet 
potentially significant acts of antipower of the sort that make an inhabitable world of 
                                                




organization without subjugation. The political economy of antipower is 
fundamentally grounded and safeguarded in the small acts of public participation in 
which anyone may step in and claim their share of public business. Arendt argues that 
this was a conviction that Jefferson had firmly in mind when he advocated an idea he 
called the ward system. The stakes were nothing short of preserving the revolutionary 
spirit, a moment of massive antipower and participation in reshaping the political, and 
channeling this spirit in a milder, productive outlet that would secure the values of the 
revolution itself. The cost of failure nothing short of an empty public space where the 
freedom of citizens would depend solely upon “virtue of luck, cunning or fawning,” 
but in an empty public realm, even these lucky ones are never far from “nearby 
possible worlds where their fortune, wit, or charm fail.”420   
The Ward System and Empty Public Space 
 
Hannah Arendt reflected in On Revolution, “it is perfectly true, and a sad fact 
indeed, that most so-called revolutions, far from achieving the constitutio libertatis, 
have not even been able to produce constitutional guarantees of civil rights and 
liberties, the blessings of ‘limited government.’”421 Arendt expands on her vision of 
the problems of “founding freedom” in the post-revolutionary period in the life of a 
polity by working through the challenges of simultaneously protecting freedom and 
creating order. Arendt makes a bold theoretical stroke in two sentences: 
the distance between tyranny and constitutional, limited government is as great as, 
perhaps greater than, the distance between limited government and freedom. But 
these considerations, however great their practical relevance, should be no reason for 
us to mistake civil rights for political freedom, or to equate these preliminaries of 
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civilized government with the very substance of a free republic. For political 
freedom, generally speaking, means the right ‘to be a participator in government’, or 
it means nothing.422 
 
The debate between republicans and liberals, between “limited government” and a 
“free republic” relies quite heavily on how to deal with the uneasy coexistence in the 
world between order and chaos, organization and freedom, and prediction and 
fortune. Limited government tends to take the view that, “Social harmony, instead of 
being the responsibility of a governing authority, was the design of no one; it was the 
resultant flowing from the spontaneous equilibrium of economic forces.”423  Barber 
writes that on this view, “To understand politics is therefore always, necessarily, to 
deconstruct and depoliticize it: that is to say, to decontaminate it of those exotic and 
unmanageable elements that resist assimilation by the mind in quest of certainty.”424   
 Abortion escorting serves as an example of political action – the “exotic and 
unmanageable” stuff of political practice that complicates and tests political theory. 
Abortion escorting evidences the claims of those who take a view that political theory 
likely cannot and definitely should not conquer entirely the domain of human activity. 
Nevertheless, such theorists are still left with a question of what to make of this 
unmanageable tract of activity that is still supposed to be bound by some type of 
political order. Arendt and Wolin handle this question with similar pattern of 
argument. For Arendt, we find this in her writing about Thomas Jefferson’s idea for a 
system of “elementary wards.” For Wolin, it is the development of what he calls 
“fugitive democracy.”  
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The Ward System 
Arendt comes to considering Jefferson’s ward system by means of questioning 
why the American revolutionary tradition, successful in its founding a stable political 
government “dried up” while the French revolutionary tradition carried on its 
intellectual force despite ending in disaster.425  Arendt concludes success is the reason 
that the American revolutionary tradition dries up. She identifies two contradictory 
impulses in a revolutionary movement: “the grave concern with the stability and 
durability of the new structure,” and the “exhilarating awareness of the human 
capacity of beginning, the high spirits which have always attended the birth of 
something new on earth.”426  These two impulses are only contradictory from the 
perspective of looking back from after the revolution, for while the revolution is 
taking place, “in the act of foundation they were not mutually exclusive opposites but 
two sides of the same event.”427   
The question that Arendt believes the republican thinker ought to be interested 
in, and the one that the advocate of limited government is unfortunately uninterested 
in, deals with how to preserve both impulses as two sides of the life of the body 
politic after the founding as best as possible. The hope that there are intelligent ways 
to answer this question is a central commitment of the participatory democrat. It is 
why Arendt complained about the lack of citizen-escorts outside of Little Rock 
Central High Scool, and it is why abortion escorts seem to fulfill the hopes of this 
participatory vision.  
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 To show that this idea was not lost on every American founder in the 
immediate post-revolutionary era, Arendt turns to Thomas Jefferson. Jefferson 
believed that dividing the country into participatory wards would “permit the citizen 
to continue to do what they had been able to do during the years of revolution, 
namely, to act on their on and to participate in public business as it was being 
transacted from day to day.”428  In short, Arendt believes Jefferson to have seen 
something about how to deal with founding both durable institutions and the joys of 
the revolutionary spirit at the same time, and that is, in the process of founding, make 
“a public space where freedom could appear.”429  Jefferson’s ward system ultimately 
represents a participatory ideal, a forum through which people may disclose various 
public talents they might possess through having a space to act. As such, the wards 
represented a public space where we could learn about who we are through the 
disclosing nature of our actions. Just as making an artificial realm of politics is what 
makes men equals, the making of the wards system was an artificial creation that 
could allow us to be equals and yet still reveal our distinct character at the same time. 
Something that appears under naturally conditions episodically, the wards aimed, at 
least for modest political questions, at preserving the episodic moments of the 
political in a permanent institutional conceit where people who cared for their public 
happiness could partake.  
 When Arendt is writing about the ward system, her concerns are directed 
towards the politics of her times in the 1960’s. She is ultimately aiming at what is for 
her a contemporary normative analysis. Sheldon Wolin’s writing about the fugitive 
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nature of democracy and the loss of a sense of the public is a similar contemporary 
normative project, but from the start of the new millennium. His diagnosis of more 
recent times is not an encouraging one: 
The political economy embodies a widespread consensus of an ironical sort, that a 
highly advanced society signifies the presence of a determinism more powerful than 
any Marx could have imagined. It takes the form of a lack of confidence that politics 
can be the servant of popular sovereignty, the means for shaping society to benefit 
the vast majority in ways other than modest material improvements.430 
  
Wolin believes that our political vision today is one that is inattentive to the political. 
For Wolin, there are a number of reasons we have developed a political vision that 
has an empty view of the political, but the primary culprit is our increasing tendency 
to understanding everything, even culture, through market-based economics. Wolin 
notes that, “Prior to the mid-eighteenth century culture had primarily been associated 
with the unchanging,” but that now, “Two centuries later culture appears quick, 
protean, and, above all, premeditated, manufactured, or, euphemistically, 
constructed.”431  Wolin’s observation about the dynamics in culture is not unique 
amongst those desperately trying to hold onto a participatory spirit. Barber’s Jihad v. 
McWorld describes the global struggle of the world as one primarily between the old 
version of culture (Jihad) and the new (McWorld). Barber writes,  
The apparent truth, which speaks to the paradox at the core of this book, is that the 
tendencies of both Jihad and McWorld are at work, both visible sometimes in the 
same country at the very same instant. Iranian zealots keep one ear turned to the 
mullahs urging holy war and the other cocked to Rupert Murdochs Star television 
beaming in Dynasty, Donahue, and The Simpsons from hovering above.432 
 
Barber’s critique has the emptiness of the public realm at heart as he progresses. In 
the afterword of the book, he writes that his argument is, “finally about neither Jihad 
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nor McWorld, but about democracy—and the dangers democracy faces in a world 
where the forces of commerce and the forces reacting to commerce are locked in 
struggle.”433  This conflict is clash similar to Arendt’s rise of the social and Wolin’s 
principalities of organizational power.  
Political Action as a “Road Not Taken” 
All of this relates back to Arendt’s sense of the road not taken with Jefferson’s 
conception of the participatory ward system and to abortion escorting as a 
participatory act.434  The conflict between old culture and new is the apparent last 
stand against the politico-economic future in which McWorld is triumphant, and 
corporate powers spread their tendrils of across the world, seeking their own 
lebensraum, and competing for their own interests like the “warring city-states of 
sixteenth-century Italy”435 that Machiavelli despised so much. However, “old culture” 
is destined to be a losing representative. As Francis Fukuyama argues rather 
convincingly, this bout is bound to have but one conclusion, because the forces of his 
term for old culture, what he terms “history,” are dramatically overmatched. He 
writes, “at the end of history it is not necessary that all societies become successful 
liberal societies, merely that they end their ideological pretensions of representing 
different and higher forms of society.”436  Fukuyama’s point is well taken: there seem 
to be no real alternatives at the level of competition amongst the towering structures 
of power. Yet, before one signs on with Fukuyama in agreement that the principles of 
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the broad socio-economic arrangement’s he endorses cannot be improved upon, we 
need to reflect back on our intrepid participants. What world they are to inherit if their 
deeds are reduced to simply one action in a grander scheme of maneuvering in this 
climactic battle about the fate of socio-economic totalism? Even Fukuyama is 
despondent on this count, believing that life at the end of history, writing “The end of 
history will be a very sad time,” and “Perhaps this very prospect of centuries of 
boredom at the end of history will serve to get history started again.”437 Participation 
and its joys, the way it is described by Arendt, seem a counter-point to this joyless 
end Fukuyama predicts might accompany liberal capitalisms final triumph.  
Even as abortion escorts represent the possibility of a public as place inhabited 
by citizens who act to guarantee their appearance in this world as equals, the tendency 
is to describe them not in terms of their deeds but in terms of their affiliation to a 
cause. The significance of their participation as participation is blotted out by what is 
seen as the greater cause: the moral and legal status of abortion practices. Abortion 
escorting can either remind us of the spontaneous, “fugitive” character of democracy, 
or it can remind us of Wolin’s suggestion that, “The actual weakness of democracy is 
the consequences not of a frontal attack but of a judgment that democracy can be 
managed and, when necessary, ignored.”438   
Fugitive Democracy and Modest Revolutions 
 
Sheldon Wolin’s work on the problem of founding freedom is largely 
consistent with Arendt’s formulation of the problem. He calls it “fugitive 
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democracy,” a term he invents “in order to emphasize its necessarily occasional 
character.”439  Wolin explains,  
The fugitive character of democracy is directly related to the fact about democracy 
that Aristotle emphasized: democracy’s politics is the creation of those who must 
work, who cannot hire proxies to promote their interests, and for whom participation, 
as distinguished from voting is a necessary sacrifice.440 
 
This vision of democracy absolves itself from perpetuating the myth that the demos 
somehow can be said to be in direct control of broad governing institutions. The 
power in this move is that it allows us to view the constitution of the political not by 
trying to match it to some mythical appeal to “democraticness.”  Instead, large-scale 
governance and its concerns are exposed as, “the meaning and substance of the 
political as well as the questions of who dominates politics and who has responsibility 
for the care of civic life.”441  
Wolin defines democracy this way so that we are free to think of democracy 
as active, spontaneous and order-disruptive. The problem that he and Arendt (via 
Jefferson) try to work out with regard to the fugitive nature of democracy then, is to 
notice that democracy has to coexist in a world in which there are boundaries. Wolin 
writes “Boundaries signify the will to contextualize,” and “the reality cloaked in the 
metaphor of boundaries is the containment of democracy.” For Wolin, “the crucial 
boundary is a constitution.” 442  At this point, Wolin has set up a way to think about 
saving the joys of participating in the spirit of the democratic moment while also 
founding a new order. Wolin’s method for this is to consider the relationship and 
effects of creating ordered systems, in both thought and practice, while at the same 
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time allowing for the opportunity for this understanding of democracy to appear from 
time to time. In this light, Jefferson’s ward system appears as an effort to try to use 
the founding process of institutionalization for institutionalizing a space that would be 
spurious and antagonizing to the very order that boundaries are supposed to impose. 
The idea being, as Stephen Holmes has convincingly argued, that all things need to be 
made aware of their limits, even those things created to impose limits themselves.443  
Disruption, Disturbance, and Anxiety 
Political acts like abortion escorting are modestly disruptive, or to say it in 
Wolin’s terms, are disruptive within boundaries. Abortion escorts create a space in 
which the ominous presence of the pressure of social conformity is denied in part by 
the presence of others who are willing to stand next to the intended targets of such 
pressure and share in “taking the heat.”  Not only do escorts share in absorbing this 
social pressure, they generally do so with a nonchalance that further mitigates the 
impact of this pressure. The way they greet people coming to the clinic and 
particularly with regard to the way they try to ignore the protestors as completely as 
possible are all geared to trying to create the impression that there is no need to 
consider the scene outside as anything but normal. Abortion escorts have the effect of 
taking away the imposition of authority that is projected by protestors. Arendt wrote 
in On Violence that what most undermines authority the fastest is laughter.444  If the 
strategies employed by escorts are to be given full consideration, laughter is at best 
only a slightly better remedy than is indifference.    
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As such, the contestation abortion escorts are engaged in has the 
characteristics of a power-antipower relationship, or of what we might call a modest 
revolution, as all deeds that Arendt describes as action have the qualities of natality. 
Arendt writes,  
The purpose of the creation of man was to make possible a beginning… The very 
capacity for beginning is rooted in natality, and by no means in creativity, not in a 
gift but in the fact that human beings, new men, again and again appear in the world 
by virtue of birth.445 
 
For Arendt, it is the combination of natality and the “common stage” that living 
beings appear before one another that allows them to take part in lives with meaning. 
It is not the novelty of creation, but the novelty of appearance. The novelty rests in 
the newness not of the deed itself. Abortion escorting looks relatively similar 
regardless of who is doing it. Instead, it is that abortion escorting allows everyone to 
appear as themselves in participating as an abortion escort that gives it the character 
of natality.  
More generally, Arendt, Pettit and Wolin are all trying to preserve the status 
of the free human subject through political equality, while acknowledging that 
making and maintaining this political order of equals requires constant trade-offs. All 
three also have an understanding that threatening the stability and neutrality of 
desirable institutions with unpredictability and particularity is problematic; and yet, 
so too is allowing institutions to dictate the constitutions of the public and of the 
entirety of a common life to which the individual is entirely at their mercy. 
Tocqueville predicted that great revolutions would become rare because “if you can 
found a state of society in which each has something to keep and little to take, you 
                                                




will have done much for the peace of the world.”446  This formula is at the heart of 
how Pettit’s preservation of freedom can work in practice, and both Wolin and Arendt 
show a great concern for maintaining a set of boundaries such that the revolutionary 
character of action is contained within larger structures that maintain this larger peace 
in the world. However, Pettit’s antipower is also predicated on the idea that freedom 
is the ability to demonstrate one’s ability to use their own revolutionary capacity for 
action in ways that are demonstrable to others and to one’s self as a means of 
constantly warding off the continuous threat of domination from others. With the case 
of abortion escorts, as was previously mentioned, this happens in the form of 
relatively spontaneous cooperation to ward off the projection of social power against 
those who wish access to services at a reproductive health clinic. The organizational 
work that goes into setting up a clinic defense is about as involved as getting frends 
together for a pick-up basketball game.  
Tocqueville, Wolin and Arendt, in particular, seem to have a further concern 
about the alienating effects that changes in the structure of power in the world and 
what this means for the ability for each and every one of us to feel as though we 
belong in the world. Perhaps in the past we could cheat on this question, and claim 
that we belong to a region, a particular race, a particular culture, a particular nation-
state, a particular corporation, etc. Such ties however appear less and less binding, as 
the discussion above about new versus old culture exemplifies. The question in 
essence becomes how does one formulate a sense of belonging in the world. If one 
has absolutely no power whatsoever to disrupt the order of things in the world, than 
the very capacities that may be said to individuate us from one another makes us 
                                                




nothing more than obnoxious to large-scale systems that depend on a lot of us but not 
on any one of us in particular. Thus, it might be desirable to keep a bit of our capacity 
for revolutionary action at hand for our own sense that we deserve to live. It was 
Albert Camus who wrote that the only question left in philosophy is “why not 
suicide?”447 It is not an accident that this question was posed by the author of The 
Plague, in which the stories heroes take resisting the mass death the plague brings to 
Oran into their own hands while their government does little, and fellow citizens of 
the world can only wax philosophic from the distance on a boat with a loudspeaker.448   
In Tocqueville’s acknowledgement of why revolutions will become more 
modest, he argues that, “Men equal in rights, in education, in fortune, and to say it all 
in a word, of similar condition, necessarily have needs, habits, and tastes barely 
unalike.”449 Hence, when the tyranny of the majority expresses itself in the form of 
social pressure, as it does with abortion protestors outside of the reproductive health 
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center, it is a mistake to interpret such a gathering as deliberative.450  Protestors 
combine their presence, collective witnessing, “praying for the sinners,” and “good 
cop-bad cop” messages to push as hard as they can to set off the alarm that every 
individual seems to carry inside of them that tells them whether or not the rest of the 
world assents to their belonging.  Tocqueville believed that democratic citizens feel 
this fear of belonging particularly strongly because democracy and the spirit of 
equality level or obliterate the meaningful status of any other markers of one’s place 
in the world. Tocqueville writes that in democratic republics, tyranny “leaves the 
body and goes straight for the soul.”451 The main source of power is ostracism, 
The master no longer says it: You shall think as I do or you shall die; he says: You 
are free not to think as I do; your life, your goods, everything remains to you; but 
from this day on you are a stranger among us. You shall keep your privileges in the 
city, but they will become useless to you; for if you crave the vote of your fellow 
citizens, they will not grant it to you, and if you demand only their esteem, they will 
still pretend to refuse it to you. You shall remain among men, but you shall lose your 
rights of humanity. When you approach those like you, they shall flee you as being 
impure; and those who believe in your innocence, even they shall abandon you, for 
one would flee them in their turn. Go in peace, I leave you your life, but I leave it to 
you worse than death.452 
 
What abortion escorts are successful in doing, when they are successful (which is 
most of the time), is almost an ironic twist on the whole theoretical story. Abortion 
escorts, in their ability to diffuse the social pressure of the protestors, use their actions 
to create a sense of bizarre “normalcy” outside of the clinic. They create the sense 
that since the protestors protest everyone who walks into the center, and since they 
come out every week to do this, and since they all belong to the same church or other 
organization that brings them out their to do this for their cause, the pressure they try 
                                                
450 See Jon A. Shields, "Christian Citizens: The Promise and Limits of Deliberation," Critical 
Review 19, no. 1 (2007). 





to apply becomes depersonalized. At their most successful, escorts turn the protestors 
into a form of white noise, just part of the background, no big deal. Social resistance 
in this way actually mirrors analysis by Martin Heidegger on the relationship between 
“the background” discussed above and “disturbance.”453  
Disturbance in this sense can be interpreted as either a good or a bad thing. In 
general, disturbance, while not generally thought of in these terms, is thought of as a 
positive thing in politics, for it forces political actors and constituents to stop and talk 
and think about the wisdom of their decisions, values, objectives, etc. Martin Luther 
King, Jr.’s talk about “stopping business”454 exemplifies this understanding nicely. In 
the case of the abortion protestors, they are looking to cause a disturbance for the 
purposes of getting someone to do something that they have previously committed to 
doing, and are legally permissible to do, but have not quite completed carrying out 
such a decision. Protestors claim that there objective is simply to “reason with” the 
people who have decided to use the reproductive health center’s facilities. However, 
the situation outside the clinic is not about reason, it is about anxiety. The tactics 
protestors generally employ are directed more at playing up anxiety to disrupt 
resolve, or to create such a violent disturbance in the world of the entrant that they are 
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overwhelmed. This is an entirely what is at stake for abortion protestors outside of the 
clinic rather than demonstrating than engaging in epistemic reason-giving 
exhcanges.455  
The great Danish philosopher Søren Kierkegaard provides great insight into 
the anxiety that accompanies large decisions beyond simply choosing a morally 
correct position when he reflects on the story of Abraham and Isaac in Fear and 
Trembling. He writes  
if there was one who, having heard the greatness as well as the dreadfulness in 
Abraham’s deed, ventured to proceed along that path, I would saddle my horse and 
ride along with him. At every station before coming to Mount Moriah, I would 
explain to him that he could still turn around, could repent on the misunderstanding 
that he was called to be tried in such a conflict, could confess that he lacked the 
courage…456    
  
Kierkegaard spells out this part of the story of Abraham’s faith because, “What is 
omitted to Abraham’s story is the anxiety, because to money I have no ethical 
obligation, but to the son the father has the highest and the holiest.”457  Likewise, 
what is omitted from the account of protestors and escorts, when we engage in 
judging and describing their deeds, is this anxiety. There is anxiety in making a 
decision with so much at stake as a human life to be sure, and it has been enough to 
occupy the minds of many great thinkers on this particular decision. What we seem to 
have lost, just as Kierkegaard argued theologians had lost in their contemplation of 
Abraham and Isaac, is that the trip to reproductive health services is, like Abraham’s 
trip to Mount Moria, a journey over many days, with many stops, where the weight of 
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this anxiety hangs about constantly from moment to moment along the journey. As 
Kieregaard notes, this makes it more than a question of decision-making, but a test of 
strength to bear such a burden of anxiety.  
The protestors’ attempt at disturbance outside of the clinic represents the 
attempt to snap the strength of their target at their most vulnerable point. For many, 
entering a physician’s office of any kind creates an accumulation of anxiety that is 
difficult to bear, even if the rational calculations behind going are straightforward. 
Now one must imagine this with the intense weight of moral uncertainty. Add to this 
the vague, engrossing specter of ostracism that for many of us takes the form of a 
paranoia that never directly manifests itself.  For the person walking to the clinic, this 
paranoia takes the form of real people, who appear unshakeable in the certainty of 
their own moral conviction, who equally plead with you to change your mind and 
threaten you with the eternal loss of your soul.   
Abortion Escorts as Making Disturbing Protests Mundane 
Abortion escorts, by making the presence of protestors seem more normal, as 
just another group out on the streets shouting about something that one need not pay 
any mind to, actually force protestors back into the background. Thus, the ability of 
the protestors to force an disturbance in those going to the clinic by trying to show 
them they are not in fact strong enough to go into the clinic is reduced by the fact that 
escorts have some ability to redefine their efforts not as “the social” passing judgment 
on them, but instead as nothing more than a mild irritant. In walking directly around 
people on the clinic, escorts literally create a foreground space in the perceptive field 




measured effect of a measurable decrease in anxiety of patients when they are inside 
of the clinic.458   
 The fact that disturbances and counter-disturbances may be used for either ill-
intended or well-intended enterprises would leave a bad taste in the mouth of a pure 
ethical proceduralist. Indeed, I have intentionally avoided contemplating whether or 
not there is some higher order principle involving the morality of abortion that 
justifies the actions of either escorts or protestors, or neither of them. I did not want to 
get weighed down by such arguments and their potential to short-circuit an inquiry 
into the actual political dynamic happening outside of the abortion clinic. Just as 
Kierkegaard shows us with Abraham, whether his actions were justified or not, 
raising this question alone does not tell the entire story. So to is it the case with 
abortion escorts, protestors, and those wishing access to the clinic.  
 While all of this does not lead to a canceling out such that it was like no one is 
outside at all, it does make a clearing for those who might have previously been 
interrupted from carrying out there decisions. I would again like to claim no moral 
expertise in whether or not they ought to be interrupted or not, accept to notice that 
there are, in most things we engage with in our shared world, appropriate and 
inappropriate times to engage in such disturbances. A recent example of this would be 
trying to create an interruption about one’s previous held views on the US occupation 
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of Iraq for a mother of killed American soldier during his or her funeral. Presumably, 
we justify such determinations not by the absolute justificatory nature of the 
occupation of Iraq, but because we recognize that after we make such decisions for 
ourselves, even when we have possibly erred, we are owed the space and time to live 
with those decisions that we have made without interruption. What is partially at 
stake for republican understandings of freedom as non-domination is that to deny 
such space to live with our choices suffocates all value from being allowed to be an 
agent who chooses in the first place.  
 
Neither Eichmann Nor McNamara: Why Organizational Power Needs to Face 
Spontaneous Resistance 
 
Arendt and Wolin carry concern for the bureaucratic element of a world 
without the modest revolutionary power of political acts of antipower. A question 
persists: why “play with fire” when it comes to allowing spontaneous, unpredictable, 
and, to think back to Talisse’s criticism of activism, “epistemically immodest” 
democratic action?  The answer Arendt provides us comes in the form of cautionary 
tales: her coverage of the Adolf Eichmann’s trial and her essay on the decision-
making process by the Executive Branch of the United States during the Vietnam 
War. In both of these writings, Arendt’s thoughts gravitate towards the amount of 
self-deception that was involved in order to perpetuate the wrongs committed in both 
cases. This self-deception required a turning away from the common-sense 




positions of authority have the capacity to get away with this, the results can be most 
unfortunate. Hence, Arendt concludes, “In the realm of politics, where secrecy and 
deliberate deception have always played a significant role, self-deception is the 
danger par excellence.”459   
 Arendt’s political thought on the Eichmann trial and on the Pentagon Papers 
also explores the thematic of organizational power and the importance of action as a 
resistant strain to organizational power’s greatest hazards. Arendt tells in these two 
stories how organizations can mobilize power in contradiction to their own stated 
principles, come to be dominated by a thoughtless elite, and h can be self-
dissembling, particularly through the use of its ability to exclude. When the interests 
of political, social, and economic institutions run adrift of what Dewey calls the 
public, what would seem like naturally decent, considerate things to do are forced to 
appear as acts of defiance. This is why Arendt writes that the Israeli court was baffled 
by Adolf Eichmann’s apparent “normality.” She claims that “what they could neither 
resolve nor escape,” was the fact that “under the conditions of the Third Reich only 
‘exceptions’ could be expected to react ‘normally.’”460  In the cosmos of the Third 
Reich, the world created by their political, military, and corporate arrangements, 
simple acts of decency are not so simple. The simple act of allowing someone stay 
over at one’s house as a guest, a principle value of simple decency in the Roman 
world, could make one an enemy of the state if one’s guests happened to be non-
Aryans.  
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 Arendt also tries to make clear in both Eichmann in Jerusalem and in The 
Origins of Totalitarianism that belonging to or having some function in an 
organizational structure is a poor safeguard against domination. For if your existence 
is justified solely based upon your usefulness, it takes only a means supplant or make 
obsolete this usefulness and one becomes stripped of their armor. Arendt writes in the 
beginning of Origins, “Antisemitism reached its climax when Jews had similarly lost 
their public functions and their influence, and were left with nothing but their 
wealth.”461  She later writes in Eichmann in Jerusalem “one of the first steps taken by 
the Nazi government, back in 1933, had been the exclusion of Jews from civil 
service.”  In short, one of the major strategic moves of anti-Semitism was to remove 
as much claim Germany’s Jewish population could make on the public as possible, 
and this was in part accomplished by making sure that they were not necessary for 
any particular part of industry or society. Once removed from any claim on public 
power, Germany’s relationship with anti-semitism, under Arendt’s reading of the 
situation, seems to have proven Hobbes famous line true that “covenants, without the 
sword, are but words.”462 In short, anti-Semitism got as bad as it did in the early 
twentieth century because those in a power to dominate did so, and they did so 
because more opportunities opened up for them to get away with it and fewer 
opportunities opened up to resist, at least on the organizational level.    
 As such, covenants, reason giving, and justifiable policy can be reconstructed, 
reinterpreted and re-justified in order to feed the immediate needs of those in power 
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and their clients. Adolf Eichmann, at least Arendt’s version of him,463 is caught up in 
an organizational structure that rewards him even though it should have occurred to 
him that he was engaged in a sinister project. Arendt writes that the “flaw in 
Eichmann’s character was his almost total inability to ever look at anything from 
another’s point of view.”464  Arendt’s famous claim about the “banality of evil” has 
been taken many ways and used in the service of a lot of expanded ideas that have 
taken the term used to describe a man on trial for mass-murder who could only talk in 
clichés and turned this descriptive term into a cliché itself. Rather than dabble in the 
term, “banality of evil,” it suffices to notice that Arendt calls Eichmann “a clown.”465  
Perhaps her ultimate condemnation of him is when she writes, 
The longer one listened to him, the more obvious it became that his inability to speak 
was closely connected to his inability to think, namely, to think from the standpoint 
of somebody else. No communication was possible with him, not because he lied but 
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because he was surrounded by the most reliable safeguards against the words and the 
presence of others, and hence against reality as such.466 
  
Eichmann’s inability to think is precisely related to his lack of an ability to see the 
world outside of his own interests. Eichmann certainly had other mental abilities. 
Arendt notes, “There were two things he could do well, better than others: he could 
organize and he could negotiate.”467  In spite of these abilities, Eichmann was a 
narcissist par excellence, and as one obsessed with his own reflection, he saw the 
world as little more than a means for doing this. Arendt notes “In his mind, there was 
no contradiction between ‘I will jump into my grave laughing’” which he had 
bragged to colleagues was his take on being a part of the holocaust, and once arrested 
saying “‘I shall gladly hang myself in public as a warning example for all anti-
Semites on this earth,’ which now, under vastly different circumstances, fulfilled 
exactly the same function of giving him a lift.”468  This narcissism in Eichmann was 
little different from the general bureaucratic mentality for the carrying out of the 
“Final Solution” between bureaucratic organizations, “which was no help to their 
victims, since their ambition was always the same: to kill as many Jews as 
possible.”469  However, like Eichmann, once the context changed, the desire for 
relative aggrandizement survived despite the fact that to preserve the relative good 
standing of one’s bureaucratic organ, “only now it works in reverse: it has become 
each man’s desire ‘to exonerate his own outfit’ at the expense of all others.”470  That 
Eichmann understood and accepted when other members of rival outfits apparently 
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did this at his expense is not lost on Arendt, and shows the shocking congruity 
between the thoughtlessness of Eichmann and of the organizational universe in 
Germany as a whole.471  Eichmann seems to have understood the competitive nature 
between the various organs because the one thing he understood was professional 
self-promotion. “Eichmann was a careerist of the first order,” writes Corey Robin, 
“Late in the war, as Nazi leaders brooded in Berlin over their impending fate and that 
of Germany, Eichmann was fretting over superiors’ refusing to invite him to 
lunch.”472  
The “Banality” of Organizational Evil Due to an Empty View of Common Business 
The narcissism of structured, organizational behavior is the unhappy result of 
the increasingly common vision of the political as constituted as parts only and not 
wholes.473 As such, the structural relationship of organization and order causes an 
irrational loyalty towards carrying out one’s function in the scheme without regard 
towards its overall contribution to the larger picture, a larger picture whose 
constitution is securing the viability of al of its parts coexisting in the first place. On 
the inside of a group, the vision of reality itself can be warped by a sense of in-group 
unanimity, without regard to the reality. This could be because decision-makers in 
such contexts are incapable of thinking with an enlarged mentality, the way Arendt 
thinks about Eichmann. It also can be ascribed to the fact that in dominating 
relationships, as Amartya Sen has so famously argued, the decision-makers do not 
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share in the consequences of their decisions.474  Only the Allies victory in the Second 
World War that brought about some degree of cost for Eichmann and his colleagues, 
and in bringing about this victory in Europe, Robert McNamara and Curtis LeMay 
were reflecting on how it was only victory in the Pacific that would keep them from 
being war criminals for their use of fire-bombing.475    
For Eichmann, his “Pontius Pilate moment,” as Arendt calls it, took place at 
the now-infamous Wannsee Conference. Here, Arendt writes that “As Eichmann told 
it, the most potent factor in the soothing of his own conscience was the simple fact 
that he could see no one, no one at all who was against the Final Solution.”476  
Eichmann had adopted an administrative consensus theory of truth, and why not, 
since his objective was only to seek comfort for himself and to validate the 
importance of his work. Madeleine Albright’s comments about being the United 
States’ Ambassador to the United Nations during the Rwandan Genocide echo the 
frustration of organizational power even when, as Albright says in her own words, 
“My instructions were to support full withdrawal. I listened to the discussion very 
carefully in the Security Council. I could see that our position was wrong, and 
especially in listening to the African delegate, Ambassador Gambari from Nigeria, 
[who] was very moving on this.”477  Albright’s reflections on the Clinton 
Administration’s handling of the situation, even with a much greater sense of 
awareness, perhaps reveals a priority of conscience over result,  
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I wish that I had pushed for a large humanitarian intervention. As I write in my book, 
people would have thought I was crazy. It would never have happened. But I would 
have felt better about my own role in this. But [I] don't think, in retrospect, it would 
have made a difference. It just would have made me feel better. But I don't think it 
would have happened.478 (Emphasis is mine) 
 
Arendt’s analysis of the decision makers who made America’s Vietnam War policy is 
no more cheerful, “What caused the disastrous defeat of American policies and armed 
intervention was indeed no quagmire…but the willful, deliberate disregard of all 
facts, historical, political, geographical, for more than twenty years.”479  Arendt 
attributes this to the fact that  
[T]he self-deciever disappears in an entirely defactualized world; Washington and its 
sprawling governmental bureaucracy, as well as the various think-tanks in the 
country, provide the problem-solvers with a natural habitat for mind and body… the 
self deceived deceiver loses all contact with not only his audience, but with the real 
world.480  
 
Here, Arendt’s thinking adds an important qualifier on Sen’s formula of democracy, 
free press, and literacy: it is possible for a majority to not only be deceived by self-
decievers, but to also participate in self-deception themselves. This is the danger of 
having people who do not have a claim on our view of the shared world… we can 
easily deny a problem with the shared world when we define those who are wronged 
as not a part of it in the first place. Samantha Power’s account of the international 
response to the Rwandan genocide is only but one of the more recent examples. 
Power writes, 
The Tutsi rebels in the Rwandan Patriotic Front publicly appealed for a Western 
response. On April 13 they accused the Rwandan government of carrying out 
genocide. They invoked the Holocaust. In an April 23 letter to the head of the 
Security Council, the RPF representative, Claude Dusaidi, reminded Security Council 
members and the secretary-general, ‘When the institution of the UN was created after 
the Second World War, one of its fundamental objectives was to see to it that what 
                                                
478 Ibid. 
479 Arendt, "Lying in Politics," 32. 




happened to the Jews in Nazi Germany would never happen again.’ But as Kurdish 
leader Jalal Talabnai had found in Iraq and as the Bosnian government was learning 
around the same time, those who are suffering genocide are deemed to be biased and 
unreliable. Besides, that analogy that most gripped American minds at the time was 
not the Holocaust but Somalia. 481 
 
To say that such stories show a “failure of will” on behalf of the great institutions of 
the modern world is incorrect. Their will to ignore genocide is powerful enough to 
pretend not to see as thousands died in Rwanda every day. They develop this strong 
will by virtue of collecting institutional momentum that carries them in a different 
direction than being interested in thinking. Their willfulness without thoughtfulness 
makes the procedural views of politics that encourage us to think that they are the 




The consequences of a purely factional vision of the political are not only 
theoretical. The character of the world we live in shapes what is and is not 
permissible; what counts as murder versus what counts as just another day at the 
office. Further, it seems clear that our ability to be a “joiner” of either civil society or 
of an activist movement is not sufficient in itself to either foster or preserve an 
enlarged mentality capable of explicitly managing the political economy of non-
domination. Activist movements are committed to particular ideological points of 
view.482  Civil society creates in-group bonding more than across-group bridging.483  
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In each case, the political structures offer little hope of escape from dominating power 
relationships for any who belong to groups that are either overpowered or overlooked.  
What is striking about Wolin’s comparison between organizational power 
today and in Machiavelli’s Tuscan landscape is the striking similarity of crisis in the 
constitution of political life. Machiavelli believed the crisis lie not simply in a lack of 
ideas. He understood that preserving the common interest required organizing citizens 
so that they had real-world commitments to preserving the public, and that this had to 
be done through habits and public practices as well as well-reasoned values. Because 
Machiavelli lived in a time and place devoid of a vision of the political, he had a 
healthy perspective on the costs involved in rebuilding and protecting a new one. 
With so many political theorists, be it Wolin’s account of organizational “postmodern 
democracy,” or what Benjamin Barber calls “thin democracy,” or what Jeffrey Isaac 
calls “democracy in dark times,” it is no accident why a “republican revival” with a 
set of concerns that parallel Machiavelli’s would spring forth in a contemporary 
setting where factional interest again appears threatening to the public world.  
In this setting, the stakes are high, but the solutions need to be small. With 
regards to the stakes, Albert Camus wrote,  
In the age of negation, it was of some avail to examine one’s position concerning 
suicide. In the age of ideologies, we must examine our position in relation to 
murder… It is incumbent upon us, at all events, to give a definite answer to the 
question implicit in the blood and strife of this century.484 
 
 The definitive answer to this question on the Twentieth Century for republican 
thought is that a politics empty of anything but interests restrained by a conception of 
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rights will only be restrained a by a conception of rights in fact when it suits the 
interest of the strong. To address this problem thus requires more than militating for 
an enlarged set of public values alone, as Carol Gould and Seyla Benhabib both argue 
for.485 Further, it might seem paradoxical that the better way to have a conception of 
the public that is supportive of antipower, and inclusive enough to prove resistant to 
the dangers of organizational power, small-scale political action must be given a 
space to survive and flourish. Yet, Micahel Sandel writes that this is exactly the case, 
“the cosmopolitan vision is wrong to suggest that we can restore self-government 
simply by pushing sovereignty and citizenship upward. The hope for self-government 
lies not in relocating self-government, but dispersing it.”486  Public mindedness seems 
best likely to be ensured by, “The joys of public happiness and the responsibilities for 
public business” by the “few from all walks of life who have a taste for public 
freedom and cannot be happy without it.”487  This has to be done in the particular 
world in which citizens actually dwell. It also means that to ensure public happiness, 
we need not all be abortion escorts, or something similar, just belong to a political 
community in which the politics opens up the space for those who would be escorts to 
assert their claim to public happiness through public deeds.     
What we are left with, when we root out the modern dangers of organization 
and systemic thought that does not leave a space for the freedom of individual, novel, 
political action is a highly corruptible structure that offers us no real incentive to 
consider the wider world in any way that really respects others as others. It is only in 
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our ability to appear that we can make our existence in the world particular, 
meaningful, and irreplaceable. It is thus, perhaps a bit paradoxically, only when we 
have a political order that allows for spontaneous, unstructured action that is 
disruptive to the predictable workings of the order that creates it, that we can contain 
maintain a sense of collective meaningfulness. Creating public space prevents larger 
institutional arrangements from running so afoul, so entirely dependent on the idea of 
“who you are is what you join,” that someone like Eichmann can make the decisions 
that, “he might have still preferred—if anybody had asked him—to be hanged as 
Obersturmbanführer a.D. (in retirement) rather than living out his life quietly and 
normally as a traveling salesman for the Vacuum Oil Company.”488   
It must surely seem a stretch to move from a few people who come out and 
walk side-by-side with people waling into an abortion clinic to the Vietnam War and 
the Holocaust. The scales of the stories seem to have an almost infinite distance 
between them. Nevertheless, they are, if one is to take Arendt’s theorizing on these 
stories seriously, important stories of contrast. What US policymaking in regards to 
the Vietnam War and the bureaucratized battle between careerists to commit mass-
murder in Nazi Germany lack, abortion clinic escorts and protestors both possess: a 
respect for operating inside of reasonable boundaries that promotes freedom and 
allows for open contestation. What is funny is that both escorts and protestors evoked 
Nazi characterizations of the other while I was observing at the clinic. Protestors 
frequently compare abortion to the Holocaust directly and refer to escorts as 
“deathscorts.”  The term “fascists” came up on occasion when escorts would talk 
about how they felt about abortion protestors and the political points of view they 
                                                




ascribed to them. Yet it is the toleration of one another, in deed perhaps well more 
than in thought, that makes neither side anything like the fascists whatsoever.  
Those gathered outside of the abortion clinic, no matter which side of the 
argument we are talking about, are not like Eichmann and they are not even like the 
problem-solvers of the Kennedy and Johnson administrations. They are not willing to 
do whatever it takes to make their beliefs real, because when protestors and escorts 
both appear outside of the abortion clinic, both are forced to appear as citizens first 
and foremost. Stephen Macedo wrote in Liberal Virtues that liberal society does not 
allow for “real Nazis” because, “The liberal polity requires that Nazis be law-abiding 
Nazis and that is not easy. They cannot be ‘gung-ho’ Nazis, in fact they cannot be 
Nazis at all but only play at it.”489  Escorts and protestors, whatever flaws one might 
think they possess or whatever one might read into them as standing for, this much is 
certain: they are both interested in engaging in a form of contestation that has limits. 
However, the comments made about one another and the reported actions of 
protestors when escorts are not around indicates that this commitment to limits is 
ultimately not resting in an enlarged mentality or a sense of either fairness or 
solidarity that is constructed from an epistemic construction of a moral point of view.  
Instead, it is derived from the fact of contestation itself. The practice of legal 
abortions makes the appearance of protesters possible. The appearance of protestors 
makes the appearance of abortion escorts possible. The most important overlapping 
consensus at work is the acknowledgment, however grudgingly, that all parties have 
the right to appear and contest in the first place. Even this acknowledgment is likely 
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to be rooted only as firmly as it is simply because how one feels about the other’s 
right to contest does little to change the fact that they possess such a capacity in the 
first place.  
Calling this situation a “Hobbesian truce” fails to do it justice. Pettit, Arendt, 
Madison, Montesquieu – all of these theorists argue that the disbursement of the 
power and capacity to resist domination is, somewhat paradoxically, empowering. 
The reasons for this have been traced above, but what stands equally as important is 
the ability to point to the politics outside of the abortion clinic and say, “here it is.”  
Here are the “local freedoms of every kind” that Tocqueville sees in America.490  
Here is a Camus-like resistance where the common answer for what escorts believed 
they were standing for was Camus-like “common decency,” which one of Camus’ 
characters defined by saying, “I don’t know what it means for other people. But in my 
case I know that it consists in doing my job.”491  Here are the signs of a vision of 
politics that Jeffrey Isaac writes of approvingly about Arendt and Camus,  “one that 
refuses to privilege any form of human authority and that values chronic contestation 
in public life.”492  What strikes Robert Putnam as a tragic scene of 
incommensurability may actually be the very signs of life democratic theorists ought 
to be searching for.  
This does not make abortion escorting the essential, foundational bedrock of 
human freedom, or some other exaggerated claim with regards to its significance. 
Abortion escorts represent but one, fugitive instance of political action. Its singularity, 
and its minimal impact on the grand scheme of things are not in dispute. What 
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remains highly disputable is to think that such facts necessarily imply that such 
activity is beneath the notice of democratic theory. The prevailing academic attitude 
is one where somehow abortion escorting must either be jammed awkwardly into a 
pre-existing canon of political thought or it will have no place in the canon at all – 
just like the iconoclastic theorists who would dare to take notice. The dismissive 
shrug of Seyla Benhabib when she assures us that Arendt and Barber are not our 
concern is not her making an argument – it is giving us permission to ignore. In more 
mainstream criticisms of Arendt, the way this permission is usually given by 
questioning her loyalties to her ethnic heritage given her more controversial writings 
and her relationship with Martin Heidegger.493  The philosopher’s version is to call 
her a phenomenologist.  
Yet, for all of the resistance to the worthiness of political action as a 
noteworthy topic of inquiry, there are many of what Arendt was fond of calling 
“stubborn facts” that still seem to get in the way. The “republican revival” seems to 
be a trend in political theory that is growing and, acknowledged or not, there are still 
people using their capacity to act out their on the sidewalks practically every Saturday 
morning, occasionally on Wednesday’s and on whatever day that the anniversary of 
the Roe v. Wade decision happens to fall on that particular year. Regardless of the 
meaning that political theorists wish to imbue on such actions, they are out there and 
they are still taking place, in this form and others. They serve as a reminder of what 
might be an important piece of the core of democratic politics – and they remain as 
such as long as we choose to see it.  
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